In geopolitics, where ruthless games are devised and played, states must be agile and adaptable, learning from the successes and mistakes of other states. The US war against Iran is one such game from which smaller, weaker states can draw complex security lessons, especially in assessing and recognising the limits of a great power’s ability to assist allies facing threats from rivals.
The US launched military campaigns against Iran to achieve specific objectives; those could have been pursued through diplomacy, but it chose to go to war. Despite being the most powerful nation on Earth, the US is still struggling to attain them. Therefore, the US mission in Iran thus far reveals that power has its limits; as such, being an ally of the US does not ensure a state’s sovereignty or security. One may argue that the US alliance has kept post-war Europe safe for decades, so being a US ally is not always questionable; however, that has not been the case for the Gulf states.
The Gulf states have been staunch US allies for decades. They welcomed US bases in their countries and provided material support for regional security. Moreover, the US has sold them the latest weaponry and trained them to maintain their territorial integrity. Nevertheless, these arrangements could not prevent Iranian attacks. The harsh reality of the US-Iran war is that restoring the Gulf states’ infrastructure, which Iranian attacks have severely damaged, will take billions of dollars and years. The phenomenon highlighted what other US allies might face in the event of a regional conflict between the US and its peer competitor.
In East Asia, Taiwan stands out as the most vulnerable. The fear of a Chinese military invasion to reunite Taiwan with the mainland is a legitimate concern. During his visit to China last month, President Donald Trump explicitly refused to commit to sending troops to fight China over Taiwan’s reunification. By law, the US is obligated to defend Taiwan. Therefore, the tension between Trump’s position on Taiwan and US law is telling; if a state lacks sufficient power of its own, offshore help will not suffice. This is one lesson Taiwanese can draw from being spectators to the US-Iran war game.
The war between Ukraine and Russia is another example. When Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014, the US and other European states vociferously condemned the move. Russia paid no heed. In 2022, it launched a full-scale attack on Ukraine, which is still ongoing. Ukraine has already lost a significant number of military and civilian lives, while Russia, on the contrary, is in no hurry to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict. A winning party in a war rarely does so. Hence, the Ukraine-Russia war will likely be settled on the battlefield or turn into a war of attrition.
The US, by contrast, implies that Ukrainians should accept the loss and move on. The puzzle is: Why was Ukraine relying so heavily on the US in the first place? They believed the US would help them gain membership in both NATO and the European Union. The Biden administration convinced Ukraine to continue fighting Russia and promised unwavering support for the war. Ukrainians accepted that US commitment and carried on with the mission. However, Trump never supported the war and wanted to end it even before he entered office the second time. Now, Ukrainians are caught in a tough spot as US support for the war is waning.
Lastly, the smaller NATO countries bordering Russia are in a quandary. The recent Russian drone incursion over the Baltic states is a worrisome development. Greenland, part of Denmark, was threatened with a US invasion to take the island if necessary. While Article 5 of NATO stipulates that an attack on one member is an attack on all, it’s hard to predict whether NATO would come to the aid of smaller countries if they were attacked. Therefore, smaller NATO states should carefully observe how the US ends the war with Iran and on what terms, as they may one day face a similar situation.
The Trump administration has begun to recognise that the US no longer has the gravitas to end conflicts as it wishes or to prevent others from attacking its allies. Nonetheless, the Gulf states either did not believe in or preferred to remain in denial about the limitations of US power, and that arrogance led to their countries being attacked by Iran. They could have sought to diversify their security support with other countries.
Iran has long been a pariah in geopolitics and is often described by the West as a rogue state intent on wiping Israel off the map and threatening US interests in the region. Therefore, Iran is the only obstacle to US-Israeli hegemony in the region. If Iran is sufficiently damaged and denied the opportunity to develop nuclear weapons, Israel, especially, will be able to dominate the region unchallenged. The counterargument to this claim is that if the US had not attacked Iran, Iran would have dominated the region. This is one of the salient objectives for which the US started the war against Iran.
On the other hand, Iran has fortified its defenses with conventional military hardware to withstand US-Israeli attacks, but those measures proved insufficient. Hence, Iran might now resort to developing nuclear weapons to protect itself from future foreign aggression. At the same time, Iran’s resilience, counterattack capabilities, and the prospect of becoming a nuclear power might prompt the Gulf states to reassess which allies would be more suitable for them.
Since the US has been unable to safeguard them, perhaps a regional security alliance could reduce the risks. The Gulf states should carefully weigh these critical points to ensure stability and peace in their backyards. They should also recognise the limitations of what their allies can offer. Other states can draw on the US-Iran war to inform and prepare their own security paradigms.
The writer is a Doctoral Researcher, International Relations, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM)
