“Time is running out.”
At 9:26am on 25 February, the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) sent the warning to Dhaka, saying the information Bangladesh had provided was unlikely to justify keeping $25 million frozen for much longer.
The money was held in the name of Mohammad Showkat Ali Chowdhury, then chairman of Eastern Bank and a shipbreaking businessman. The NCA had temporarily frozen the funds in an account at UBS AG bank’s London branch. The amount was worth more than Tk306 crore.
The agency had already told the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) what it needed to keep the money frozen: which agency was investigating Showkat, what offences he was suspected of, how far the investigation had progressed and how the alleged crimes were linked to the $25 million.
It also asked whether Bangladesh could submit an effective mutual legal assistance (MLA) request within two months.
But the response sent from Dhaka at 1:13pm that day exposed serious gaps in Bangladesh’s preparedness.
BFIU told the UK that Showkat’s bank accounts in Bangladesh had been frozen on 1 July 2025, but the freeze had not been extended beyond 29 August.
It also said that although the National Board of Revenue (NBR), Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) were separately working on matters involving him, none had seized any of his assets.
Two days later, on 27 February, the UK informed Bangladesh that the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre would not proceed further. It said Bangladesh could approach it again if stronger allegations could later be established.
Banking and intelligence records show that the money was released soon afterwards and moved to the United Arab Emirates.
With that, Bangladesh lost what could have been its first real opportunity since the establishment of BFIU to recover a major sum from abroad.
A TIMES investigation found that Bangladesh had opportunities to provide the legal groundwork and information the UK wanted, but key steps were not taken in time.
The freeze on Showkat’s domestic accounts was not extended. No move progressed through CID or ACC to seek court-ordered seizure of his assets. The legal grounds later presented to the UK to connect the money with alleged offences emerged only after the funds had been released.
The investigation also uncovered evidence of multimillion-taka “packages” allegedly offered using the name of the BFIU head to have frozen bank accounts reopened, as well as claims that an internal syndicate was suppressing files and blocking cases.
The findings are based on confidential intelligence reports, internal documents, emails and NBR records involving NCA, UK Financial Intelligence Unit and BFIU.
According to the government’s white paper, around $234 billion was siphoned out of Bangladesh over the previous 15 years – about seven times the country’s total foreign exchange reserves. Recovering such money is the responsibility of Stolen Asset Recovery Task Force led by BFIU.
Warning from London
The first formal intelligence alert over the $25 million reached Dhaka on 10 February, a day after NCA prepared its report.
It provided details of the UBS AG London account in Showkat’s name and asked whether he was under investigation in Bangladesh and whether Dhaka wanted further assistance.
Showkat, however, was already known to BFIU.
More than a year earlier, on 28 January 2025, the agency had begun examining transactions involving him and members of his family after receiving a suspicious transaction report from Meghna Bank.
His bank accounts were frozen on 1 July 2025, but the restriction was allowed to lapse after 29 August.
On 18 February, BFIU told the UK that Showkat was a “person of interest” and asked it to keep the $25 million frozen.
NCA then asked why his accounts in Bangladesh were no longer frozen and why no assets had been seized.
Under existing law, BFIU could have kept the accounts frozen for another five months.
If a longer freeze was needed, CID or ACC could also have gone to court.
Action came after release
BFIU stepped up its response only after the UK said on 27 February that it would not proceed further.
On 10 March, it told the UK that Showkat was being investigated over alleged trade-based money laundering involving imports of old ships through shell companies registered in offshore jurisdictions, including the British Virgin Islands.
It again asked for the money to remain frozen.
On 15 March, NBR imposed a tax demand and penalty of Tk306.87 crore on Showkat, equivalent to $25 million at the exchange rate at the time.
Two days later, BFIU presented that penalty to the UK as a basis for Bangladesh’s claim over the funds and sought help in keeping the money frozen and returning it to the country.
The agency also said an investigation had begun into alleged violations of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act because Showkat had no approval to transfer or invest money abroad.
These were the kinds of legal grounds and links to suspected offences the UK had asked for in February.
Dhaka presented them after the money had already slipped beyond reach.
What Bangladesh could have done
TIMES asked three former senior BFIU officials, all speaking on condition of anonymity, to independently review the confidential intelligence reports, emails and internal records.
Their assessments were broadly similar.
They said UK restrictions on sharing the intelligence report with another agency or presenting it before a court did not prevent Bangladesh from conducting its own investigation or taking domestic legal action.
They said Bangladesh could have refrozen Showkat’s accounts, advanced CID or ACC inquiries and sought court orders to seize assets.
That, they argued, would have strengthened Bangladesh’s position with the UK and helped create the basis for an MLA request.
Barrister Rizwan Siddique, after reviewing the documents, said, “If the Bangladeshi agencies had played an effective role, there was an opportunity to extend the freeze on this money.”
Questions over BFIU officials
Evidence reviewed by TIMES shows that key decisions in Showkat’s case were being taken by BFIU Head Iqtiaruddin Md Mamun and Operations Analysis Wing Additional Director Kamrul Hasan Azad.
Policy Wing Deputy Director Fuara Khatun handled the email exchanges with the UK on their instructions.
Mamun and Azad were also involved in decisions during the critical four-hour period on 25 February.
Azad had earlier led BFIU inquiry into Showkat.
Although that investigation was completed in September 2025, TIMES found no evidence that the report was sent to CID or ACC.
The report also did not include information about Showkat obtaining a St Kitts and Nevis passport through investment or owning luxury property in Singapore, although documents relating to those matters had reached Azad during the investigation.
These issues have raised questions over the roles of Mamun and Azad.
TIMES could not establish whether either had received any benefit from Showkat.
The investigation, however, uncovered what appeared to be a wider pattern involving attempts to secure payments in exchange for lifting account freezes.
Evidence reviewed by TIMES indicates that information about BFIU decisions to freeze bank accounts was reaching Shoayeb Md Muntasir Morshed, a nephew of the agency chief.
He then contacted people whose accounts had been frozen and proposed financial “packages” to have the restrictions lifted.
At this reporter’s request, two businessmen contacted Muntasir and recorded their conversations. TIMES verified the recordings.
In the recordings, Muntasir can be heard referring to Mamun while asking for Tk2 crore to Tk2.5 crore in advance and a quarter of the money held in the accounts after the funds were released.
He also offered to arrange a private meeting with the BFIU chief if the advance was paid.
The investigation could not proceed further because he would not arrange the meeting without advance payment.
When contacted through WhatsApp for comments on the matter, BFIU Head Iqtiaruddin Md Mamun asked for evidence supporting the allegations. However, after being informed that the audio recordings could not be shared to protect the source’s security, he declined to comment.
Within a minute of the questions being sent to the BFIU chief via WhatsApp, his nephew Muntasir phoned this correspondent. He initially denied the allegations, but after being informed about the recordings, he requested that the matter be “looked at softly”.
Several former BFIU officials also told TIMES that an internal “syndicate” controls which information is shared, how far cases are allowed to proceed and what responses are sent to foreign agencies.
An internal audit obtained by TIMES also referred to such concerns.
It showed that, besides Azad, the group included an additional director of Monitoring Wing-1 and a joint director who had spent 12 years in the Policy Wing.
Most of the others identified had also been at the agency for long periods, although rules do not allow officials to remain there for more than five years.
Of the BFIU’s 75 officials, at least eight have been at the agency for between five and 12 years.
TIMES found that dozens of cases, in addition to Showkat’s, had not reached a final legal stage despite investigations having been completed.
Reports were not sent to CID or ACC for possible money laundering or corruption action.
BFIU has previously faced allegations involving senior officials.
The official Mamun replaced was dismissed over financial and ethical misconduct. The chief before him has been in prison since January 2025 over allegations of financial crimes.
Mamun denied that a syndicate operated within BFIU.
“These are the people who carry out the unit’s important work. So there is no scope to remove them,” he said.
How the files reached NBR
NCA intelligence report carried restrictions on onward disclosure, but documents from the case nevertheless reached NBR.
Mamun gave conflicting explanations about how that happened.
During a meeting with this reporter at his office between 1:42pm and 2:54pm on 13 July, he said he had personally taken the file to NBR.
TIMES later obtained from NBR copies of emails exchanged among NCA, UK FIU and BFIU.
But during a third discussion at his office at 2:30pm on 3 August, Mamun denied having sent the documents to the tax authority.
That raised another question: if the information could be shared with NBR, why was it not shared with CID or ACC?
NBR used the material to raise a tax demand and impose a penalty.
A CID or ACC investigation, by contrast, could potentially have established links to money laundering or corruption and opened the way for court-ordered seizure of assets through criminal proceedings.
Asked why Bangladesh had lost such a rare opportunity to bring money back from abroad, Mamun rejected that characterisation.
“We did not lose this money,” he told TIMES.
“An equivalent amount has been secured because NBR imposed a penalty. Even if the money does not return, the country’s interests have been protected through recovery of the penalty.”
He also said legal action had been constrained by UK restrictions.
“This intelligence document could not be shared anywhere because the UK did not allow us to do so,” he said. “We repeatedly sought permission, but the UK did not grant it.”
