Iran imposed a nationwide internet shutdown, leaving millions trapped in what can only be described as a state of digital isolation. For this long period, people across the country have been effectively trapped in a digital darkness, having been unable to access international or domestic internet services, make mobile phone calls, or communicate reliably with the outside world. Yet the most surprising and concerning development is that, for the first time, Iran has effectively neutralised the satellite-based internet service operated by Elon Musk, Starlink.
Once regarded as a last remaining gateway beyond state-controlled networks, Starlink is now also under the grip of Iran’s digital repression. This has triggered a global debate over a question: can governments now dominate even satellite internet, long assumed to be beyond their reach?
Internet restrictions are nothing new in Iran. In previous periods of unrest, authorities typically relied on partial or localised disruptions; slowing down international traffic, blocking social media platforms, or cutting access in selected provinces. These tactics allowed the state to manage dissent while keeping core services operational.
The current shutdown, however, represents a dramatic escalation. This time, both international and domestic internet connections were severed simultaneously. Mobile phone networks were shut down, international calls blocked, and nearly every pillar of the digital economy brought to a standstill. Banking services, ride-hailing platforms such as Snapp and Tapsi, e-commerce sites, and even domestic social networks went offline almost overnight.
The use of Starlink has never been officially authorised inside Iran. Yet, thousands of receivers have reportedly entered the country over time and have been used illegally, particularly since the nationwide protests of 2022. For many activists and ordinary citizens, the service became an alternative channel for uncensored communication during previous crackdowns.
Internet researcher and digital rights activist Amir Rashidi, who studied internet access and censorship for two decades, told the international media, “The current blackout extends well beyond conventional network controls. As protests erupted nationwide, military-grade jamming signals targeting Starlink satellites were detected. Initially, around 30 percent of Starlink’s uplink and downlink traffic was disrupted. Within hours, that figure climbed to more than 80 percent”.
Mr Rashidi described the situation as unusual. He noted that the level of interference suggests the use of highly sophisticated, military-grade technology – equipment that may have been supplied by foreign allies such as Russia or China, or developed domestically by Iran itself.
According to a report by The Times of Israel, Starlink receivers rely heavily on GPS signals to establish and maintain satellite connections. Since Iran’s twelve-day conflict with Israel last year, authorities in Iran have reportedly intensified efforts to interfere with GPS signals.
The result is an uneven shutdown across the country. In some areas, users experience intermittent or weak connectivity; in others, the blackout is nearly full. Technologists have described this phenomenon as a ‘patchwork quilt’ of connectivity; an irregular digital landscape where access exists in fragments rather than as a coherent whole.
Varied estimates suggest that between 40,000 and 50,000 people in Iran currently use Starlink. During the twelve-day internet blackout in the summer of 2025, amid the Iran–Israel war, a limited number of users were still able to access the global internet through the satellite service. This time, however, even that narrow escape route appears mostly closed.
The shutdown has not been limited to internet access alone. Around 10 p.m. on 8 January, mobile phone networks across Iran were completely disabled. While some households briefly retained Wi-Fi connections, the absence of upstream internet rendered them practically useless. International calling was also blocked. Applications such as Yolla, which typically allow voice calls into Iran, confirmed that new restrictions had been imposed.
By the morning following the blackout, Iranian authorities had begun implementing a so-called ‘white list’ system. Under this plan, selected institutions and accounts were granted limited internet access. Gradually, state media outlets, pro-government Telegram channels, and certain university networks reappeared online.
This selective restoration has laid bare a growing digital divide within Iran. Internet access is no longer merely restricted, it is classified. Those aligned with or trusted by the state are allowed back online, while the broader population remains cut off from information and from one another.
The economic consequences of the shutdown are equally austere. Speaking to Forbes, internet shutdown researcher Simon Migliano described Iran’s current ‘kill switch’ approach as economically devastating. According to his estimates, each hour without internet access costs the Iranian economy approximately $1.56 million.
Monitoring group NetBlocks reports that even after more than 60 hours, Iran’s overall connectivity remains at around one percent of normal levels – a figure that underscores the scale and severity of the blackout.
Analysts argue that Iran has now demonstrated something deeply unsettling: that a determined state can, under certain conditions, disrupt even satellite-based internet services. This is not merely a domestic issue. It sets an example that other authoritarian governments may seek to replicate.
Starlink once widely seen as a symbol of digital freedom, an infrastructure beyond the grasp of national censorship regimes, has faced a significant challenge due to Iran’s actions. The question now facing the world is no longer whether the internet can be controlled, but how far that control can extend and at what cost to freedom in the digital age.
The writer is an author, journalist, and language instructor
