Bangladesh’s first subsoil mega-project, a multi-lane road tunnel under the Karnaphuli River, has become a severe financial burden for the government.
The economic activities expected to drive its viability have failed to materialise, largely due to faulty traffic surveys, inadequate planning for connecting roads, and slow industrialisation on the Anwara side of the river.
Only 14% of the projected traffic is now using the tunnel leaving toll revenues to fail to cover operation and maintenance costs, causing monthly losses of Tk3.1 crore.
Serious financial irregularities have also come to light in the Tk10,689 crore project, according to an impact assessment report by the Planning Ministry’s Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Department (IMED).
The IMED report notes that the 2013 feasibility study aimed to increase the capacity of the Chattogram-Cox’s Bazar highway, link Chattogram Port with the proposed Matarbari deep-sea port, and establish a “One City, Two Towns” model connecting both banks of the river, inspired by Shanghai and Pudong.
Approved in 2015 at an initial estimate of Tk8,446.63 crore, the project’s cost surged after two revisions to Tk10,689.71 crore, a 26.56% increase.
Furthermore, the implementation period doubled; originally scheduled for completion in June 2020, the tunnel did not open until June 2024.
The initial study projected a daily volume of 17,000 vehicles upon opening, rising to 28,305 by 2025. However, traffic data from November 2024 to March 2026 reveals that only 4,000 to 4,500 vehicles use the tunnel daily. Most are cars and light vehicles, severely deflating expected toll revenues.
IMED attributed this shortfall to flawed traffic forecasting in the 2013 study, which relied on a speculative “zone concept” rather than actual base-year vehicle data.
Limitations in time pricing and the preparation of the origin-destination (OD) matrix further compromised the forecasts.
Currently, daily toll collection averages Tk12 lakh (Tk3.6 crore monthly), while daily operating expenses reach Tk22 lakh (Tk6.6 crore monthly). Toll revenue covers just 54% to 55% of operating costs, leaving a monthly deficit of over Tk3 crore.
Operational vulnerabilities are compounded by a lack of skilled local personnel. The tunnel relies heavily on the technical support and workforce of the contractor, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), as the Bangladesh Bridge Authority has yet to secure approval for its own permanent technical organogram.
IMED warned that this dependence inflates long-term costs and undermines strategic self-reliance.
The report also questioned a Tk484.19 crore service area containing bungalows, motels, and convention centres, noting its relevance to the tunnel’s primary purpose remains unclear.
Finally, an audit review uncovered 68 objections, 48 of which are classified as serious financial irregularities (SFIs) and remain unresolved. These include constructing a Tk50.37 crore service area without clear justification, Tk25 crore in contingency expenses, an unreasonable Tk22.41 crore price adjustment, and Tk7.33 crore in unauthorised variation orders. Other major discrepancies involve redundant supervision fees, unverified tree-planting expenditures, and failing to penalise project delays. IMED concluded that most irregularities stem from violations of the Public Procurement Rules (PPR-2008) and recommended immediate resolution.
To restore the tunnel’s financial sustainability, IMED recommended accelerating the completion of the 74-km regional highway connecting Matarbari deep-sea port.
It also urged upgrading the Anwara-Banshkhali-Satkania road as an approach route, speeding up the development of the Anwara industrial zone, and encouraging industries to route imported raw materials through that part of the port.
Other proposals include introducing electronic toll collection (ETC), rerouting cargo truck traffic, leasing the unused service area to international hotel chains, approving a permanent technical workforce structure, and training skilled local operators.
Dr Mustafizur Rahman, Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), told TIMES of Bangladesh that caution is paramount when undertaking mega-projects. “The economic viability of a project depends on many interconnected factors,” he noted. “When we build infrastructure but fail to deliver the accompanying elements, the project ceases to be economically sustainable.”
He explained that the traffic forecasts for the Karnaphuli Tunnel depended heavily on the establishment of a special economic zone (SEZ) in Anwara, which was meant to be developed by a Chinese company.
“The import-export traffic expected to move between this SEZ, Chattogram Port, and eventually Matarbari Port formed the very foundation of the forecast,” Dr Rahman said. “However, because the economic zone stalled for various reasons, the projected 17,000 vehicles a day never materialised. Today, only around 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles are using it.”
Emphasising the necessity of good governance and synchronized planning, Dr Rahman added: “Our takeaway must be that complementary initiatives ensuring a project’s economic rationale must be delivered in parallel. Otherwise, infrastructure falls into these traps.”
He also stressed that projects must remain cost-effective from inception. “In this project alone, a service area was built at a cost of nearly Tk500 crore, which the government is now desperately trying to lease out. We must prevent costs from inflating unnecessarily during the formulation stage.”
“Ultimately, linked initiatives cannot be left behind,” Dr Rahman concluded. “If one major project is completed but its companion developments are neglected, this is the inevitable outcome.”
