In the modern Bangladesh, fear is no longer merely a private emotion but an effective language of power. The visible rise of religion-based political discourse following the mass uprising of 2024 is not simply the ascent of a particular party or ideology. Rather, it reflects a deep-seated crisis within the state, society, and the collective psyche of citizens.
To understand this reality, Professor Ali Riaz’s theory of the ‘culture of fear’ has become more relevant than ever. For decades, he has warned that when the state turns fear into an instrument of governance and society sinks into profound insecurity, the rise of religion-based politics ceases to be inevitable. Bangladesh’s current condition appears to be a concrete manifestation of that warning.
Following the historic mass uprising that brought down the authoritarian rule of Sheikh Hasina, a new wave has emerged in Bangladesh’s political landscape: the resurgence of authoritarian Islamist politics rooted in religious identity. Its pressure is now unmistakable – not only in electoral politics but also in social discourse and even in policy-oriented debates. There is little room for doubt on this score.
Professor Ali Riaz has long written on the rise of Islamism, militancy, the crisis of secularism, the culture of fear, and the absence of democracy in Bangladesh. As a liberal political thinker, his position in questioning power has consistently been clear and fearless. However, his post-uprising decision to assume responsibilities within the Constitutional Reform Commission and the Consensus Commission has placed him in a new role as a stakeholder within state power itself. It is from this position that a new debate has emerged.
In his book Culture of Fear, Riaz warned that Bangladesh could gradually move toward a religion-based state. His analysis shows that fear-driven political narratives began to take shape as early as the 1990s, later assuming a structural form. Even earlier, in 1994, he cautioned that the ultimate outcome of this process could be the laying of the foundations for a theocratic state. Riaz explains that a religious state deploys two parallel forms of fear to control its citizens. One is worldly fear – state repression, institutional control, and violence. The other is otherworldly fear – religious guilt, moral pressure tied to sin and virtue, and the dread of divine punishment. Only when these two forms of fear operate simultaneously does theocratic politics gain social legitimacy.
When despair, insecurity, and helplessness become pervasive in Bangladesh’s social reality, people’s rational faculties weaken, and they naturally gravitate toward religious refuge. This creates fertile ground for the spread of fundamentalist ideologies. According to Riaz’s analysis, these tendencies are not merely present in today’s Bangladesh; they are intensifying. For many, invisible metaphysical fears now outweigh tangible worldly realities.
Millions are connected through social media platforms where misinformation, distorted videos, bot accounts, and emotionally charged messages spread instantaneously. Among populations with limited literacy and political experience, such messages quickly acquire the status of ‘truth.’ As a result, fear-based religious narratives become not only acceptable but, at times, appealing.
Political communication theory suggests that those who control the frame control power. Today, religion-based political forces are setting that frame. They translate fear into the language of faith and recast politics as a moral redemption project. Simultaneously, they determine what issues are discussed and which are excluded. In many cases, the media has become a carrier of this agenda.
On 19 October 2024, speaking at an event at Dhaka College Auditorium, Professor Ali Riaz stated that the culture of fear had been dismantled and that a free environment for questioning had emerged. He argued that the goals of the mass uprising must now be realised. “The extraordinary achievement made possible through the July mass uprising must be preserved,” he said. “Students and ordinary citizens have entrusted us with this achievement by sacrificing their lives. The objectives of the uprising must now be implemented. Let us all come together to complete this great task.”
In Bangladesh, religion-based politics is gaining strength, fear is regulating social behaviour, and the anarchic expansion of digital media is accelerating this process. The consequences are not merely political; they threaten the very character of the state, citizens’ rights, and the foundations of democracy. Mob violence, political intolerance, religious tension, the erosion of the rule of law, and vigilante justice together have pushed Bangladesh into a reality where the future may tilt toward an even deeper fascist or theocratic order.
BBC Bangla recently raised the question of whether the culture of fear, once associated with the Awami League government, has returned once again. Political violence is not new to Bangladesh. During July and August, we witnessed how the ousted Hasina government carried out mass killings against its own people. After its fall and the assumption of office by the Muhammad Yunus government, many believed the new administration would first stabilise the country, ensure security, and then organize elections to transfer power to an elected government.
I am a close reader of Professor Ali Riaz, a long-time admirer and, when necessary, a critic. I am neither his flatterer nor his devotee. The power of his writing, the depth of his analysis, and his courage in exposing the language of power have taught me how to think – there is no denying that. Precisely for that reason, today’s question cannot be ignored.
At a moment when the culture of fear is once again becoming institutionalised in Bangladesh, when the imagination of a theocratic state is gradually expanding across social and political spaces, I oppose it unequivocally. In this context, an uncomfortable question continues to haunt me: after the warnings Professor Riaz issued in 1994 about the culture of fear, has he, since 2024, consciously become a significant part of that very project?
Why is a scholar who produced some of the most important research on mob culture, political violence, culture of fear and state silence now silent? Why does the public intellectual whose writings repeatedly demonstrated the moral courage to question power now avoid those questions?
I know this question is difficult and controversial. But history does not forgive us for avoiding hard questions at critical junctures. The question is uncomfortable, even contentious, but it cannot be evaded at this moment in history. Because the transformation of the state does not always occur only in theory – sometimes it unfolds through the very hands of its theorists.
The writer is an Associate Professor, Communication and Journalism, University of Chittagong
