Dr. G.M. Shahidul Alam
So, what gives? If at all there is something to be given—or taken—in the global political environment that has been operating during the first quarter of the twenty-first century A.D., it is this: unless one is habitually cynical, there is always something to give and to take in a world where singular or multiple events occur within a single country, or among multiple nations, producing singular or tangential effects in different parts of the globe.
This century, however, is still wrapped in a nation-state–based global system where different forms of power and its projection are key ingredients in its operation. While the system may help maintain order and peace, the fundamentally nation–state–driven structure that still dominates across the world also stands in the way of a truly global order.
The world continues to be shaped by big powers—the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—who, singly or in groups, often threaten or violate the broader framework of peace when their interests demand it.
Thus, while U.S. President Donald Trump frequently spoke of the necessity of global peace, he rarely missed a chance to threaten the imposition of Pax Americana on comparatively weaker nations of the world (or even on Canada, which is no “minnow” by any definition). Perhaps it was an opening move—also imitated by other newly elected leaders of the global system—if he perceived wrongdoing from weaker quarters. This posture has contributed to another round of global and regional unrest.
Trump became the latest U.S. president to adopt policies aimed at bringing about significant changes in both the geopolitical system and his own country’s internal political functioning.
Other U.S. presidents have embarked on similar undertakings, with varying degrees of success and failure—the Vietnam War being a particularly massive failure, and the Afghanistan venture a sharp blow to America’s prestige. Yet, time marches on, and new presidents, each with their own personalities, policies, and visions, leave their imprint on history through the implementation of new ideas.
Staying on the subject of presidential privileges and prerogatives: while Trump waxed eloquent on the necessity of global peace, he never failed to wield the threat of Pax Americana against relatively weaker nations whenever he perceived wrongdoing. He positioned himself as the latest American president attempting to reshape both the geopolitical system and the internal functioning of the United States.
At times, he even threatened to deploy troops to control law and order within Democratic states (in his perception). One does not have to be an astute political analyst to grasp the ramifications of such ventures.
The United States, long regarded as a beacon of liberal democracy—despite its many hiccups along the way—risks becoming an antithesis of that very model (hopefully not). Liberal democracy, which has generally served its adopting countries on a spectrum from broadly successful to somewhat unsatisfactory, has historically placed the U.S. on the side of the “better” governments. It still remains the most powerful country in the world.
Signs, however, suggest that the liberal democratic model it has espoused for so long is under strain. Since James Monroe—American Founding Father and president—proclaimed his doctrine limiting European colonialism in the Americas, liberal democracy in the United States has endured trials and tribulations, ultimately evolving into a robust political system. This system, when exported to other nations, produced mixed results, especially in many third-world countries.
Now, Trump appears determined to impose his will—whether by persuasion or coercion—on much of the world: gently on pliant countries, harshly if necessary. Meanwhile, Putin’s Russia, throughout nearly the entirety of Trump’s second presidency, has skillfully manipulated him through an array of strategies.
Ukraine has been one of the biggest sufferers, enduring Putin’s ruthless tactics as he played both Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Russia’s advantage. With Trump seemingly adopting Putin’s approach toward the Ukraine war, Russia sensed victory. Meanwhile, Israel has grappled with the Hamas conundrum, with Trump caught up in two major conflicts partly of his own making. Lebanon and Gaza have continued to suffer.
Lately, Trump has shifted his attention back to domestic issues. For instance, he abruptly withdrew federal financial support from Harvard University—apparently on the grounds that it did not admit “enough” Jewish students. The move, though strange, dealt a financial setback to one of the world’s great institutions of learning, though not to its global reputation. Neighboring MIT escaped such treatment, while Columbia University and the University of Pennsylvania may also have faced similar consequences.
It is worth noting that John George Trump, an electrical engineer, inventor, and educator, was a professor of electrical engineering at MIT—providing a family connection for Donald Trump.
Perhaps relying on such associations, the president seemed to hope that public memory would soften over time, as he pursued re-election through a barrage of executive orders. These targeted law firms for “unethical” conduct, terminated government contracts, restricted access to federal buildings, curtailed USAID operations, ended birthright citizenship, and even aimed to dismantle the Department of Education.
As of August 4, 2025, Donald Trump had signed 191 executive orders, 47 memoranda, and 79 proclamations.
So, what gives? Having established that something had to give, it appears that Donald Trump indeed could—and would—for another three years and beyond as president of the world’s most powerful nation.
Much will change, both in the global system and within the United States itself. What Trump has wrought will eventually surface—whether as a boon, a failure, or some combination of the two. Whatever the ultimate outcome, there is little doubt that Donald J. Trump has left his imprint on both the global stage and America’s fortunes.
The writer is an MALD (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) and PhD (Boston University).
