The July Uprising sprung from grievances arising from misrule in key sectors including – education and employment. But its true underpinning lay in Bangladesh’s external relations – relations with its closest and biggest neighbour – India. The Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina adopted an India-centric stance. While maintaining stability, making eye-catching developmental strides, the AL government pursued a foreign policy where India’s interest dominated often at the expense of that of Bangladesh. India clearly invested in the person of the former Prime Minister which returned huge dividends. In the name of policy, a commensurate narrative transcended almost all spheres of life in Bangladesh. This was so brazen that institutions and bureaucracy fell in line and became partisan tools of governance melted into unabashed authoritarianism.
With the fall of the government of Sheikh Hasina, relations with India almost overnight transformed into what could now be described as ‘strained’ at the least. India’s reaction to the ouster of such a trusted ally was found to unmistakably reflect in significant non-cooperation with the Interim Government (IG). Because of the international stature of its Chief Advisor Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, the Interim Government quickly gained trust of most international leaders. Though that did not leave much scope for India to undermine the new government, he was targeted from the word go in Indian media and in some ways in its official pronouncements. The people of Bangladesh are upset as India’s undeniable role in the war of liberation has been abused politically for a long time to achieve dividends often undermining their national interest. All these and other related factors combined to create a condition which does not inspire confidence rather engender and entrench instability.
Neighbourly relations do not wither away to nothingness, they may wilt under difficult conditions but with re-establishment of mutuality of interest and good will, can be rejuvenated. No doubt, the path forward is murky. At the same time, it is hard to disagree with the need to find opportunities, identify challenges and adopt a constructive, mutually beneficial approach. The critical need for fostering mutual trust and engaging in open, constructive dialogue as a means to overcome the existing uncomfortable status quo and unlock the full potential of Bangladesh-India bilateral cooperation is irrefutable. That said, it is clear that the tone and tenor of relations between the two close neighbours have significantly changed after 5 August 2024, a reality that cannot be lost sight of.
The IG is preoccupied with a heavy domestic agenda driven by ongoing initiative for institutional and legal reforms, justice to victims of previous government’s unjust and violent deprivation of rights, restoring economic stability and to create conditions to hold a free and fair general election in about two months. That may not leave the time and resources necessary for the government to embark on the task of rebuilding relations with India. A question, therefore, arises – whether installation of an elected political government in Dhaka after the February elections would provide an opportunity for both sides to work on bringing relations back on track. This assumes high importance given the toll taken on bilateral relations by measures and countermeasures taken by India and Bangladesh restricting trade and other connectivity.
The ethos that inspired the July uprising and its popular expression in the aftermath was instrumental in critically viewing the Bangladesh foreign policy dictum of ‘friendship to all and malice towards none’ particularly in the context of relations with India. The recent outsized strategic interest of other more important powers in South Asia makes matters even more complicated. To grasp the geopolitical competition in South Asia and the challenge Bangladesh faces, it is essential to consider several key aspects:
First, India’s perception of what is called China’s encirclement strategy. Second, how Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) impacts on the region’s power dynamics. Third, the strength of Indo-U.S. security partnership, the formation of QUAD and the recent 10-year Defence Framework Agreement. And fourth, how Dhaka positions itself on the geopolitical competition among major powers.
All of this embodies the common challenge that runs through Bangladesh’s relations with the three countries. It is reflected in China’s decade old trillion dollar initiative BRI and its impact on smaller South Asian nations, all of which have had relations of dependency of varying degree with India. BRI is dedicated to closely interweave economies of partner countries with China’s. In case of Bangladesh, notable in this regard is the Chinese claim that about 600000 jobs have been generated through BRI related projects. From 2019 to 2023, roughly 72 per cent of Bangladesh’s arms imports originated from China, accounting for 11 per cent of Beijing’s total global arms exports during that period.
On the other hand, over the last few decades, India sought and succeeded to forge special relationship with Bangladesh as manifested by a burgeoning bilateral trade, power and other connectivity infrastructure collaboration and so on. India’s response to the uprising put a spanner in this relationship. As a result, it seems to have lost its unique hegemonic power in the region, as it has been unable to meet the economic and military demands of its neighbours. Relations between China and Bangladesh are visibly on the upswing. A question then stirs the mind – if this is a consequence of the downturn in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Interestingly, recent improvement (deemed as a ‘tactical reset’) in Indo-China relations led some analysts to believe that any downturn in Indo-Bangladesh relations would not augur well for China’s economic and trade centric initiatives in Bangladesh.
Every crisis offers scope to look for opportunities. Until an elected government takes charge after elections are held in Bangladesh, relations between the two countries are likely to remain politically difficult. Though before and after the International Criminal Tribunal in Bangladesh pronounced the death sentence against Sheikh Hasina, her sojourn and activities in India continued to substantially vitiate ambience, it is possible to be hopeful for a re-engagement. At the critical juncture of Indo-Bangladesh relations, both sides should try to explore quiet engagement opportunities.
A careful approach should be adopted by initiating low key steps, primarily to continue cooperation in areas where sensitive issues are not involved. Some examples from the recent past – New Delhi recently provided medical support for burn victims in the tragic air crash in Dhaka. Earlier, Dhaka had resorted to ‘mango diplomacy’, allowed export of hilsa fish during the last Durga Puja and leaders of both countries exchanged Eid greetings. This was thought to bring thaw in an otherwise frosty year. But the challenge remains in that India not just waits for political stability in Dhaka, but adapts to the change in Bangladesh and the people’s choice both in August last year and in the upcoming elections. On 17 September last year, some encouraging pronouncement augured well when, Indian EAM Jaishankar reportedly told the media that “the political churn in Bangladesh is that country’s internal matter” but India is keen to continue what was a stable relationship, underlining the maxim that neighbouring nations are “dependent on each other”. More recently, Bangladesh Foreign Affairs Adviser said while responding to a question at a press meet, “Since she (Hasina) is convicted, we surely want her extradition to implement the punishment. I do not think other issues will get stuck for this (Hasina) issue”.
If this tone and tenor is anything to go by, in the interest of ‘functional connectivity’, following may be considered:
Focus on low-visibility, high-impact connectivity projects
The extension of the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline which can be restarted due to stalling due to political unrest. Resumption of freight train services and similar trade facilitation and logistic support measures that can be undertaken in the interest of increasing bilateral trade. The first trilateral power transaction inaugurated in November 2024 and ran from Nepal to Bangladesh via the Indian Grid. Finally, taking incremental steps towards formalizing the Trilateral (Bangladesh-India-Bhutan) Cooperation in Hydropower. Strengthening such energy partnerships can enhance regional energy security and serve as a mutually beneficial pathway.
India could engage in cooperation with Bangladesh by joining other countries
Re-orienting development matrix to co-financing projects with like-minded or other willing countries as well as partners that may otherwise be competitors would augur well. For example, Japan’s very important investment foot print in Matarbari port can be significant in pushing forward bilateral functional stake. Similar ventures are possible and can continue in areas like digital infrastructure and health. Even consortium financing including India and China among other investors already present in Bangladesh may be considered as a good way to diversify investment sourcing.
Strengthen people-to-people contact and development assistance
India has funded over 90 High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDPs) so far worth over USD 50 million that includes the construction of student hostels, academic buildings, cultural centres, orphanages, and others. Additionally, Border Haats between India and Bangladesh need to be restarted. The imperative to undertake such projects is more now when India needs to find ways to reengage with Dhaka. Also, enhance budget support to training programmes for civil service and judiciary officers and scholarship for Bangladeshi students.
Para diplomacy, sub-national engagements
Due to geographical proximity, linguistic and cultural similarities between Kolkata and Tripura on one hand and Assam on the other, collaborative efforts on mutually beneficial projects may be explored through track II initiatives with support from Indian and Bangladesh authorities.
Given the political tension, difficult messaging and lack of trust generated by recent events, both India and Bangladesh would continue to be wary of official engagements on sensitive issues. But it should be opportune to use the interim period till elections in Bangladesh, to take preparatory steps and keep the efforts away from spotlight. In the absence of any forward movement in relations, wouldn’t track II provide appropriate mode of engagement? However, even in track II mode, good will, quiet diplomacy, competency and focus will need to be ensured through some mechanism.
Bangladesh will need to be close to India to cooperate for mutual benefit in proven areas, but should be open to China in order to take advantage from an alternative source of support. Yet, with astute diplomacy that is needed to do so, Bangladesh has to be able to decline any overture when national interest demands it.
A forward-looking relationship between Bangladesh and India should embrace equity, mutual respect and justness. It must transition from the polemic to the factual and should place importance on re-building trust as stakeholders looking to benefit mutually through re-vamped bilateral diplomacy including engagement in regional forums. In terms of dealing with close neighbours with substantial stake, care must be taken to prevent it from appearing ‘distant and aloof’. That seems to be the recipe to move on.
(The views expressed in this article are the author’s own)
The writer is a former Ambassador
