Despite a year marked by historic verdicts and long-awaited legal changes, the country’s judiciary in 2025 fell short of meeting the full expectations of the people in the aftermath of the mass uprising. While several high-profile cases and reforms drew national and international attention, many observers believe the judiciary failed to decisively break from the legacy of the authoritarian era or to move firmly towards the destination envisioned after the revolution.
In the wake of the popular uprising, expectations were high that the justice system would undergo sweeping transformation. Instead, critics argue that many judicial outcomes appeared predictable: actions taken during the fascist period were reversed almost automatically, while deeper structural accountability remained elusive. Trials for crimes against humanity began, but within a narrow scope. Many individuals accused of involvement with the former authoritarian regime were not brought to justice; instead, they were allegedly allowed to flee the country. A significant number of judges perceived as collaborators of the former regime continue to serve in both lower and higher courts.
Legal observers say the judiciary did not proceed in the manner or direction expected after a “revolution”. While symbolic actions were taken, the broader promise of justice as the “last refuge of the people” remains unfulfilled.
One of the most significant developments of the year was the sentencing of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina to death on charges of crimes against humanity. She was also convicted in several other cases along with her son and daughter. In contrast, her long-time political rival and former prime minister Khaleda Zia, along with her son Tarique Rahman, was acquitted in all corruption cases. In the same year that Hasina was sentenced to death, Khaleda Zia was declared innocent by the courts—an outcome that underscored the dramatic reversal of fortunes between two long-standing political adversaries.
Beyond these verdicts, the judiciary remained in the spotlight due to a series of consequential rulings and legal developments. These included the restoration of the caretaker government system for elections, long demanded by opposition parties; the initiation of trials against military officers accused of enforced disappearances and killings during Hasina’s rule; the promulgation of ordinances on judicial appointments and the establishment of a separate Supreme Court secretariat; changes to procedures for appointing and removing judges; and the unprecedented prosecution of a former chief justice. Jamaat-e-Islami regained its party registration and electoral symbol, while its central leader ATM Azharul Islam was acquitted by the Appellate Division after previously being sentenced to death for crimes against humanity.
Senior lawyer Monir Hossain, convenor of the Bangladesh Law Association, told TIMES of Bangladesh that the judiciary has failed to reach its desired destination even a year after the uprising. While he acknowledged the sincerity of the chief adviser, he blamed non-cooperation from most advisers for the failure to carry out necessary reforms and to remove collaborators of the former regime from state institutions. According to him, more than 600 such collaborators were allowed to cross the border under the protection of influential quarters. He further alleged that a section of senior BNP leaders, whom he claimed do not practise genuine BNP politics, colluded in shielding fascist collaborators and anti-state actors from prosecution.
Monir Hossain argued that due to these factors, the judiciary could not function independently or effectively. Fascist-era judges remain entrenched in both lower and higher courts, despite public demands for their removal following the uprising. Even within the Chief Justice’s Office, he claimed, collaborators of the former regime continue to operate through lobbying networks and syndicate-based influence involving certain lawyers. As a result, cases related to major incidents such as the Shapla Chattar and Pilkhana killings have not been filed, while proceedings at the International Crimes Tribunal continue at a slow pace. He warned that this inertia has allowed remnants of the former regime to attempt a political resurgence.
Another senior lawyer, Syed Mamun Mahbub, echoed similar concerns, stating that the judiciary not only failed to move in the desired direction over the past year but experienced further erosion of its independence. He noted that during both the Four-Party Alliance and Awami League governments, people believed judicial verdicts would not go against the ruling authorities. That perception, he said, persists today, with many believing that the judiciary will not rule against the current government or any party likely to come to power in the future. While he welcomed the ordinances establishing a separate judicial secretariat and a new judicial appointment mechanism, he described these as the only notable positives amid broader decline.
In 2025, Sheikh Hasina was tried at the International Crimes Tribunal along with two associates. The court sentenced Hasina and former home minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal to death. Former IGP Chowdhury Abdullah Al Mamun, who cooperated with the court as a state witness, received a reduced sentence of five years. Although executions of heads of government for crimes against humanity are not unprecedented globally, this marked the first such instance in Bangladesh. Hasina, the former prime minister, leader of the now-banned Awami League, and daughter of the country’s founding president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, became the most prominent figure in Bangladesh’s history to face such a verdict. Following the collapse of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024, both Hasina and Kamal remain absconding and were tried in absentia.
In separate cases related to abuse of power in allocating Rajuk plots in Purbachal, trial courts sentenced Hasina to a total of 21 years in prison on 27 November. Her son Sajeeb Wazed Joy and daughter Saima Wazed Putul were each sentenced to five years in separate cases and fined Tk100,000. In another case involving the allocation of a 10-katha government plot, Hasina was sentenced to five years, her sister Sheikh Rehana to seven years, and her niece Tulip Siddiq, a UK lawmaker and former minister, to two years’ imprisonment on 1 December.
Meanwhile, three members of the Zia family were acquitted of charges this year. On 14 January, the Appellate Division overturned the convictions handed down by the trial court and High Court in the Zia Orphanage Trust case, acquitting Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman. On 2 March, the Appellate Division upheld the High Court’s verdict acquitting Khaleda Zia in the Zia Charitable Trust case. On 4 September, it upheld the High Court’s acquittal of Tarique Rahman and all other accused in the grenade attack case at an Awami League rally. Tarique Rahman and his wife Zubaida Rahman were also acquitted by the High Court on 28 May in a case involving alleged accumulation of illegal wealth.
On 20 November, the Appellate Division unanimously restored the non-party caretaker government system by declaring illegal and void its earlier verdict that had annulled the Thirteenth Amendment. As a result, the caretaker government system—abolished by a Supreme Court ruling—returned through another Supreme Court ruling. However, the system will be implemented from the 14th parliamentary election, not under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Several military officers were brought under the law for enforced disappearances and killings during the Awami League’s rule. In one case involving secret detention centres allegedly run by the DGFI and RAB, Hasina and 28 others, including current and former military officers, were accused. Trials also began in a case involving the killing of 28 people in Rampura during the July uprising, with two army officers among the accused. Former military officer Ziaul Ahsan was named in another disappearance and killing case.
To ensure greater judicial independence, the government issued an ordinance on 21 January establishing a Judicial Appointment Council, whose recommendations guide the president in appointing Supreme Court judges. On 30 November, the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance, 2025, was promulgated, formally separating the judiciary from the executive branch.
The government appointed 25 additional judges to the High Court Division on 25 August, while 21 judges received permanent appointments and took oath on 12 November. Several judges were removed or resigned following investigations into allegations of corruption, misconduct, and abuse of power. Complaints were lodged with the Supreme Judicial Council against High Court Justice Md Rezaul Hasan and Appellate Division Justice Md Ashfaqul Islam.
Former Chief Justice ABM Khairul Haque was detained by police on 24 July and later shown arrested in a murder case related to an incident in Jatrabari. Currently in prison, he faces three cases and has been interrogated on remand with court permission.
On 1 June, the Appellate Division overturned the High Court’s verdict that had declared Jamaat-e-Islami’s registration illegal. The party also regained its electoral symbol, the scale, following the ruling.
On 4 December, the Appellate Division upheld the High Court verdict declaring the oath and formation process of the interim government led by Dr Muhammad Yunus lawful, thereby validating the current administration.
The Judicial Reform Commission submitted its report to the chief adviser on 5 February, recommending the appointment of the senior-most Appellate Division judge as chief justice based on tenure. Subsequently, on 15 March, the Constitution Reform Commission led by Professor Ali Riaz submitted its report, proposing decentralisation of the higher judiciary and the replacement of the term “subordinate courts” with “local courts”.
