For many Western economists and scholars, BRICS used to be little more than a clever acronym. Today, its demographic presence makes it a major player in world politics. The 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi may well be another landmark in a transformation that has quietly been underway for more than two decades toward a new economic and political order. This bloc is more plural, more multi-centred, and less dominated by the West. The journey began in 2001, when Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs coined the term ‘BRIC’ for Brazil, Russia, India, and China. He thought these four large emerging economies were already important to the world. The first summit took place in 2009. In 2011, South Africa became the fifth member, making BRICS what we know today. In 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE joined. A year later, Indonesia joined. According to Reuters, BRICS membership has grown not only in number but also in demographic and geopolitical presence.
The BRICS countries have a combined population of 3.9 billion people. The G7 accounts for less than 10 percent. Though demography alone doesn’t provide geopolitical power, a group comprising billions of people has an argument that cannot be ignored: markets, labour, consumption, and growing metropolitan areas. Further economic analysis makes this comparison even more interesting. In terms of purchasing power parity, BRICS collectively accounts for around two-fifths of the world’s total PPP and has outperformed the G7. China and India play big roles in this performance. China is an industrial and trade superpower, and India is one of the world’s fastest-growing and largest economies.
This does not mean BRICS has defeated the G7 in every metric. On market exchange rates, the G7 remains economically strong. The United States has the most financial power. The dollar remains the primary currency held in reserve by other countries. Western financial markets are also the preferred destination for most of the world’s capital. The G7 countries also have a significantly higher average income. However, it no longer has uncontested economic power in the world. The world’s economic structure is changing. Many trade indicators make this geographic shift visible. BRICS accounts for about 25 percent of global trade, and trade within BRICS has grown tremendously. More importantly, the trade growth has built a bloc of increasingly complementary economic assets. In 2030, the Global South will be the world’s most influential group, and most Western-led blocs will suffer heavily.
China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Iran, the UAE, and Egypt combined produce massive amounts of manufacturing, raw materials, technology, and services, and house a massive consumer market. China has titanic manufacturing potential. India offers a massive potential market, plus services and technology. Russia produces vast amounts of energy and raw materials. Brazil produces mass agriculture. South Africa has vital minerals and financial services. Indonesia combines an enormous consumer market and commodity resources. Iran and the UAE provide energy resources. Egypt controls an international trade route on the Suez Canal. Collectively, these countries have manufacturing, services, and technology capacity, as well as raw materials, agriculture, and a variety of resources. They also control a massive consumer market.
The combination of the countries involved matters because twenty-first-century power is not about GDP. It is about energy, food, minerals, manufacturing capacity, and technological power. It is about supply-chain links, markets, and population size. The new grouping includes some of the biggest producers and consumers of oil, gas, and coal. Some of the biggest suppliers of minerals for batteries, renewable energy, and electronics are also in this grouping. In a world where governments talk more about ‘economic security’, control of resources and supply chains has become part of geopolitics. BRICS has shown it wants to create new institutions instead of just criticising existing ones. One of the most important is the New Development Bank, established in 2015. Since then, the bank has approved billions of dollars for infrastructure and sustainable development.
The same is true with the discussions about currencies and payment systems. The dramatic forecasts of a common ‘BRICS currency’ in the near future overestimate what the group is really working toward. A more realistic development is the gradual expansion of trade settlement in national currencies, increasing local-currency lending, and work to improve cross-border payment systems. However, it will take a long time for the dollar to leave international trade finance. Its dominance stems from the depth of US capital markets, the size of the US economy, the liquidity of dollar-denominated assets, and decades of institutional confidence. If a growing share of trade among major developing countries can be conducted without using the dollar, gradual adoption could shape global financial architecture in the future. Russia now settles close to 95% of its trade with India and close to 99% of its trade with China in national currencies, not dollars. But there is still no evidence of a block-wide exit.
However, Western attitudes toward the Global South, particularly the continued reliance on economic sanctions and hegemonic policies, may ultimately prove counterproductive. Rather than reinforcing Western economic and geopolitical dominance, such approaches could accelerate the movement toward de-dollarisation as emerging economies seek greater monetary and financial autonomy. If this trend continues, it could gradually weaken the US dollar’s international position and reshape the global financial architecture. Europe, meanwhile, may face particularly serious economic consequences as geopolitical tensions, higher costs, declining competitiveness, and shifting global trade patterns put increasing pressure on its economies. While an outright collapse is not inevitable, the possibility of significant economic decline and a fundamental shift in the global balance of economic power should not be underestimated.
But BRICS is not NATO, nor the European Union. It is not working toward political integration, an integrated defence system, or a system of governance above the nation-state. BRICS members do not need to agree on all geo-strategic matters to keep the institution working. BRICS’s strength may lie in providing a framework for cooperation among countries with different political systems and strategic interests. The argument that developing nations should evolve from ‘rule-takers’ to ‘rule-shapers’ is an insightful framing of the key issues that Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted while addressing the UN General Assembly.
The current world is different from 1945. India and China are now the world’s largest economies. The dynamism of the African continent, its populations, and its economies will be celebrated throughout the twenty-first century. The Gulf region has now become an important hub of finance, investment and logistics. Brazil will remain an important player in international discourses on food, commodities, and climate change. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect that growing and newly dominant powers will seek greater representation in these institutions.
What is more historically significant is that, for many years, Europe and later North America have dominated a significant portion of global economic, financial, and institutional power. The case of BRICS demonstrates that this dominance is beginning to diminish. The New Delhi summit does not signify that a new global hegemon has been crowned. What it signals is that one small part of the globe dominating the institutions of world order is coming to an end. The international order in 50 years will likely not be Western- or BRICS-led. It will likely be more multipolar. BRICS matters because the Global South is no longer content to demand only a seat at someone else’s table. It now wants to help design the table.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author
The writer is a UK-based educator, author, and researcher
