In 2013, Bangladesh made history as the first Asian country to approve and release a genetically engineered food crop. More than a decade later, Bt brinjal remains far from mainstream adoption. What happened?
In 2013, Bangladesh approved and released Bt brinjal – an eggplant engineered to resist the fruit and shoot borer (FSB), one of the crop’s most damaging pests. The technology offered a practical solution to a practical problem: protecting brinjal from insect damage while potentially reducing farmers’ dependence on insecticides.
Studies and field experiences have documented the technology’s effectiveness and potential benefits. Yet after its initial release and extension efforts, the momentum largely stalled.
The reasons are not entirely clear, but several factors stand out. First, Bangladesh did not offer enough choice to farmers. Only four Bt brinjal varieties were released, and eventually only one gained significant popularity. That is a serious limitation in a country where brinjal comes in a remarkable range of shapes, colours, sizes and tastes. Consumers in northern Bangladesh may prefer long, slender purple varieties, while parts of the south and southwest favour round, green brinjal. Farmers ultimately grow what consumers want to buy. A technology can solve a pest problem, but if the variety does not meet local market preferences, adoption will remain limited.
Second, the technology was poorly communicated. Farmers, consumers, journalists and policymakers needed sustained, accessible information about what Bt brinjal was, what it was designed to do, how it was assessed and what the evidence showed. Instead, the GMO debate often became a simplistic argument between supporters and opponents. But communication about an approved agricultural technology cannot depend permanently on donor-funded projects. The public agricultural extension system must eventually own the conversation. Third, regulation has created another bottleneck. Bangladesh’s system has generally required approval at the variety level. Consequently, introducing the same GM trait into additional locally preferred varieties can require substantial regulatory work. Strong biosafety oversight is essential, but a regulatory system should also allow responsible innovation to progress efficiently.
Fourth, institutional continuity has been weak. Members of technical committees and government officials frequently change or are transferred. People who have received years of training and orientation on biotechnology may leave their positions, taking valuable institutional knowledge with them. Fifth, the communication imbalance is real. Critics of GM technology have often communicated effectively their concerns to policymakers and senior officials. Scientists and product developers have not always been equally effective at explaining the evidence, benefits and limitations of the technology outside scientific circles. That does not mean dismissing criticism. Independent scrutiny is essential. But policymakers need access to the complete evidence base – not simply the most effectively communicated narrative. There is also a basic economic reality: farmers are running businesses.
Farmers want high yields, market demand, affordable seed and reliable returns. Bt brinjal varieties released in Bangladesh were inbred, while many farmers prefer high-yielding hybrids. A farmer may therefore choose a conventional hybrid even if pest control requires considerably more pesticide. For biotechnology to succeed, it must solve both the biological and economic problems facing farmers.
The private sector has also had limited incentives to invest in GM brinjal. Seed companies already have established businesses around conventional and hybrid varieties, while agrochemical companies benefit from pesticide sales. Without a clear commercial pathway, investment in additional Bt varieties and their distribution remains difficult.
Finally, there is the donor-dependency problem. Much of Bangladesh’s agricultural biotechnology development has relied on externally funded projects. When projects end, who develops the next variety? Who supports regulatory work, extension, farmer training and public communication? There is no clear answer.
This is not simply a Bt brinjal problem. It reflects a broader weakness in Bangladesh’s agricultural innovation system. Bangladesh has demonstrated that it can develop and regulate agricultural biotechnology. BARI has worked on Bt brinjal and late-blight-resistant potato; BRRI has worked on Golden Rice; and the Cotton Development Board has been involved in Bt cotton research. Yet scientific achievement alone does not guarantee adoption.
So, was Bt brinjal a failure? Perhaps the more useful question is whether the system around the technology failed to deliver its full potential. Bangladesh was bold enough to become Asia’s first country to release a GM food crop. The next challenge is to build an innovation system where promising technologies do not stop at regulatory approval. That means better varieties, predictable regulation, stronger extension, better science communication, independent research, private-sector participation, domestic investment and institutional continuity.
Most importantly, farmers should have access to credible evidence and suitable choices so that they – not politics, ideology or misinformation – can decide whether a technology works for them. Bangladesh pioneered Bt brinjal in 2013. The unfinished question is whether we can build the system needed to ensure that agricultural innovation actually reaches the farmers for whom it was developed.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author
The writer is the Executive Director of Farming Future Bangladesh, and the Regional Head of Asia at WePlanet International. Email: [email protected]
