A government is more than an institution that balances competing interests. Its fundamental purpose is to protect the public interest, regulate essential sectors and ensure that basic services are not left at the mercy of private profit.
Yet, an increasingly troubling pattern is taking shape – the government appears to be withdrawing from some of its core responsibilities while presenting that retreat as reform, efficiency or modernisation.
Consider three areas together – energy, edible oil pricing and teacher recruitment – and the pattern becomes difficult to dismiss. In each case, the government appears to be relinquishing direct responsibility while reducing its own role to that of regulator, supervisor or facilitator.
The result is a state that increasingly manages the transfer of power rather than exercises power in defence of the public interest.
The energy sector provides perhaps the clearest example. Privatisation is routinely promoted as a means of improving efficiency, securing supply and reducing costs. Yet the outcome often points in the opposite direction.
Energy is not an ordinary commodity. It affects the cost of production, transport, agriculture, industry and everyday life. A state that gradually relinquishes control over energy is not simply embracing a different economic model. It is weakening its own capacity to shape the economy and protect citizens from market shocks.
The argument that the ‘market’ will take care of such a sector is equally problematic.
Markets do not operate in a vacuum. Where supply and distribution are dominated by only a handful of powerful companies, leaving matters to market forces can effectively mean leaving the public dependent on the commercial calculations of a few private actors.
The edible oil market presents the same contradiction in a form that reaches directly into every household. The government periodically announces prices and speaks of market monitoring, yet consumers often see little evidence of effective intervention.
Prices rise swiftly, usually with reference to international markets, exchange rates or import costs. But when those pressures ease, reductions are rarely as rapid or as visible.
Regulation then begins to look symbolic rather than substantive. Consumers are told that prices are shaped by global forces, while the domestic market remains heavily influenced by a small number of major players. In such circumstances, merely announcing prices cannot amount to meaningful regulation if the government lacks either the capacity or the willingness to enforce them.
For ordinary families, this is not an abstract economic debate. It is reflected directly in the cost of cooking and the pressure on household budgets.
When the prices of essential commodities remain beyond effective public control, the state is effectively asking citizens to bear the consequences of a market structure it has failed to discipline. That is not regulation. It is surrender dressed up as supervision.
Giving greater authority to governing bodies or local committees may be presented as decentralisation or as a way to make recruitment more efficient. But in the political and social context, such a shift also creates wider opportunities for local influence, patronage, political pressure and nepotism.
Teacher recruitment should be based on merit, qualifications and transparent standards. Once local power structures acquire greater control over appointments, the danger is obvious: merit may be displaced by loyalty, influence or personal connections.
The consequences would extend far beyond individual appointments. Poor recruitment weakens institutions, and weak institutions inevitably weaken the quality of education.
Education is not merely another administrative function that can be delegated to local committees. It is one of the state’s most fundamental responsibilities.
If the government retreats from ensuring fair, transparent and merit-based recruitment while leaving crucial decisions to locally influential groups, it reduces itself from guarantor to coordinator. That distinction is crucial.
The state is gradually stepping away from direct responsibility for energy supply, the regulation of essential commodity prices and teacher recruitment. Private businesses are gaining greater influence over strategic sectors of the economy.
Market actors increasingly shape the cost of essential goods. Local power structures are acquiring greater leverage over public institutions. Meanwhile, the government increasingly describes its own role in terms of facilitation, supervision and regulation.
But a government cannot facilitate its way out of responsibility. There is nothing inherently wrong with private-sector participation, nor is decentralisation undesirable in itself. Private investment can contribute to economic growth, and stronger local institutions can improve public administration.
The problem arises when the state transfers responsibility without ensuring accountability, competition, transparency and effective public oversight.
Privatisation without effective regulation does not necessarily create efficiency; it can create private monopolies. Decentralisation without safeguards does not necessarily deepen democracy; it can entrench local patronage networks.
Market freedom without enforcement does not protect consumers; it leaves them exposed to those with the greatest economic power.
This, therefore, is not simply a debate over whether Bangladesh should have a larger or smaller government. The deeper question is whether the state is retaining sufficient authority, capacity and willingness to defend the public interest.
The writer is the Chief News Editor, Daily TIMES of Bangladesh
