The so-called 1/11 episode-marked by the military-backed caretaker government takeover on 11 January, 2007-did not emerge suddenly.
It was the culmination of a year-long political impasse in 2006, driven by deep mistrust and a zero-sum power struggle between Khaleda Zia’s ruling BNP and Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League.
At the heart of the crisis was the constitutional provision requiring elections to be held under a neutral caretaker government. As the BNP’s tenure neared its end in late 2006, the opposition Awami League grew increasingly distrustful of the process, alleging that the ruling party had manipulated state institutions to ensure electoral advantage.
The controversy centered on the appointment of the Chief Adviser, head of the neutral caretaker government for conducting a free, fair and credible election. By convention, the role was to be filled by the most recently retired Chief Justice.
However, when the then Chief Justice KM Hasan was slated for the role, Awami League and its allies rejected the move outright, alleging him politically aligned with the BNP.
This disagreement triggered a wave of street agitation. Throughout October 2006, Dhaka and other parts of the country witnessed hartals (strikes), blockades, and violent clashes between rival political activists, leaving scores dead and injured.
BNP insisted on adhering to constitutional procedures, while Awami League demanded electoral reforms, including a reconstituted Election Commission and a “neutral” caretaker leadership acceptable to all parties.
Amid mounting unrest, President Iajuddin Ahmed assumed the role of Chief Adviser himself after KM Hasan declined the position. This move deepened the crisis.
The opposition viewed Iajuddin as partisan, given his proximity to the BNP. The Election Commission, led by M A Aziz, also came under intense criticism for alleged voter list irregularities, including claims of millions of “ghost voters.”
By late 2006, the political environment had become highly volatile. Awami League announced a boycott of the scheduled January 2007 elections, arguing that free and fair polls were impossible under the prevailing conditions. With major opposition parties withdrawing, the legitimacy of the electoral process collapsed.
International observers and donors signaled concern, warning that an uncontested election would undermine democratic credibility.
The situation reached a tipping point in early January 2007. Escalating violence, administrative paralysis, and fears of widespread electoral fraud created a national crisis. On 11 January 2007, under pressure from the military and amid growing public anxiety, President Iajuddin Ahmed declared a state of emergency, postponed the elections, and stepped down as Chief Adviser.
A new, military-backed caretaker government was installed, led by Fakhruddin Ahmed. Aided by the then Army Chief Moin Uddin Ahmed, the regime pledged to restore order, reform institutions, and hold credible elections.
However, it also ushered in an extended period of extra-political intervention, with key political leaders, including Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, facing arrest during anti-corruption drives.
In essence, the 1/11 episode was the product of institutional fragility and entrenched political wrangling. BNP and Awami League’s inability to reach consensus on electoral rules transformed routine political transition into systemic breakdown.
The events of 2006 thus underscore how mistrust, when combined with weak institutions, can open the door to non-democratic interventions—even within a formally constitutional framework.
