The United Nations Security Council will hold a special meeting on 24th February to mark the 4th anniversary of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Gradually, about 90 per cent of the Donbas is under Russian control. It is now clear that the objectives of the special military operation will certainly be achieved very soon. But the Western world does not want to imagine that. Instead, to protect the so-called values , democracy and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to permanently cripple its long-time adversary, Russia, NATO countries have implemented an unprecedented level of devastating sanctions against Russia. But there is no let-up in Russia’s military operation, instead, Russia is striking even harder. The West believed that only an embargo on Russia’s energy sector could crush Putin. But they were all wrong. On the contrary, the destructive sanctions have become suicidal and have brought extreme instability and disaster to Europe. The picture of economic disaster and human misery is now becoming apparent in all Western media, as if the crisis in Ukraine is not important news.
The European market is essential for Russian energy exports and, at the same time, Russian energy has strengthened Europe’s economic wheel. In 2021, more than half of Russia’s oil exports went to Europe (about one-third of its total oil imports from that year). This reflects Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian crude oil and petroleum products before sanctions were introduced. Among them, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechia are the largest importers of Russian oil. The European Union has imposed a 19th package of sanctions on 23rd October 2025, including a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) into the EU. As a consequence of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies has declined sharply.
The share of natural gas imports from Russia fell from nearly 45% in 2021 to approximately 13% by 2025. Oil imports experienced an even steeper contraction, dropping from 27% in 2021 to just 3% in 2025, while coal imports, which accounted for around 50% in 2021, have been phased out entirely. In parallel, the United States and the United Kingdom implemented comparable sanctions targeting Russian oil exports. Notably, in early 2022, before the full effect of these measures, Russia was supplying the European Union with roughly 2.2 million barrels of crude oil and 1.2 million barrels of refined petroleum products per day, underscoring the scale of the disruption introduced by the sanctions regime. European countries find themselves trapped in a stark ‘survive or collapse’ dilemma, with consequences that are increasingly severe and potentially destabilising not only for Europe but also for the global economy as a whole.
Following each successive sanctions package, the president of the European Commission has characterised the ban on Russian energy products as a landmark measure intended to weaken Russia’s capacity to finance its war. The underlying assumption was that Russia would suffer substantial revenue losses as a direct consequence of these restrictions. However, subsequent developments have revealed outcomes largely contrary to these expectations. Rather than producing the anticipated economic collapse, the sanctions have exposed significant strategic miscalculations, raising serious questions about the prudence and foresight of European leadership. This policy approach suggests a decline in the depth of political judgment and strategic intelligence historically associated with European statecraft, particularly when contrasted with the intellectual rigour of earlier periods such as the European Renaissance. Although formal colonial structures have largely disappeared, elements of a colonial mindset appear to persist within contemporary European political thinking, shaping adversarial postures and policy responses. As a result, the consequences of such actions may be viewed as structurally predictable rather than accidental.
Immediately after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the West came very close to Russia. The socialist state system was suddenly closed, and a tide of democracy and freedom began to flow. President Yeltsin was seen as a symbol of Russia’s new democracy and was adored by the West. Putin was close to the West during the early stages of his presidency. But it was not until he got used to the idea that a long-term Western conspiracy existed to destroy Russia that he began to complain about NATO’s encroachment into Eastern Europe. Whenever the Russian president began to complain about NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, the United States and its Western allies began to form new alliances against Putin’s Russia.
On the whole, the sanctions have helped form a new market for Russia. Countries in Asia are increasingly importing Russian oil for strategic and economic reasons. Because of a global oil supply shortage, the world is seeing rising oil prices and increased volatility in the global market. One would say that, upon the imposition of sanctions, Russia achieved significant success in diverting its energy exports to new markets, and it is important to note that, before 2022, the European Union imported approximately $117 billion in energy from Russia as Europe’s imports of Russian gas fell sharply. The EU is paying a premium price to replace a cheap pipeline supply with costlier alternatives and infrastructure. There are now higher energy bills, fiscal strain, high inflation, domestic political tensions and division in EU countries.
While there is a loss of access to European energy markets, a loss of revenue due to price decreases, a longer energy transportation distance, and increased energy transportation costs, Europe’s market loss is more than compensated for by consolidating demand in Asia. Europe’s imposed restrictions on Russia’s energy exports have led to increased exports to Asia, with little to no change to Russia’s export mechanisms. When analysing the European Union’s sanctions on Russian energy, the EU appears to have engaged in self-sabotage. The EU has proven to the world that it can destroy an energy relationship that has provided its industrial competitive advantage and price stability, while simultaneously failing to achieve its primary goal of economically crippling Russia.
Europe adjusted to high prices, supply fragmentation, and strategic vulnerability, while Russia structurally adapted and suffered almost no long-term damage to its export capacity. In this sense, the sanctions acted as a boomerang, causing more damage to the initiator than to the target. Rather than being seen as a strategic move, the policy is a political statement and a moral posture, with little regard for economic reality. From a strategic and economic point of view, the sanctions also justify the description used in this article as not just ineffective, but self-destructive for the European Union.
The writer is a UK-based Educator, author, and researcher
