The assassination of president Ziaur Rahman remains one of the most important, discussed, and unresolved chapters in the history of Bangladesh.
On 30 May 1981, the then president was killed at the Chittagong Circuit House. Following this, a conventional narrative was established through rebellion, arrests, counter-operations, military trial, and the execution of sentences.
However, even after more than four decades, reliable answers to certain fundamental questions have not been found.
A re-investigation into this assassination is necessary. Its purpose, however, is not to create a new political narrative, but to hold all old narratives accountable before evidence. This is because the history of a state cannot rely on speculation, loyalty, or propaganda.
History must be established on verifiable documents, testimony, forensic evidence, and an accurate timeline.
In this inquiry, three aspects are paramount – first, what existing documents state; second, which questions those documents have failed to answer; and third, what evidence must now be collected for an effective reinvestigation.
What the documents say
Following the assassination, a Commission of Inquiry was constituted on 6 June 1981. The primary mandate of the commission was to investigate whether the assassination was the outcome of a conspiracy, who the conspirators were, what their motives and plans were, and who aided them.
However, on 13 June, through another notification, this core scope of investigating the conspiracy was omitted. Thus, merely seven days after its formation, the most crucial question surrounding the assassination was excluded from formal inquiry.
Nevertheless, the commission’s report concluded that a faction of military officers led by Major General Manzoor was involved in a conspiracy to seize power. It was also noted that 14 to 16 officers took part in the operation at the Circuit House.
Yet, where the authority to investigate conspiracy was removed from the terms of reference itself, the extent to which the conclusion regarding conspiracy rested on a comprehensive investigation demands re-evaluation.
The commission recorded the statements of 67 witnesses.
The report explicitly highlighted intelligence failures, security lapses, and a lack of co-ordination among forces. Intelligence agencies possessed an understanding of Major General Manzoor’s political ambitions and potential threat, and the President was duly warned.
However, from the night of 29 May to the dawn of 30 May, these agencies failed to provide any advance information regarding what was about to transpire. Moreover, despite the presence of adequately trained personnel and weapons, no resistance was mounted against the attackers at the Circuit House.
Allegations surfaced in testimony that two police personnel positioned in front of the President’s room were removed at around 10pm. In addition, there was no effective unified command between the Police, the President Guard Regiment, and the Military Secretary to the President.
Most significantly, the commission expressed apprehension that the President’s security might have been compromised from within, by one or more members of his personal staff. Although the commission reached no final determination against any individual, it identified several crucial leads.
These included the collection of a typed list of room allocations, allegations of removing security guards, the failure to request timely assistance despite functional wireless apparatus, and suspicions that bullet marks in one room might have been created subsequently.
Whilst the autopsy report recorded approximately 20 distinct bullet wounds on the President’s body, no ballistic conclusions were established regarding the number of weapons used, calibre, direction of firing, distance, or the correlation between specific weapons and injuries.
Another vital event was the death of Major General Manzoor. According to documents, he was alive and in police custody.
Upon receiving instructions from Dhaka, he was handed over to the army against a written receipt. Manzoor had expressed a desire to remain in civilian custody; nevertheless, he was transported to the cantonment with his hands and feet bound and eyes blindfolded.
Upon entering the cantonment, the vehicle carrying him altered its route, and he was later found dead with gunshot wounds. If the primary architect of this assassination was killed while in custody, that death remains inextricably linked with the search for the fundamental truth.
Questions the documents left unanswered
First, why the investigation into the conspiracy was excised from the commission’s terms of reference, who proposed and approved this decision, and what justification was recorded in government files remains unknown.
Second, when and how the decision was made to cancel the President’s visit to Rajshahi and schedule the Chittagong tour, and why intelligence advice recommending the postponement of the visit was disregarded, remains unanswered.
Third, despite identifying Major General Manzoor as a potential threat, why security was not reinforced, whether these warnings were written or verbal, and which officer received them and when, remains unclear.
Fourth, who issued the order to remove security guards from outside the President’s room and why is not known. Fifth, why the typed list of room allocations, detailing the President’s location, was collected and to whom it was delivered remains an unanswered question.
Sixth, why the President’s personal staff failed to seek timely assistance from Army Headquarters or other forces despite possessing operational wireless equipment remains a major query.
Seventh, which specific weapons caused approximately 20 bullet wounds and whether scientific examinations were conducted on the shells, bullets, and weapons retrieved from the scene remain unclear. Eighth, who the members of the so-called Army Revolutionary Council were, and whether key planners or political contacts existed beyond the 14 to 16 directly involved, remains unestablished.
Finally, and most crucially, the ninth question asks who in Dhaka instructed the handover of Manzoor from police to army custody, where the written receipt of transfer is, why the vehicle’s route was changed, and how a bound and blindfolded detainee became exposed before armed individuals.
These questions cannot be resolved through conjecture, nor can a complete history be written while evading them.
Evidence required in a reinvestigation
The primary step of a reinvestigation must be the retrieval of the commission’s complete archive.
Beyond the published report, the original statements of 67 witnesses, written submissions, proceedings, members’ notes, crime scene photographs, sketches, weapon inventories, and attached documents must be recovered.
Concurrently, the original government files concerning the notifications of 6 and 13 June 1981 should be retrieved to inspect note-sheets, opinions, and approval stages regarding the exclusion of the conspiracy aspect.
A precise timeline must be constructed by cross-referencing the President’s itinerary, itinerary revisions, and intelligence reports alongside the night’s army vehicle logbooks, night training orders, and arms and ammunition issue registers.
Acquiring Manzoor’s transfer receipt, wireless transmissions, and statements from escort personnel is essential. Moreover, surviving witnesses could be re-examined through audio-video recordings to construct a contradiction matrix against their former statements.
The original autopsy report, X-rays, physical evidence, and photographs require re-analysis utilizing modern technology.
Reconstructing a 3D crime scene using bullet marks and the architectural layout of the Circuit House would clarify the positions of the attackers and the guards’ opportunities for resistance.
In addition to domestic evidence, dispatch records from foreign embassies of that period, diplomatic reports, and international declassified documents should be collected and verified against other material.
Truth is not the property of any political faction
A reinvestigation does not imply that all previously established conclusions are incorrect. Nor can it be asserted that all answers have been uncovered simply because an earlier investigation took place.
The core objective of a reinvestigation is to recover evidence, verify statements, reconstruct the sequence of events, and establish accountability prior to determining culpability.
Where documents speak, one must speak in the language of documents. Where documents are silent, questions must be raised. For questions whose answers remain unknown, evidence must be sought.
The assassination of President Ziaur Rahman is not merely the murder of an individual; it is a decisive chapter in Bangladesh’s national history. That history ought not to be confined within incomplete records, political expediency, or propagated narratives.
The right to know accurate history belongs to the state, the public, and future generations. This reinvestigation is not aimed at vengeance or predetermined outcomes, but at completing the unfinished search for truth.
Ultimately, history does not remember claims; history survives through evidence that remains true even when confronted with questions.
The writer is a Prosecutor and Special Investigation Officer at the International Crimes Tribunal.
