As more flood victims are being rescued from the streets in the tragic situation of August 2026 in Kathmandu, Nepal, a difficult question haunts them: why was the city turning down offers of foreign search-and-rescue teams when it was facing such a huge crisis? It is not just a denial of humanitarian assistance. Nepal was not closed off from the international community. Still, it chose to accept targeted assistance where it felt it needed it, and to participate in rescue operations under national command. You need to make a distinction between the two.
The disaster had hit parts of Rasuwa, Nuwakot and Dhading, with Rasuwa being particularly important, as it is located on the Nepal-China border in the Tibet Autonomous Region. A massive glacial landslide in the headwaters of the Himalayas led to an unparalleled discharge of ice, rock, mud and water at the downstream end, causing the flooding. The geo-historical setting thus imposed on the disaster had a very sensitive geopolitical aspect.
The first and foremost is institutional confidence. The Nepal Army, Army Police and Armed Police Force have adequate experience to conduct the first rescue operation, Kathmandu said. Subsequently, Nepal’s Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal explained that the policy was made with the country’s capacity, urgent needs, and geographical situation in mind, which would not allow any other policy. The Nepalese soldiers are familiar with the mountains, rivers, narrow valleys and the terrain, which is not even solid in Nepal. Not a claim of nationalism.
In the rugged, rocky landscape of the Himalayas, it is not possible to complete the rescue operation any sooner, even if one has more teams overseas to rely on. Foreign personnel must be transported, housed, communicated with, coordinated about security, and integrated into the operations. Foreign personnel will be transported, accommodated, communicated with, coordinated for security and brought into operations. This can be logistical too, as many teams are not familiar with the conditions of roads and bridges being washed away, and the possibility of secondary landslides and flooding.
The second is about the 2015 Nepal earthquake that struck Gorkha. After that, there was a huge international response in Nepal. Equipment, aircraft and supplies were brought in from outside, but a lot of help also arrived, which caused issues with organisation and logistics. It seems Kathmandu has learned its lesson. No, it was not that foreign aid was undesirable, but that an uncoordinated influx of rescue squads could overload airports, roads, communication systems and government coordination procedures at the time of need. Now that the catastrophe is over, there have been reports that Nepal did not want to deal with many foreign teams, as it has had to in the past.
Rasuwa is not just like any other disaster-hit district. It borders Tibet, China and has strategic transport, border and hydropower facilities. The area around the Nepal-China border and Gyirong was a big area for Kathmandu and Beijing. The disaster also impacted many foreign nationals (including Chinese and Indian citizens and workers). This raises a fresh question: did geography have anything to do with Kathmandu’s calculations?
Nepal has maintained close relations with China and India while seeking to maintain its strategic autonomy. Foreign military/quasi-military rescue forces deployed in a sensitive border area can lead to problems with sovereignty, intelligence, access to, and control over operations. Some observers have wondered whether this has influenced the government’s initial preference for homegrown forces, given the strategic sensitivity of this border region between Rasuwa and Tibet. The region’s ‘geographic sensitivity’ was a likely reason, said former Nepali diplomat Dinesh Bhattarai in a report. But Nepalese officials have said it was not under pressure from the Chinese.
One of the biggest misunderstandings about the controversy is that Nepal has been denying the entry of all humanitarian assistance. It did not. The government has established an Emergency Response Team to arrange search and rescue, information verification and consular assistance for any foreign nationals affected by the flood. It also kept in touch with the neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. More importantly, the nature of the emergency became clearer, and Kathmandu changed its tune. India and China were then asked for special assistance, particularly for those trapped in the hydropower tunnels. Dead identification and control were also requested as technical assistance in Nepal.
The Nepal experience is a larger teaching tool for South Asia. The effects of climate change, glacier instability and extreme weather conditions are leading to a growing number of cross-border disasters. The impacts of glacial melt and floods do not end at the borders of any nation or state. Thus, there is a need to enhance the disaster-diplomacy mechanism among Nepal, China, India, Bangladesh and other regional countries. These should feature real-time data transfer of hydrological and geological data, satellite monitoring, early-warning systems, training, other personnel, pre-staging of emergency supplies, and the mobilisation of specific regional emergency rescue potential.
The initial rejection of general search-and-rescue teams from abroad, therefore, must not be interpreted as an isolationist, rejectionist trend in Nepal towards international solidarity. It was an indication of their faith in the domestic security forces; lessons learned from the logistical troubles encountered during 2015 and the extraordinary geographical difficulties encountered in the Rasuwa-Tibet border area. As for the disaster, it evolved as others were reminded of the need for a regional solution. Hundreds had been trapped in tunnels, and thousands were missing in Nepal, which had asked for special aid from China and India.
The true message is thus not ‘Nepal was right to refuse foreign assistance’ or ‘Nepal should have opened the door to all’. The lesson to be learned is that sovereignty and solidarity can go hand in hand in humanitarian assistance. The question ought no longer to be who enters first, but how neighbouring countries can ensure that the right expertise is in the right place at the right time without infringing on a country’s sovereignty and command in the face of disaster, in view of the increasingly climate-vulnerable Himalayas.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author
The writer is a Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh. Director, Hong Kong Research Centre for Asian Studies-Bangladesh Centre (RCASBC). Email: [email protected]
