Every change of government in Bangladesh brings a familiar promise: state institutions will be freed from political influence, and public administration will return to the principles of merit and neutrality. Yet every transition also revives the same uncomfortable question: has the culture of politicisation truly ended, or has only the name changed?
Government jobs and public institutions are supposed to serve citizens, not political parties. Recruitment, promotions and appointments should be guided by competence, transparency and institutional rules. But Bangladesh’s political history shows a recurring pattern. Successive governments have struggled to maintain a clear separation between party interests and the state.
During the Awami League’s rule, critics accused the government of using quotas, political influence and patronage networks to shape recruitment and administration. Many citizens expected the political transition that followed to bring a different approach, one in which state institutions would become more independent and professional.
Recent controversies, however, have raised concerns that Bangladesh may be repeating an old pattern under a different political banner.
The latest debate centres on the formation of a four-member “high-powered” committee to expedite recruitment for vacant posts of sub-assistant agriculture officers. According to reports published by daily Samakal and other media outlets, the committee is headed by State Minister for Public Administration Md Abdul Bari.
The concern is not simply the creation of a recruitment committee. Governments often form committees to address administrative challenges. The larger question is whether political authority is entering areas where independent and transparent procedures are essential.
Public recruitment is expected to follow established mechanisms through institutions such as the Bangladesh Public Service Commission (PSC) and relevant government bodies. When a political office-holder becomes directly involved in recruitment-related decision-making, it naturally raises questions about whether merit and institutional processes will remain protected.
The inclusion of senior bureaucratic officials, including the cabinet secretary, the principal secretary to the prime minister and the public administration secretary, adds further significance to the issue. A professional bureaucracy must serve the state rather than any political organisation. Public confidence declines when officials or candidates begin to believe that political connections matter more than qualifications.
The debate over political influence has also expanded beyond recruitment. Controversies surrounding appointments to sensitive state institutions, including the Election Commission Secretariat, have intensified concerns about institutional neutrality.
The appointment of an additional secretary to the Election Commission drew criticism from opposition parties and political groups. They questioned whether politically connected officials should hold sensitive positions ahead of local government elections. They raised objections with the commission and later organised protests, including a long march, where they placed several demands, including the cancellation of what they described as politically motivated appointments.
The government and relevant authorities may argue that such appointments were made under existing administrative procedures. However, in democratic institutions, legality alone is not enough. Public trust also depends on whether decisions are perceived as fair, transparent and free from partisan influence.
This concern is not limited to one institution. Since taking office, the BNP government has faced criticism over appointments to various state bodies and local government institutions. Questions have been raised over whether some appointees have political backgrounds and whether party loyalty is becoming a factor in selecting people for public positions.
This is where the term “BNP-isation” enters the debate. It is not merely a political slogan. It represents a wider concern over whether one ruling party is repeating institutional practices previously criticised under another government.
The deeper problem is not whether Awami-isation or BNP-isation is worse. The problem is that every ruling party in Bangladesh has faced accusations of using state institutions to reward supporters and consolidate political influence. The names change, but the pattern remains familiar: a new government arrives, but the old culture survives.
The irony is particularly significant because BNP came to power amid public expectations created by the July-August 2024 quota reform movement. The movement’s central demand was simple: government jobs should be based on merit, not political identity or privileged access.
Thousands of young people protested for a fair recruitment system where qualifications would determine opportunities. Their message was that public service should belong to capable citizens, not political networks.
If any government repeats the same practices it once criticised, it risks damaging public faith in the very idea of reform.
The consequences of politicised recruitment and appointments are far-reaching. First, it discourages talented candidates who invest years preparing for competitive examinations. A system perceived as politically influenced reduces motivation and trust among young citizens.
Second, it weakens administrative neutrality. Officials who believe career advancement depends on political loyalty rather than professional performance may become less accountable to citizens and institutions.
Third, it affects public service delivery. Agriculture, health, education, law enforcement and election management all require skilled and impartial officials. When appointments are viewed through a political lens, the credibility of these institutions suffers.
Bangladesh’s challenge, therefore, is not simply replacing one form of politicisation with another. The real challenge is building institutions strong enough to withstand changes in political power.
BNP now has an opportunity to demonstrate that its promise of change means more than a change of rulers. Ensuring transparent recruitment, strengthening the independence of the PSC, respecting the neutrality of the Election Commission and maintaining professional standards in public administration would be meaningful steps towards breaking the cycle.
Government jobs and state institutions are not rewards for electoral victory. They belong to citizens and exist to serve the public interest.
Bangladesh cannot build a strong democracy by changing the political colour of state institutions after every election. Whether the label is Awami-isation or BNP-isation, the result is the same: weakened institutions, declining public trust and a fragile state.
The real measure of political change is not who controls the state. It is whether the state can remain fair, professional and independent after power changes hands.
