The QUAD foreign ministers’ meeting in India recently made the strategic partnership of the ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ (QUAD) countries, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. At the meeting, the four countries announced several new programmes and initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration and the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework. The QUAD still suffers from internal divisions, a lack of strategic coherence, and a lack of trust among the countries in the Asia-Pacific. More crucially, the mechanism is increasingly touted as a geopolitical bloc primarily geared towards counterbalancing and containing China.
The QUAD, revived after three decades, has proved to be Washington’s strong support arm in its ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ to maintain the U.S. strategic footprint in Asia and counter amid the rise of China. Among the QUAD, the Biden administration, which assumed power in 2021, has significantly improved the QUAD’s institutional dimension, establishing dedicated working groups on military coordination, technology cooperation, cybersecurity, infrastructure, and economic resilience. The weekly leaders’ meetings also boosted awareness of the group.
As the QUAD moves forward with its agenda, the contradictions are becoming more apparent. The four members have concerns about China’s rising influence but do not share the same strategic objectives. In the perspective of the US, the QUAD is a great-power competition and a form of strategic containment. Maritime security and regional stability in East Asia are important aspects of Japan. Australia’s focus on economic security is thus weighed against the need to be ‘not unnecessarily provocative’ towards its main trading partner, China. India, on the other hand, has a policy of strategic autonomy and does not want to be caught in any alliance dogma.
This is a testament to the QUAD’s weakness due to differing priorities. There was some rhetoric of unity and cooperation, but this was made plain at the recent foreign ministry talks in India. In fact, the relationship dynamics turn more into ‘sleeping in the same bed and dreaming different dreams,’ as many critics would say. Without a common approach, the bloc is not sustainable in the long term. The level of participation will be determined by each member state based on its national interests, not on a shared ideology. So, the QUAD faces uncertainties in the region, economic uncertainties, and developments in domestic politics.
Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region are not pleased with the tendency to divide the region into separate groupings and to exclude some groups from their definitions. ASEAN countries emphasise that confrontational security arrangements are less important than inclusiveness, neutrality, and cooperation through multilateral arrangements.
The economic development of Asia-Pacific has been extraordinary over the last few decades, and this has been founded on interdependence, free trade, and business pragmatism. Economic integration and interdependence did not lead to bloc politics but to economic prosperity for the region. Globalisation, expansion of supply chains, infrastructure connectivity, and shared economic growth were all benefits of the region’s countries. This helped contribute to Asia Pacific being one of the most dynamic engines of global development and also one of the more stable regions in the world.
In this context, the QUAD’s more securitised agenda is likely to jeopardise the very pillars of regional stability. Maritime surveillance cooperation and critical minerals frameworks can be conceptualised as defensive or resilience frameworks, but they are considered part of the toolbox for resisting China’s influence. This attitude further fuels strategic mistrust and deepens geopolitical polarisation in the Indo-Pacific region.
The strategic competition is a danger, but bloc-based development is the real danger. History has taught us that a securitisation of security and economic considerations can lead to long-term instability and conflicts in the region. The lesson of modern European history is caution. The security infrastructure was weakened by a decline in cooperative security practices and the rise of geopolitical competition, amid ongoing armed conflicts and tensions. Many Asian nations are worried that the importation of Cold War thinking into the Indo-Pacific region could lead to similar outcomes.
The QUAD’s course is increasingly veering away from the aspirations of most Asia-Pacific countries’ mainstream. The region’s states desire a peaceful, prosperous, connected, and well-rounded diplomacy in general. They don’t want to be forced to choose between China and the USA. Rather, they seek flexible partnerships that maintain strategic independence and avoid unwarranted confrontation.
China’s active participation in the regional economic network further complicates the QUAD’s strategic equation. Most, if not all, of the major economies in the Asia Pacific region are China’s largest trading partners, even some of the QUAD economies. This deep economic interdependence has a negative impact on China’s ability to be fully separated as a bloc and isolated. Even countries with security concerns about Beijing have continued to maintain strong economic engagement policies toward China.
Thus, the QUAD’s attempt to define China as a strategic threat could reveal the mechanism’s weaknesses. The more the bloc advances the containment narrative, the more it risks triggering an escalation of its actions and, in turn, regional states’ reactions that are more about economic cooperation than a balance of diplomacy. All such measures can create new divisions and concerns rather than promoting regional unity.
The sustainability of QUAD is another significant issue. In many cases, strategic alliances are established to address a common threat and dissolve when compromise becomes necessary. The four QUAD countries have different histories, economic interests, and geopolitical priorities. Without a positive, inclusive vision of the region, beyond balancing China, the mechanism may gradually become redundant and lose momentum.
The outcome of the QUAD foreign ministers’ meeting is not China-specific but rather for the Asia Pacific region. It is a sign of an attempt to institutionalise a geopolitical concept based on strategic rivalry and choice of alliances. It is not about ‘clubs’ or ‘suspicion’; it is about inclusiveness, respect, economic integration, cooperative security, long-term security, and the future of the Asia Pacific region. The future of the Indo-Pacific should not be left to ‘bloc politics,’ but to a cooperative spirit among all the countries of the region for mutual benefit and the peace and prosperity the region has strived to achieve.
The writer is a Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh. Director, Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies-Bangladesh Center (RCASBC). Email:[email protected]
