The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the world’s largest security alliance. It was designed to contain the Soviet Union threats to Europe after World War II. Since its founding in 1949, it has expanded 10 times, bringing the total membership to 32 countries. The salient tenet of the NATO treaty is Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is an attack on all. The United States is the alliance’s primary security provider. Except for President Trump, all US administrations have treated NATO as the bridgehead of transatlantic security relations. His animus toward NATO has been evident since his first-term election campaigns. NATO’s reluctance to support the current US war against Iran made Trump utterly contemptuous of it and prompted him to threaten withdrawal. Is this the end of NATO?
Speculation about NATO’s end is not new; for years, it has been a prominent topic of debate within European security and political circles. For instance, in 2019, French President Macron called NATO ‘brain-dead,’ and other European leaders described its relations with the US as ‘toxic’ and marked by ‘anxiety of divorce.’ These characterisations stem from the US’s shift in priorities from Europe to Asia. Yet Europeans have taken a laissez-faire approach to developing their own security arrangements, leaving the US presence in the alliance indispensable to them.
However, the rupture between the US and NATO materialised when Trump repeatedly suggested that Canada become the 51st state of the US. It was ominous; Canada is a founding member of NATO, yet the US sought to trample the sovereignty of its longtime ally and neighbour, violating its commitment to Article 5. This disrespectful, coercive posture angered Canadians and alarmed Europeans.
While NATO members were astounded by the US attitude toward Canada, the situation hit hard in Europe when Trump wanted to buy Greenland or use force to take it. Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark, another founding member of NATO. This provocation made Europeans nervous. The rationale for taking control of Greenland was to stave off the Russian and Chinese footprint on American security dominance in the Arctic region and to gain access to critical rare-earth minerals there. The premise was flawed, and NATO denounced it; the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, warned that NATO would end if the US went ahead with an invasion of Greenland.
The US-NATO relationship has deteriorated to its lowest point amid the US war against Iran. The Trump administration ignored European allies before launching attacks on Iran. After Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, Trump asked members to help reopen it, but they declined. They argued that Iran’s war was not their war and that they had neither been consulted nor informed about the military operations in advance.
President Trump could not tolerate Europe’s refusal to help. Consequently, he vented his dismay on his Truth Social platform,“NATO wasn’t there when we needed them, and they won’t be there if we need them again. Remember Greenland, that big, poorly run, piece of ice.” Moreover, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer was caricatured as ‘no-Churchill,’ and the British aircraft carriers were dismissed as ‘toys.’ The UK, Spain, France, and Italy did not allow their airspace to be used for US military attacks on Iran. Eventually, Trump branded NATO allies ‘cowards’ and a ‘paper tiger,’ and warned that he was seriously considering abandoning the alliance.
Trump, however, cannot unilaterally end the US’s membership in NATO; doing so would require overcoming significant hurdles. For instance, he would need to notify Congress and secure a two-thirds vote in the Senate, which is unlikely given the strong bipartisan support for NATO. According to the Pew Research Center, 58% of the American public views NATO favourably; thus, there would also be resistance from them. Nevertheless, Trump could still withdraw US military assets from Europe and pull its 80000 troops stationed there without congressional approval; he could also move US troops from countries that did not support its war against Iran to those that did. The alliance’s security guarantee, though, would become lopsided if any of these possibilities were to come to fruition.
Splits within NATO have occurred in the past. In 1966, France, under Charles de Gaulle, partially withdrew from the alliance’s integrated military command, and in 1974, Greece did the same in protest against Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus. Both later rejoined. But it would be a complete ‘game-changer’ if the US were to leave it, even temporarily.
The impact of the US withdrawal from NATO will be disastrous. Western European nations – the UK, France, and Germany – are less vulnerable to Russian threats than Eastern European ones – Romania, Poland, and the Baltic states; Western countries are far from Russia, while Eastern countries are closer; furthermore, individual members’ security preparedness varies widely; of the 32, only 2 European members – the UK and France – possess nuclear capability. The rest rely on US nuclear protection. Building a unified European defense system without the US would be a substantial undertaking, costing a trillion dollars. Accordingly, it will require significant political will and commitment; that is a recipe for resentment and misunderstanding, as not all NATO members might go along with dictates from Brussels.
The US projects its global power with the help of NATO members, and Europeans help contain Russia’s great-power revanchism and advance US interests in Europe. Both the US and Europe need a strong NATO because of their symbiotic relationship; they complement each other. NATO without the United States would greatly undermine European security; hence, Europe has a significant interest in keeping the US in it. Toward that goal, Secretary General Mark Rutte has maintained rapport and deferred to Trump to keep NATO intact; it’s not the most prestigious move, but it is realistic in these circumstances. Therefore, given what is at stake for both the US and Europe, it is unlikely that NATO will end. Rather, it is likely to survive for decades to come.
The writer is a Doctoral Researcher, International Relations, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM)
