Efficient use of public money is no longer merely a procurement issue; it is a national development imperative. Prevailing corruption and collusion in public procurement offset the development programme. Corruption in Bangladeshi public procurement is very common scenario of bribes and irregular payments in the process of awarding government contracts are perceived as extremely example in the Global Competitive Index (GCR 2015-2016). The practice of Nepotism, fraud, and bribery in the awarding of contracts is very common (TI, 2015).
A recent study of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has found that state procurement is held hostage to monopolistic contractors who dominate the system through collusion, political influence, market capture and inflated project budgets
Public procurement accounts for about $30 billion annually, making up roughly 45% of the national budget and 85% of the Annual Development Programme. Because so much money is involved, the sector remains highly vulnerable to illegal practices.
The study also shows that in the Ministry of Housing and Public Works, the top 5 percent of contractors control nearly 75 percent of the total project value. In the Road Transport and Highways Department, 11 percent of contractors control a staggering 93.55 percent of the total project value. These illegally framed monopolistic practices not only reduce competition but also inflate costs, compromise project quality, and limit opportunities for new contractors. Every unnecessary loss of funds through corruption, bid rigging, collusion, inflated prices, or weak procurement means fewer resources for infrastructure, education, healthcare, industrialisation, skills, and employment creation.
In practice, private firms collude to manipulate bids while public officials facilitate the arrangement through bribery, abuse of office, information leakage or procurement manipulation. Global experiences demonstrate the danger of procurement cartels becoming embedded within the procurement administration itself. When officials facilitate, protect, or participate in collusion, competition law enforcement alone may be insufficient to protect public funds. A proven example of collusion between government officials and businesspersons in Bangladesh.
Therefore, enforcement of anti-corruption law should not be confined to punishing businesspersons. Public officials, even former public officials, along with corporate executives, should be prosecuted. As per service rules, government officials are immune from investigations and punishment after certain periods of retirement. Interestingly, politicians do not enjoy such immunity.
Apart from punishment for past corruption, steps should be taken to prevent further corruption. The OECD’s 2025 Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement therefore expressly recommend cooperation among competition, procurement and anti-corruption authorities through information exchange, working groups, data access and formal cooperation arrangements.
Bangladesh should therefore establish a formal Tripartite Public Procurement Integrity and Competition Mechanism involving the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Bangladesh Competition Commission (BCC) and Bangladesh Public Procurement Authority (BPPA).
BPPA possesses procurement expertise and the national e-GP data infrastructure; BCC has the mandate and specialised role to address cartels, collusive bidding and other anti-competitive behaviour; while ACC addresses corruption involving public officials and private actors. Bid rigging and corruption are legally distinct, but in practice they may reinforce each other.
An MoU or Joint Working Protocol could establish a small Joint Procurement Intelligence and Competition Cell comprising nominated officials from ACC, BCC and BPPA. Its functions should include secure sharing and analysis of relevant e-GP data; joint capacity building; adoption of the OECD Tender Design and Bid-Rigging Detection Checklists; and development of a Bangladesh Bid-Rigging and Corruption Red-Flag System.
Using data analytics and, progressively, AI-assisted screening, the system could identify suspicious patterns including bid rotation, cover bidding, bid suppression, repeated winners, abnormal price similarities, unusually low participation, suspicious subcontracting, common bidder relationships and unusual bidding behaviour. Red flags would not themselves establish guilt; they would identify cases requiring human assessment and, where appropriate, referral to BCC, ACC or both.
If we look into the experience of others, since 2006, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has operated its Bid Rigging Indicator Analysis System (BRIAS). By 2026, the system was connected to 16 electronic procurement systems and was receiving tender information from 1,042 awarding authorities, using factors such as winning rates and bidder participation to identify cases for further investigation. Bangladesh need not start from zero. Bangladesh’s own experience demonstrates the financial value of procurement reform. The World Bank estimates that e-GP produced about 7% savings in procurement costs compared with paper-based procurement, with estimated budget savings reaching USD 1.4 billion in 2023. This provides a strong basis for believing that the next generation of procurement reform focused on competition, integrity and intelligent detection could yield substantial additional savings.
The benefits extend far beyond fiscal savings. An integrated ACC–BCC–BPPA mechanism would send an important international message that Bangladesh is serious about transparent institutions, competitive neutrality, corruption control and rule-based markets.
For international investors, predictability and institutional credibility reduce investment risk. A transparent procurement environment can therefore strengthen Bangladesh’s reputation, encourage quality FDI, widen multinational participation, support technology transfer and facilitate deeper integration into global value chains. This is particularly important as Bangladesh seeks investment and productivity growth sufficient to create 10 million jobs and reach the trillion-dollar ambition.
Bangladesh has successfully moved from manual procurement to digital procurement. The next reform should move the country from digital procurement to intelligent, competitive and corruption-resistant procurement.
ACC, BCC and BPPA do not need overlapping powers. They need connected intelligence, clearly defined responsibilities, digital tools, and one shared national objective.
Bangladesh already possesses the essential institutional building blocks: the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) for corruption control, the Bangladesh Competition Commission (BCC) for competition enforcement, and the Bangladesh Public Procurement Authority (BPPA) for procurement regulation and e-GP oversight.
A formal ACC–BCC–BPPA Public Procurement Integrity and Competition Coordination Mechanism could connect these mandates without disturbing the statutory jurisdiction of any institution. Under such a framework, BPPA could use e-GP data to identify repeated winners, suspicious price similarities, low bidder participation, bid rotation and other procurement red flags; BCC could assess whether such patterns indicate bid rigging, cover bidding, cartelisation, market allocation or other anti-competitive arrangements; ACC could investigate bribery, illicit payments, conflicts of interest, abuse of public office and related corruption; relevant cases could be referred to competent prosecutorial or judicial authorities where criminal offences are established; and the three institutions could jointly develop red-flag indicators, secure data-sharing arrangements, referral protocols, whistleblower channels and preventive training.
The international lesson is straightforward: when corruption and collusion between businesspersons and government officials work together, public institutions cannot afford to work separately.
Three institutions need not become one authority; they need to act as one coordinated national defence against corruption, bid rigging and misuse of public money. The objective should therefore be coordination, not duplication. Each institution should exercise its own legal mandate while contributing to one national objective: protecting public money and preserving fair competition.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author
The writer is the CEO of Bangla Chemical, and a legal economist. Email: [email protected]
