‘Tech-fascism’ is not an abrupt political eruption; it is a slowly evolving structural transformation in which technology, state power, and corporate algorithms become increasingly entangled, producing a new regime of control. In the digital world, this tendency is especially visible, where social media platforms such as Meta Platforms, YouTube, and X are no longer merely spaces for information exchange but instruments for predicting, shaping, and influencing political behaviour. In this system, power is no longer exclusively concentrated within the state. Instead, a ‘power nexus’ emerges among the state, political parties, and technology companies – largely invisible to citizens, yet effectively pervasive in its reach.
Tech-fascism becomes particularly potent when algorithmic structures reward emotionally charged and polarising content. Fear, anger, and identity-based agitation gain greater visibility, which in turn translates into political influence. As a result, the public sphere gradually transforms into an ‘engagement economy’ driven battleground, where virality outweighs truth. Within this framework, surveillance states, data-driven propaganda, and digitally constructed enemy narratives take shape. The outcome is a form of governance in which control and repression are exercised not only through law enforcement or institutional force, but through algorithms, platform design, and the subtle management of information flows.
Disinformation targeting politicians on social media is no longer an isolated or spontaneous phenomenon; in many cases, it has become part of a coordinated and strategic political process. This observation was made by BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, who argued that such trends are embedded within a broader attempt to ‘destroy’ politics itself, gradually destabilising the country’s democratic environment. Speaking as the chief guest at a discussion held at the National Press Club on 5 June, he noted that the misuse of social media is pushing the country’s political situation toward a profound crisis. According to him, the deliberate construction of narratives and information online has created a tendency to portray politicians as disreputable or socially inferior figures – an alarming development for a healthy political culture.
He further alleged that much of the language, content, and discourse circulating online around politics is deliberately manufactured. In his view, online bullying and digital campaigning are not merely personal attacks, but a conscious attempt to weaken and distort the political process itself. If such trends continue, he warned, the country’s normal democratic development would be seriously undermined.
In contemporary political reality, the rise of right-wing and conservative forces cannot be understood merely as an electoral trend; it is the outcome of a deeper digital transformation in which social media has become a central infrastructure of political power. The case of Brazil illustrates this shift with particular clarity. During the 2018 electoral cycle, WhatsApp networks evolved into an informal yet highly powerful political campaigning apparatus. Research suggests that a significant portion of political content circulated through these channels consisted of organised misinformation designed to construct misleading narratives against opposition forces. Many scholars describe this process as ‘digital astroturfing,’ in which artificial impressions of grassroots support are manufactured. Politics, therefore, becomes less dependent on real social dialogue and increasingly grounded in digitally constructed realities.
A similar pattern is even more evident in the Philippines. Since the 2016 elections, Facebook has become the central platform for political communication. The rise of Rodrigo Duterte has often been described by researchers as the first ‘social media presidency.’ During and after the electoral period, troll networks, fake accounts, and coordinated engagement strategies were widely used to amplify political narratives. As a result, public opinion is often shaped less by actual social sentiment and more by algorithmically amplified visibility.
In Mexico and other Latin American countries, a similar architecture is visible, where social media has become the primary arena of narrative warfare. Discourses centred on ‘corruption,’ ‘law and order,’ and ‘national restoration’ spread rapidly through YouTube and Facebook, often structured around insecurity and fear. These narratives tend to favour right-wing or conservative positions, as they are particularly effective at triggering emotional responses.
In the Middle East, the role of social media is more ambivalent. On one hand, it serves as a space for political expression and mobilization. On the other hand, it functions as a tool of state surveillance and control. In countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, social media has effectively become a monitored public sphere, where state or state-aligned networks disseminate propaganda against political dissent and closely track online activity. Scholars describe this condition as ‘digital authoritarianism,’ in which technology enhances state control rather than democratic participation, making it more refined and efficient.
Several structural realities of the Global South underpin these developments. First, in many countries, traditional media is influenced by political or corporate interests, making social media an alternative – though often unstable – information space. Second, unequal levels of digital literacy weaken users’ ability to verify information, allowing misinformation to spread rapidly. Third, identity-based politics rooted in religion, ethnicity, language, and class are easily translated into digital content and become highly viral. Fourth, social media algorithms prioritise content that generates engagement, which is most often driven by emotions such as anger, fear, and resentment.
Taken together, social media is no longer merely a communication technology; it has become a political infrastructure that reorganises the relationship between information, emotion, and power. Within this structure, politics is no longer confined to the state or political parties but is embedded in a complex system of data-driven algorithms and platform-based narratives. The central question, therefore, is not only political but structural: does the public sphere still function as a space for democratic deliberation, or is it increasingly being reshaped into an algorithmically governed regime of power?
In this context, social media is not simply a platform for expression; it is simultaneously a space for constructing power, shaping public opinion, and challenging political legitimacy. The observation made by Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir reflects this broader reality at a local level, where organised and unorganised online campaigns against political figures are steadily eroding trust and credibility in the political system.
The core concern, then, is not merely whether disinformation exists, but how the new equation of information, emotion, and power on digital platforms is displacing rational political discourse. Politics is no longer solely a contest of ideas and policies; it is increasingly a competition over visibility, virality, and narrative control. In such a scenario, the sustainable future of democratic politics will depend on transparency, accountability, and the development of critical digital literacy within the public sphere.
The writer is an Associate Professor, Communication and Journalism, University of Chittagong. Email: [email protected]
