In Muslim-majority societies, nationalism rarely develops in isolation from religious and social capital. Bangladesh presents a distinctive case where nationalism and Islamic values coexist in uneasy yet productive tension. The reciprocal political benefits accrued by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) through ideological adjustment, strategic cooperation, and constituency overlap are enjoyed by the nationalists and Islamists. In the absence of a consistently credible secular political force, centrist nationalist parties benefit from moderated Islamic symbolism, while Islamist parties gain electoral viability through nationalist alliances. Drawing on political theory, electoral history, and comparative insights, the article identifies some key reciprocal benefits that explain the endurance of BNP–Jamaat cooperation despite ideological differences.
Nationalism in Muslim-majority countries often incorporates religious symbolism without formally adopting theocratic governance. Scholars such as Anthony D. Smith and Rogers Brubaker have shown that nationalism draws on ‘cultural reservoirs’, including religion, language, and historical memory.
In Bangladesh, Islam functions as sociopolitical capital rather than a constitutional doctrine like those of Iran. This is comparable to Hindu symbolism in India’s nationalism or Christian moral narratives in European democracies. Political actors who entirely negate Islamic values face legitimacy constraints, whereas those who reject faith privately may still proclaim belief publicly-highlighting the asymmetry between belief and disbelief in political discourse.
Political parties transform with the passage of time, change in peers or context. The transformation from All-India Muslim League → Awami Muslim League → Awami League demonstrates how political forces broaden support by shedding exclusive religious markers (Rounaq Jahan, 1972). This evolution allowed the Awami League to lead a multi-class, multi-religious nationalist movement. Similarly, BNP has undergone a lot of changes with former prime minister Begum Khaleda Zia at the helm of the party established Shaheed President Ziaur Rahman who pioneered multi-party democracy.
BNP historically positioned itself as centrist-nationalist, neither explicitly Islamist nor aggressively secular. This moderation enabled BNP to attract conservative Muslims, cultural Muslims, anti-hegemonic secular voters, and rural and peri-urban populations. Political theorists describe this as ‘instrumental pluralism’, where ideological flexibility ensures electoral competitiveness (Downs, 1957).
Contrary to monolithic portrayals, Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh has practiced contextual Islamism, adjusting rhetoric, alliances, and priorities to survive within parliamentary democracy (Nasr, 1996). Its participation in coalitions represents pragmatism rather than doctrinal surrender.
BNP gets electoral consolidation of conservative votes during general elections in Bangladesh, preventing vote-splitting among religious constituencies. Jamaat worked counterbalance to aggressive secularism for BNP, shielding it from accusations of cultural alienation.
BNP gains mosque-based informal mobilisation and expands reach beyond party offices and rallies. Islamists becomes ideological cushion against cultural globalism and helps resist perceptions of Westernisation of BNP.
The party becomes able to make moral framing of governance discourse and enhances narratives around justice, honesty, and accountability. Counter-hegemonic symbolism, which offers to use signs, images and cultural expression to challenge and resist the dominant power, offering an alternative to Awami League’s liberation-war monopoly.
Supporting Islamists back at home means gaining international Islamist soft support and indirect engagement with global Muslim civil society sprawling across 57 OIC member countries in the world including those of Muslim diaspora.
Access to state power through coalition politics enables Jamaat-e-Islami participation without electoral majority. BNP gives democratic legitimacy and its allies normalise Jamaat within parliamentary politics. Jamaat gained policy influence without governance burden as BNP allows selective impact without full accountability. Two Jamaat ministers, Maolana Motiur Rahman Nizami and Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujaheed, who got orientation of running a government.
BNP’s support to Jamaat gives it nationalist cover, reducing the Islamists vulnerability and ‘anti-state’ tagging or allegations. Jamaat got protection from political isolation, preventing marginalisation under dominant-party rule. The Islamists expanded voter base beyond ideological core, gaining centrist and protest voters.
Jamaat got better media visibility as nationalists-Islamists coalition amplifies their voice in mainstream discourse.
BNP provides political shelter during repression and in this way Jamaat could survive under restrictive political environments like fascism. It enables long-term institutional survival rather than short-term radicalism.
This reciprocal arrangement aligns with coalition theory (Lijphart, 1977) and median voter theory (Downs, 1957). In Bangladesh, ideological purity yields to governability, where moderation, compromise, and symbolic pluralism become prerequisites for rule.
The BNP–Jamaat relationship is less an ideological merger than a functional convergence shaped by Bangladesh’s sociopolitical ecology. In a country where Islam remains culturally dominant yet constitutionally moderated, political forces must internalise religious sentiment without enforcing religious rule.
This case demonstrates that nationalism in Muslim-majority states does not negate religion but disciplines it, transforming faith into political capital rather than dogma. The endurance of BNP–Jamaat cooperation reflects not moral contradiction but political rationality within a competitive, plural, and deeply symbolic democracy.
The writer is a journalist and political analyst
