The use of anti-India rhetoric is becoming increasingly visible in Bangladesh’s election discourse, with several political actors invoking India-related narratives as campaigning intensifies ahead of 12 February polls.
This trend is particularly notable among parties with limited electoral prospects, who may use such narratives to mobilise a niche voter base or deflect attention from domestic issues.
Controversial remarks and escalating tensions
Jamaat-e-Islami Secretary General Mia Golam Porwar claimed on Sunday that the killing of intellectuals during the 1971 Liberation War was part of a “planned conspiracy orchestrated by the Indian army and its intelligence agency”—a statement that has drawn sharp criticism for revisiting sensitive historical issues and contradicting the widely acknowledged role of Pakistani forces and local collaborators.
In a more provocative escalation, Hasnat Abdullah, a leader of National Citizen Party (NCP), recently threatened to support separatist movements in India’s northeastern states if Bangladesh were destabilised.
Such remarks are seen as a direct challenge to India’s sovereignty and mark a departure from previous election cycles, where anti-India rhetoric largely revolved around broader themes like “Indian hegemony” or “servitude.”
Historical context and political calculus
Former ambassador Md Abdul Hye noted that the “anti-India card” has long been a recurring feature of Bangladesh’s election politics. “Some quarters in Bangladesh have always tried to play the anti-Indian card during election campaigns. The same applies to India, where the ‘Bangladesh card’ can sometimes influence electoral outcomes,” he said.
However, he observed that this time, some actors are being cautious not to let anti-India sentiments overshadow the broader election agenda, as such rhetoric may alienate peace-loving voters and the business community, which values stability and strong bilateral ties.
Another former diplomat, speaking anonymously, highlighted that parties with realistic chances of forming the next government tend to be more restrained in their comments about India, given the depth of bilateral relations.
Bangladesh-India ties encompass critical areas like water-sharing (e.g., Teesta River), trade (India is Bangladesh’s largest trade partner in South Asia), connectivity (rail, road, and port projects), and defence cooperation. The two countries maintain over 70 official sectoral mechanisms, reflecting a partnership unmatched in scope with any other nation.
Timeline of recent developments
The election schedule announced on 11 December was quickly followed by an assassination attempt on notable political figure Sharif Osman Hadi, sparking unfounded speculation within Bangladesh that the assailant might flee to India. This incident set the stage for a series of diplomatic and political events.
On 14 December, the Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Pranay Verma, was summoned by Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This diplomatic action followed the assassination attempt on politician Sharif Osman Hadi and the subsequent speculative rumors within Bangladesh that the assailant might flee to India, indicating Dhaka’s move to officially address rising tensions and seek clarifications.
In retaliation and as a direct response to the inflammatory comments made by NCP leader Hasnat Abdullah on 15 December, the Indian government summoned Bangladesh’s High Commissioner to India, M Riaz Hamidullah, in New Delhi on 17 December.
This reciprocal summons underscored India’s serious concerns over the threatening remarks targeting its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the northeast.
Concurrently on 17 December, though not a state-level diplomatic summons, a political mobilisation effort titled the “March to Indian High Commission” protest rally was effectively summoned by political actors in Dhaka.
This attempted demonstration, which was ultimately prevented by police, represented a public and symbolic summoning of anti-India sentiment onto the streets, highlighting how the rhetoric had translated into planned collective action.
Who is likely to play the anti-India card?
Observers note that two narratives dominate current political messaging: opposition to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and anti-India sentiment. Parties assessing their electoral chances as strong are more likely to focus criticism on Sheikh Hasina’s governance, while those with weaker prospects may lean more heavily on anti-India rhetoric to galvanise support.
A former diplomat explained, “In diplomacy, a country cannot change its neighbour. Those who believe they have a realistic chance of forming the next government will be more cautious in their public remarks about India.” He added that the bilateral relationship is too multifaceted and interdependent to be lightly jeopardised.
The reaction in India also follows a political logic. As another analyst noted, “India, too, has an audience that responds to anti-Bangladesh narratives. These are political tools on both sides, aimed primarily at mobilising domestic support.”
However, the current rhetoric from figures like Abdullah is considered particularly sensitive, as it touches on India’s territorial integrity—a red line for New Delhi.
Broader implications
While anti-India rhetoric is not new in Bangladesh’s politics, its current form—directly challenging sovereignty and historical facts—raises the risk of diplomatic friction. However, the robust institutional ties between the two countries, including deep economic, security, and civil society linkages, are likely to absorb short-term political posturing. The mainstream electorate’s focus remains on issues like inflation, employment, and governance, suggesting that anti-India narratives may have limited appeal beyond specific constituencies.
