The post-Cold War world was largely defined by American primacy. The United States emerged as the world’s pre-eminent military, economic and technological power, while its alliances, financial institutions and security guarantees underpinned much of the international order.
For smaller and middle powers, aligning with Washington often appeared to be the safest route to security and prosperity.
That assumption is now being tested. The wars in the Middle East and Europe, the emergence of new defence partnerships, the search for alternatives to Western-dominated financial systems, and China’s growing economic weight all point towards a world in transition – from American primacy towards strategic multipolarity.
This does not mean that American power is disappearing. Rather, it means that the United States can no longer expect to shape every major geopolitical outcome on its own.
The ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict has exposed the vulnerability of the existing security architecture in the Middle East. The conflict has extended beyond the immediate belligerents, with attacks and counter-attacks affecting the wider Gulf environment and forcing neighbouring states to confront risks they did not choose.
For the Gulf states, the most important lesson may not be the military outcome of the war but the question of strategic dependence. For decades, the United States has been the principal external guarantor of Gulf security. Yet the war has demonstrated that even countries closely aligned with Washington can find themselves exposed when a conflict involving their principal security partner escalates.
The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has provided another stark reminder. A single strategic chokepoint can affect energy supplies, shipping, insurance costs and global markets thousands of kilometres away.
Recent efforts by Gulf countries to develop alternative export routes, while Iran and Oman explore arrangements for maritime traffic, underline a broader lesson: states increasingly want redundancy in their economic and strategic lifelines.
The Russia-Ukraine war has produced a similar lesson in Europe. Despite massive Western military, economic and political support for Ukraine and successive sanctions against Moscow, Russia has remained a significant military and geopolitical actor.
The European Union continues to expand its assistance to Ukraine, while Russia has sought to sustain its economy through alternative trading relationships and energy markets.
The important point is not whether Russia or the West has ‘won’. It is that neither side has been able to impose its preferred outcome quickly. The conflict has demonstrated the limits of coercion, sanctions and military superiority when confronted by strategic depth, economic adaptation and political endurance.
One of the clearest indications of changing geopolitical behaviour is the emergence of new defence arrangements. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on August 7, 2026, is officially described as defensive and does not identify a common adversary.
Nevertheless, its emergence amid the US-Iran-Israel conflict is strategically significant. It would be premature to describe the Mecca Pact as a replacement for the US security architecture.
But it clearly demonstrates that regional powers are exploring additional layers of security rather than depending exclusively on a single external guarantor. Analysts suggest that the pact is likely to change the dynamics in the Middle East.
A similar trend is visible in the Indo-Pacific. Japan and the Philippines have deepened defence cooperation through a Reciprocal Access Agreement and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, allowing greater operational cooperation and reciprocal provision of supplies and services.
These developments should not automatically be interpreted as evidence that US alliances are collapsing. Indeed, the United States remains central to many of these security networks.
But they do indicate that smaller and middle powers increasingly prefer diversified security partnerships rather than placing all their strategic eggs in one basket. This is perhaps the most important change in the emerging world order: strategic autonomy is replacing strategic dependence.
The transformation is equally visible in economics and finance. The United States derives enormous geopolitical influence not simply from its military capability but from the central position of the dollar in international trade and finance.
The ability to impose financial sanctions and restrict access to Western financial networks has become a powerful instrument of statecraft. Countries facing or fearing such restrictions therefore have an incentive to develop alternatives.
China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), and various BRICS initiatives are part of this broader effort. BRICS countries are exploring ways to facilitate cross-border transactions through national currencies and interconnected payment systems rather than relying exclusively on traditional Western financial channels.
Yet these alternatives remain far smaller than SWIFT, and the dollar continues to dominate global reserves and international finance. The significance, therefore, is not that SWIFT or the dollar is about to disappear. It is that countries are beginning to build insurance policies against financial dependence.
The same logic explains the growth of alternative economic corridors. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and emerging routes across Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Indian Ocean reflect a strategic understanding that trade routes can be as important as military alliances.
The lesson of Hormuz reinforces this thinking. If a single maritime chokepoint can disrupt global commerce, countries will naturally seek alternative ports, pipelines, railways and shipping routes. Economic connectivity is increasingly becoming an instrument of strategic resilience.
The most consequential structural change, however, is China’s rise. China is no longer simply a manufacturing centre. It has become a major economic, technological and trading power with growing capabilities in artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, electric vehicles, telecommunications, renewable energy and digital infrastructure.
While the United States continues to possess unmatched global military reach, China’s strength lies increasingly in the scale of its economy, industrial capacity, trade relationships and technological ambitions.
China has also demonstrated an ability to build relationships without requiring countries to adopt a single political model. Its economic engagement across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America gives Beijing influence that extends well beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
Russia, meanwhile, remains a major military, energy and geopolitical power. The Ukraine war has demonstrated that Moscow cannot simply be excluded from the international system through sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Russia has also strengthened relationships with China, India, Iran and other non-Western partners.
Thus, the emerging system is not a simple contest between Washington and Beijing. Russia remains important, while India, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and other middle powers increasingly possess the confidence and capacity to pursue independent strategic choices.
The world is therefore not witnessing the disappearance of American power. It is witnessing the end of America’s uncontested primacy. The United States remains the world’s most capable military power, possesses enormous economic resources, leads important technological sectors and remains central to NATO and Indo-Pacific security arrangements.
But power is no longer concentrated in one capital. China’s economic rise, Russia’s military resilience, the growing assertiveness of regional powers and the emergence of alternative financial and trade networks are creating a more distributed international system.
For smaller states, this presents both opportunities and dangers. Multipolarity gives them more choices, but more choices also demand greater strategic sophistication. The old formula of simply choosing one camp is becoming increasingly inadequate. For Bangladesh and other middle and smaller powers, the emerging order calls for strategic diversification.
Relations with the United States remain important, but so are relations with China, India, Japan, Europe, the Gulf states, Türkiye and others. The objective should not be to replace one dependency with another, but to maximise national interests through balanced engagement.
The defining characteristic of the coming international order may therefore be neither American nor Chinese dominance. It may be competitive coexistence among several centres of power. The wars in the Middle East and Europe, the emergence of new defence pacts, the search for alternative financial systems and the construction of new trade corridors are early signs of this transformation.
The unipolar moment is not ending because America has become weak. It is ending because the world has become stronger, more interconnected and more strategically diverse. The age ahead will belong not to a single power, but to those states capable of navigating a world where power is increasingly shared, contested and constantly recalibrated.
The author, Brigadier General (Retd) Mustafa Kamal Rusho, is the Research Director at Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies.
