Relations between Bangladesh and India have significantly deteriorated since the ouster of prime minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, bringing an end to what New Delhi had hailed as a “golden era” of cooperation, according to diplomats and analysts.
This downturn represents a dramatic shift after more than a decade of close collaboration in security, economic, and political spheres, and has sparked worries on both sides over trade, border management, and regional strategic dynamics, the International Crisis Group noted in a recent report.
It said, “Further strain on ties would hurt both countries. Fresh elections in Bangladesh are a chance for the two governments to put the tensions behind them.”
The Crisis Group recommends that “India should avoid provocative statements that would be seen in Bangladesh as meddling in its polls” as the national election approaches. It also recommended that in the run up to the national polls “Bangladeshi parties should avoid taking rhetorical shots at New Delhi in order to score nationalist points with voters”.
The report, titled “After the “Golden Era”: Getting Bangladesh-India Ties Back on Track” and published on 23 December, focuses on the increasingly acrimonious relations between Bangladesh and India and lays out recommendations on what can be done to breach the stalemate.
“New Delhi should give Dhaka space to strike a balance that will serve domestic stability,” it said.
The report is based on field research in Bangladesh in March 2025 and interviews with Indian specialists in mid-2025, as well as interviews conducted remotely over a period of more than six months.
Those consulted included serving and former officials in diplomacy and security, foreign diplomats, as well as analysts, researchers, and journalists. Roughly two‑thirds of the participants were men, underscoring their dominant presence in state institutions in both Bangladesh and India.
The report said, “The Indian government’s ideology is such that it will feel compelled to speak up for Hindus overseas it perceives as being vulnerable or under attack. But while it is legitimate for it to express concerns in some specific cases, it should avoid exaggerating the problem or echoing disinformation about the fate of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, things that will inflame tensions and dent its credibility; indeed, as noted, some Bangladeshi Hindus say India’s stance has been counterproductive for them.”
India’s concern about Bangladeshi Hindus is perceived in Bangladesh as politically motivated because Muslims in India often become the target of communal violence and discrimination, it noted.
According to the report, political parties in Bangladesh have been urged to avoid fueling anti‑India sentiment, while New Delhi is advised not to escalate tensions or weaken prospective allies in Dhaka. Following the elections, India is expected to offer goodwill measures to the incoming Bangladeshi administration, which in return will be required to acknowledge and address India’s security interests.
Bilateral Relations from 1971 to 2009
Although India had backed Bangladesh’s Liberation War, it found it difficult to establish durable relations with its neighbour in the years immediately after independence. A prominent Indian analyst described the fracturing of Pakistan as a “pyrrhic victory” for New Delhi.
The initial gratitude shown to Indian forces for their decisive role in December 1971 quickly gave way to resentment, as allegations of looting surfaced. The nascent Bangladeshi military also harboured discontent: its commander was excluded from the surrender ceremony, which was seen as an insult, and frustration deepened when Indian troops seized weapons and ammunition abandoned by the Pakistani army.
Strains between the two countries linked by a 4,096‑kilometre border continued after India completed its troop withdrawal in March 1972. That same month, Dhaka and New Delhi signed a friendship treaty modelled on the 1971 Indo‑Soviet pact. Some Bangladeshi officials criticised the agreement, fearing it would leave the country overly reliant on India and entangle it in the Soviet bloc.
Other disputes further complicated ties. Water‑sharing and border demarcation became contentious issues, highlighted by India’s failure to ratify a 1974 boundary accord. Seeking to diversify its diplomacy, Bangladesh secured recognition from Pakistan in 1974 and from China the following year.
Sheikh Hasina and India–Bangladesh relations
India–Bangladesh relations have experienced repeated highs and lows over the decades. In the years following Bangladesh’s independence, mistrust—often bordering on hostility—defined the bilateral dynamic, leading to a heavily securitised frontier and hampering economic cooperation.
A major shift came in 2009 when the Awami League returned to office, with Sheikh Hasina enjoying a commanding majority in parliament and greater leverage over the military. This ushered in the closest ties between Dhaka and New Delhi since the early 1970s.
Yet, over time, that intimacy became politically costly for Hasina. Mounting criticism of authoritarian tendencies and economic mismanagement, coupled with a widespread belief that she leaned too heavily on India, steadily weakened her domestic standing and ultimately played a role in her downfall.
Tensions Increased Along the Shared Borders
Border tensions have also risen since August 2024. India began constructing fences along the frontier in the 1980s to curb illegal migration and smuggling, and roughly 80 per cent of the boundary is currently fenced. A 1975 accord bars the erection of defence structures within 150 yards of either side of the border, commonly called the “zero line”, leaving many stretches unfenced due to settlements or terrain, unless both sides agree to exceptions.
Soon after taking office, Bangladesh’s interim administration signalled a tougher stance on border management than its predecessor. One official alleged that under Sheikh Hasina, border guards had been instructed to ignore repeated violations by Indian forces, adding that such tolerance would no longer continue. Shortly after Yunus assumed office, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) personnel blocked India’s Border Security Force (BSF) from building a new fence section within 150 yards of the zero line. Dhaka argued the construction lacked its approval, while BSF officials claimed the arrangement had been settled in 2012.
The situation worsened in December 2024 and January 2025, when BSF tried to fence additional areas, sparking confrontations with BGB units and local residents. Both governments summoned each other’s high commissioners. India maintained that the fences did not qualify as “defence structures” and were consistent with existing agreements, though it eventually halted construction. Later, India’s envoy suggested there was an “understanding regarding fencing” reached during Hasina’s tenure that New Delhi expected to see honoured. However, Dhaka rejected this, calling such arrangements “unequal agreements” and warning they could be revoked.
