Bangladesh and India could renew their Ganges water agreement this December and still leave its central weakness unresolved. A negotiated share at Farakka does not establish whether enough freshwater ultimately reaches the ecosystems and communities that depend on it. A treaty can divide water between two states while leaving the river itself inadequately protected. The next agreement should therefore link national entitlements to verifiable delivery, measurable ecological requirements and clear rules for exceptional scarcity. Wider cooperation with Nepal, Bhutan and China can support that effort, but it should not delay the bilateral commitments that Bangladesh and India must make.
The stakes extend far beyond the Farakka Barrage. A 2025 study of the Bangladesh Sundarbans links declining freshwater inflow through the Gorai with rising downstream salinity, while also identifying climate and sea-level influences. Water security must therefore be assessed across the connected river, delta and coast. A reading at Farakka is essential, but it cannot tell the whole story. [Wahid et al., 2025]
Reform should begin with a clear understanding of the existing treaty. Signed on 12 December 1996, the agreement took effect immediately for 30 years and is renewable by mutual consent. It governs water sharing from January to May in ten-day periods. Its special 35,000-cusec guarantees apply to three alternating periods for each country between 11 March and 10 May. Article II requires emergency consultation when availability at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs, while Article X provides for review every five years or earlier at the request of either party. The treaty also establishes joint monitoring, dispute-resolution procedures and cooperation on dry-season augmentation. Its indicative schedule is based on average water availability during 1949–1988. [Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, 1996, Arts. II, X and XII; Annexure I]
The age of that baseline does not automatically make it invalid. But it should be tested against subsequent observations, changing demand and plausible climate conditions. A review clause is useful only when the parties define what triggers reconsideration, who evaluates the evidence and how disagreements are resolved. More importantly, the treaty lacks an explicit ecological standard. It does not provide a clear mechanism for adjusting operations when evidence shows that agreed environmental outcomes are not being achieved. [Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, 1996, Arts. II and IV–VIII; Annexure II]
Better accounting is the first requirement. Rahman and colleagues, examining records from 1997 to 2016, found that flows at Hardinge Bridge were below those presumed to have been released from Farakka in 94 of 300 ten-day observations, or about 31 percent. They also identified discrepancies in 39 of 60 observations during Bangladesh’s three alternating guarantee periods, or 65 percent. These figures describe a historical dataset, not treaty performance in 2026. [Rahman et al., 2019, Table 2]
Another research presents a different picture. Lad and Jaybhaye, using flow data from 2012 to 2021, reported sharing at Farakka that was consistent with the treaty formula. They also found that flows at Hardinge Bridge exceeded recorded Farakka releases during four-fifths of the period assessed. [Lad and Jaybhaye, 2024]
The studies cover different periods and need not be treated as mutually exclusive. What they demonstrate is the importance of a common and reproducible system for measuring delivery.
Differences between gauges deserve investigation, but they do not by themselves prove deliberate withholding. Comparisons must account for measurement times, travel time, tributary contributions, groundwater and channel exchanges, withdrawals and instrument uncertainty. The treaty also permits India’s reasonable intermediate use between Farakka and the point where both riverbanks are in Bangladesh, capped at 200 cusecs. [Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, 1996, Art. III]
Each ten-day account should therefore state the available flow, applicable national shares, recorded releases, permitted uses and downstream observations. Raw readings should remain distinguishable from corrected data, and uncertainty estimates should be reported. Withdrawals should be separated from actual consumption, while changes in storage should not automatically be treated as permanent losses.
Any material discrepancy that remains unexplained should trigger an investigation within a fixed period. Neither side should be expected to accept a number that cannot be independently tested. Yet accounting is only useful if it serves an ecological purpose.
Environmental flows concern more than a minimum quantity of water. They include the timing and quality of freshwater, as well as the water levels needed to sustain aquatic ecosystems and the benefits those systems provide to people. Seasonal variation is therefore part of the requirement. [Arthington et al., 2018]
The renewed treaty should commission a joint seasonal-flow assessment covering Farakka, Hardinge Bridge and important downstream locations, including the Gorai. It should establish measurable objectives for freshwater availability, salinity, fisheries, sediment movement and channel connectivity. Specific agencies should be responsible for monitoring and response.
River-dependent communities should also be included in that process. They can help identify which outcomes matter most and whether agreed protections are reaching the people and places they are meant to serve.
Ecological requirements must be integrated with national entitlements without double-counting the same water. Water moving downstream can support habitats, navigation and salinity control at different points along its course. Negotiators therefore need to define where ecological targets apply, which uses remain compatible with them and how responsibility is assigned when targets are missed. Responsibility, however, must follow evidence.
Coastal salinity is shaped by several interacting factors, including freshwater inflow, rainfall, temperature and sea-level conditions. Deterioration cannot automatically be attributed to a single upstream action. [Wahid et al., 2025]
Bangladesh should therefore pair its demands for dependable upstream delivery with stronger domestic management of distributary channels, pollution and withdrawals. Transboundary flows will protect communities and ecosystems only if domestic water governance also works. The same principle of advanced planning should apply to exceptional drought.
Scarcity should not be managed through improvised political bargaining. The treaty should define how a shortage is established, how essential human needs and critical ecological functions are protected, how reductions are shared and when emergency measures expire.
Scarcity-sharing cannot create water that does not exist. But predetermined rules can reduce arbitrary decisions and make temporary sacrifices more predictable.
Climate change increases the value of such arrangements. In March 2026, ICIMOD reported that glacier ice-loss rates across the Hindu Kush Himalaya had doubled since 2000. The finding strengthens the case for monitoring a rapidly changing mountain system, but it does not directly determine future discharge at Farakka. Allocation decisions still require basin-specific evidence on rainfall, snow and ice melt, groundwater, storage and demand. [ICIMOD, 18 March 2026]
The Kyirong–Rasuwa disaster of 26 August 2026 reinforces the need for careful hazard assessment. ICIMOD experts identified an ice-rock avalanche and a cascading flood process, while cautioning that the event could not yet be directly attributed to warming. [ICIMOD, Kyirong–Rasuwa Assessment, 2026]
The practical lesson is not to overstate causation, but to improve preparedness. Himalayan states need systems that combine hazard inventories, satellite observations, ground monitoring and reservoir notifications. Joint exercises should test whether warnings reach local authorities, communities and infrastructure operators in time.
Regional cooperation must also respect river geography. The Brahmaputra connects China, India and Bangladesh, with tributary contributions from Bhutan. China and Bhutan therefore have important roles in wider water and hazard cooperation, but they are not parties to the bilateral allocation of Ganges water at Farakka. [World Bank, Brahmaputra Basin Cooperation]
China’s announcement on 19 July 2025 that construction had begun on the lower Yarlung Zangbo hydropower project has nevertheless increased the importance of operational transparency. The official announcement described five cascade stations and an estimated investment of about 1.2 trillion yuan. [State Council of China, 19 July 2025]
Project scale alone does not establish downstream water losses. Those effects depend on storage, diversions, filling schedules and operating rules. Bangladesh and India should therefore support prior notification, accessible operating information, cumulative-impact assessment and credible emergency communication. India has a particular reason to support consistent principles. It lies downstream of China on the Brahmaputra and upstream of Bangladesh. Transparency should remain a valid demand regardless of which country is asking for it.
India’s domestic requirements must also be addressed fairly. The Indian Express reported on 3 September 2026 that External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, in a letter dated 28 August, said Bihar’s drinking-water and industrial requirements would be considered in renewal decisions. [The Indian Express, 3 September 2026]
That is a negotiating constraint, not an agreed treaty outcome. Legitimate upstream needs deserve scrutiny alongside Bangladesh’s requirements, using comparable evidence. Common evidence is particularly important where power is unequal. Zeitoun and Warner’s hydro-hegemony framework examines how disparities in power can shape control over water and the terms of cooperation. The appropriate response is not rhetorical confrontation but institutions that constrain discretion through disclosure, verification and agreed procedures. [Zeitoun and Warner, 2006]
Nepal offers another dimension of cooperation. A 2013 analysis drawing on the World Bank’s Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment found that building all the large dams then proposed for Nepal could approximately double flows during the lowest-flow months. It also rejected the idea that upstream reservoirs could fully control basin-wide flooding and questioned the economic value of augmentation without broader improvements in water management. [Sadoff et al., 2013]
These were conditional modelling results, not ready-made policy prescriptions.
Any Bangladesh–India–Nepal initiative should therefore compare storage projects with demand management and other feasible alternatives. Nepal must participate as a sovereign partner, with transparent benefits and safeguards for affected communities. If Bangladesh helps finance projects that promise water benefits, such participation should secure verifiable operating commitments. Electricity purchases alone cannot establish an entitlement to ecological releases.
Bhutan’s role is different. Its watersheds belong to the Brahmaputra system, so Bhutanese storage cannot simply be treated as additional Ganges water at Farakka. Its contribution is more likely to involve hydropower, watershed protection, data-sharing and regional connectivity. [World Bank, Brahmaputra Basin Assessment]
The sequence should therefore be practical: a binding Bangladesh–India settlement, project-specific cooperation with Nepal where justified, and a wider Himalayan framework for information-sharing and risk management.
Economic connectivity can reinforce the political incentives for cooperation, but it should remain legally separate from water obligations.
An ADB brief published in 2021 estimated Kolkata–Agartala transport times of five days or more through Chattogram, compared with eight to ten days through the Siliguri corridor. Port and customs delays were important qualifications, and the figures were planning estimates rather than verified transit times for 2026. [ADB Brief No. 182, 2021]
Suitable inland routes could connect with Bangladeshi ports and onward maritime services. Nepal and Bhutan would require workable land-transit and multimodal arrangements. Navigation plans should also reflect actual river conditions, matching vessel size and operating seasons to available depth and flow.
Commercial opportunity, however, cannot justify treating every river as a channel for ever-larger vessels. Maintenance works should remain subject to environmental assessment. Nor should commercial disputes be allowed to suspend downstream water obligations. Electricity, transport and border agreements can create continuing benefits for all sides, but water commitments should remain legally distinct.
Renewal must ultimately produce an implementation schedule, not merely another declaration of cooperation. Bangladesh and India should preserve a binding allocation arrangement and set a deadline for the ecological-flow assessment. If technical negotiations require more time, they should explicitly agree on an interim arrangement to prevent a legal or operational gap.
Article XI provides a safeguard following an inconclusive review during the term of the existing treaty. It does not establish automatic continuation after expiry. [Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, 1996, Arts. XI–XII]
Within six months of renewal, the Joint Committee should establish a public reporting system based on common measurement standards, fixed deadlines and procedures for correcting disputed observations. Provisional daily readings should remain separate from verified ten-day accounts.
A technical panel appointed by mutual consent should investigate material discrepancies and publish its findings. Unresolved legal questions should then move through a time-bound process agreed by both governments. Later reviews should assess ecological outcomes alongside releases. They should identify why freshwater or salinity objectives were missed and what corrective action should follow. Institutional names matter less than performance. Agencies must exchange usable data, act on it and explain their decisions.
Bangladesh needs dependable freshwater. India needs an agreement that accommodates legitimate domestic demands while sustaining a credible regional relationship. Their neighbours need infrastructure and trade networks capable of withstanding hydrological uncertainty and mountain hazards. These interests converge around a simple principle: the condition of the river must be measurable, and its management must be open to scrutiny.
The next Ganges treaty should therefore be judged by more than the allocation of national shares. It should be judged by verified delivery, functioning ecosystems, fair management of scarcity and the ability to resolve disputes before they become political crises.
A successful treaty will do more than divide water between two states. It will protect the river that makes those national shares worth having.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author
The writer is a geopolitical analyst, researcher and policy strategist
