When an interim government took office following the fall of an authoritarian regime amid a violent student-led uprising in early August 2024, expectations were unusually high. The assumption of power by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was widely seen as a moral and political reset, raising hopes for the restoration of the rule of law, institutional reform and accountable governance.
Many accepted that meaningful change would take time. Key state institutions — the bureaucracy, police, military and judiciary — were deeply entrenched in loyalties to the previous ruling party. Public patience was extended, with the understanding that dismantling a system shaped over more than one and half decades would not be immediate.
By the start of 2025, optimism remained strong. The year was widely viewed as a decisive window for reforms after 16 years of political centralisation and institutional decay. That optimism, however, steadily eroded as the year unfolded.
Reform architecture without reform momentum
The interim government placed reform at the centre of its mandate. Eleven reform commissions were formed within months of assuming office, covering areas such as the constitution, judiciary, police, electoral system, public administration, labour, health, land, media, women’s affairs and anti-corruption.
Their recommendations were submitted in phases between January and April 2025. Broadly, the proposals fell into two categories: those requiring constitutional amendments and those that could be implemented through ordinances.
To build consensus on constitutional changes, a national platform was established and a reform charter drafted. Several proposals were scheduled to be put to a referendum in early 2026.
Yet progress on implementation remained limited. Only a small fraction of recommendations — particularly those deemed immediately actionable — moved beyond paper. In several sectors, reforms were selectively adopted, while core structural changes were left untouched.
Notably absent from the reform framework was education. Despite education being widely described as the backbone of national development, no commission was formed in this sector, drawing sustained criticism throughout the year.
Justice, elections and institutions: Partial change, persistent gaps
In the justice sector, some visible steps were taken. These included changes to judicial administration, amendments to procedural laws, and the creation of new institutional mechanisms aimed at improving independence and efficiency.
However, many fundamental proposals remained stalled. These included expanding access to courts at the local level, reducing case backlogs, curbing misuse of legal processes, strengthening investigative independence, reforming legal education and ensuring accountability within the judiciary.
Electoral reforms also advanced unevenly. While election laws and codes of conduct were revised, several key recommendations aimed at increasing transparency, internal party democracy and financial accountability were excluded. Proposals to strengthen oversight of political parties and candidates, and to expand public access to information, were largely left out.
In the anti-corruption sector, an ordinance was issued to reshape the watchdog agency. Critics argued that while the new framework promised independence, it weakened accountability by omitting review mechanisms that would have ensured oversight of the institution itself.
Police reform followed a similar pattern. A new commission was created to oversee discipline and professionalism, but the broader administrative chain — particularly ministerial oversight — remained largely unchanged.
Public administration reforms delivered some administrative streamlining but avoided deeper restructuring. Proposals to reduce the size of government, overhaul recruitment and promotion systems, and create a professional executive service remained unimplemented.
Law and order: A year of violence and fear
If reforms moved slowly, the deterioration of law and order was swift and visible.
Throughout 2025, violence remained a constant feature of public life. Political killings, arson attacks on cultural institutions and media offices, communal violence and mob assaults occurred across the country. Several high-profile incidents in the final weeks of the year underscored the state’s inability to enforce basic security.
Mob violence became one of the defining challenges of the year. Public lynchings, forced resignations of educators, attacks on homes and the destruction of historical and cultural sites pointed to a breakdown in state authority. While officials repeatedly declared zero tolerance, enforcement was inconsistent and often absent.
Security measures, including the deployment of the military with magistracy powers, failed to restore public confidence. Independent assessments pointed to a rise in serious crimes such as murder, robbery, sexual violence and vigilantism, alongside a growing culture of impunity.
Economy stabilised, governance strained
Economically, the interim government received cautious praise. It inherited a fragile economy marked by inflationary pressure, currency instability and declining reserves. Over the year, macroeconomic stability improved: inflation eased, foreign exchange reserves stabilised, remittances rose and external payments were managed more effectively.
These gains were largely driven by external sector adjustments rather than domestic economic transformation. Investment remained subdued, employment generation lagged and revenue mobilisation showed little improvement. No medium-term economic framework was presented, leaving uncertainty about long-term recovery.
The failure to revive private-sector confidence was particularly significant given that economic exclusion and unemployment had been central drivers of the uprising that brought the government to power.
Media freedom and democratic space
Concerns over freedom of expression resurfaced during the year. Hundreds of journalists faced legal harassment, job losses and intimidation. Allegations emerged of media institutions being forcibly taken over, editorial leadership reshaped and dissenting voices marginalised.
While the previous government had faced international criticism over media repression, the persistence of such practices under the interim administration raised questions about continuity rather than rupture in governance culture.
Observers also pointed to renewed politicisation within the administration, arguing that entrenched patterns of loyalty and patronage had merely shifted rather than disappeared.
A year that promised change — but delivered little
By the end of 2025, the gap between promise and performance had become difficult to ignore.
The interim government had been entrusted with three core responsibilities: reform, justice and elections. While groundwork was laid in each area, execution lagged, priorities blurred and public trust weakened.
What began as a moment of national reset ended as a year marked by insecurity, selective reform and unresolved structural problems. The patience initially extended to the government steadily gave way to disappointment, leaving unanswered questions about whether the opportunity created by the uprising had been fully understood — or irreversibly lost.
