Bangladesh did not face a conventional port crisis this winter. It faced a breakdown in logistics governance at precisely the moment when economic circulation mattered most.
As imports surged ahead of Ramadan, ships crowded the outer anchorage – not because terminals were closed or berths unavailable, but because cargo movement inland slowed sharply. Lighter vessels were in critically short supply. While vessels existed, many remained loaded far longer than normal, reducing turnover and constraining the system’s ability to absorb new arrivals.
What unfolded was congestion without physical paralysis, delay without infrastructure failure, and scarcity without an absolute shortage of assets; an outcome characteristic of weak coordination and ineffective enforcement rather than external shocks. This was not weather, fog, or fate but a predictable stress failure in an inadequately governed logistics chain.
Ports across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa routinely manage pre-Ramadan import surges. In most cases, congestion emerges where infrastructure meets capacity limits. In Bangladesh, congestion accumulated offshore, reflecting slow inland evacuation and limited availability of lighterage. Industry sources and port officials alike have raised concerns that some lighter vessels were retained in loaded condition for extended periods, effectively functioning as floating storage and delaying cargo circulation.
Such practices run counter to global logistics norms and to the stated objectives of Bangladesh’s National Logistics Policy, which identifies speed, predictability, transparency, and circulation efficiency as core economic imperatives. Logistics assets are meant to move goods, not to store them. When transport capacity becomes inventory, delays become profitable and scarcity becomes a market strategy.
The consequences were immediate. Anchorage queues lengthened, demurrage costs mounted, import costs rose quietly, and, as always, the burden travelled downstream ultimately reaching consumers at the most sensitive time of the year.
More troubling than congestion itself was the diffusion of responsibility. Port authorities pointed inland. Shipping interests cited operational constraints. Importers referenced storage limitations. Vessel operators cited allocation practices. Authority fragmented, accountability dissolved, and the system waited just like the ships.
At the centre of this coordination gap sits the Water Transport Coordination Cell (WTCC), a body that has long played a de facto role in lighterage allocation and inland vessel movement. While the WTCC emerged as a practical coordination mechanism, questions regarding its statutory basis, transparency, and accountability have persisted over time. Despite periodic administrative and judicial scrutiny, its operational influence has continued largely unchanged.
This winter exposed the limitations of such informal arrangements. With no enforceable time discipline and no single authority empowered to intervene decisively, lighterage capacity could not be reallocated swiftly in the national interest. Larger importers with greater storage and financial flexibility were better positioned to retain vessels longer, while new shipments accumulated offshore. Informal coordination proved insufficient under peak-season pressure.
This is not an isolated flaw; it is structural. Bangladesh’s logistics chain spans ports, waterways, roads, rail, customs, commerce, agriculture, and energy. Yet responsibility for end-to-end cargo circulation remains fragmented. The National Logistics Policy correctly identifies coordination as the system’s weakest link. But coordination without command authority has repeatedly proven inadequate.
Reform must therefore move beyond abstraction. The experience with the WTCC illustrates the risks of allowing strategic control over national transport capacity to rest on informal mechanisms. Allocation rules remain opaque. Decisions are not systematically documented or auditable. A process that may once have been a stopgap has evolved into a form of informal rule-making with national economic consequences.
This institutional gap should now be addressed through the establishment of a statutory National Logistics Commission. Such a body would not replace existing agencies but align them. Reporting to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs or the Prime Minister’s Office, the commission would serve as the apex authority for end-to-end logistics governance cutting across ministries rather than competing with them.
At a minimum, the commission should carry four core mandates. First, circulation authority. The commission must be empowered to intervene when cargo movement stalls – whether due to congestion, hoarding, or coordination failure. During declared peak seasons or logistics emergencies, it should have legal authority to issue binding directives on vessel deployment, priority cargo movement, and capacity reallocation across transport modes.
Second, time-discipline enforcement. Logistics efficiency is governed by time, not intent. National standards for vessel dwell time, lighter turnaround, and inland evacuation must be set and enforced through credible penalties. Without enforcement, time limits remain advisory and delay remains commercially rational.
Third, formal regulation of lighterage coordination. Informal mechanisms such as the WTCC must either be integrated into a lawful framework or replaced. Allocation criteria should be published. Decisions should be logged. Appeals should be institutional rather than negotiated. No entity should exercise strategic control over transport capacity without public oversight.
Fourth, data transparency and market oversight. Modern logistics governance depends on real-time visibility. A national logistics data platform – covering vessel movements, cargo status, allocation decisions, and turnaround performance – would reduce opacity, deter manipulation, and enable evidence-based intervention.
The commission should also function as a grievance-redress authority. Persistent complaints from importers, vessel operators, and consumers too often disappear into jurisdictional gaps. A single institution accountable for logistics outcomes would treat such complaints as governance failures not administrative noise.
These reforms must be reinforced by complementary regulations. Corporate control over transport capacity demands public-interest safeguards. Vertical integration is not inherently problematic; unchecked retention of capacity during peak demand is. During declared congestion periods, regulators must have authority to mobilise idle private capacity into essential service, with fair compensation and full transparency.
Equally important is separating storage economics from transport economics. Using vessels as storage must be deliberately disincentivised, while investment in onshore warehousing near ports and consumption hubs should be actively encouraged in line with the National Logistics Policy’s multimodal objectives.
The ships waited because the system allowed them to. Informal authority made that waiting possible. The next government will be judged not by how quickly this episode fades, but by whether it replaces improvised control with lawful governance.
The writer is a Port Shipping & Logistics Strategist and Adjunct Faculty, Bangladesh Maritime University
