Discussions about Bangladesh’s development usually focus on economic growth, infrastructure, investment, employment, education, healthcare, and foreign trade. Yet another fundamental question deserves equal attention: How is state power exercised, and how is that power held accountable? The answer to this question allows us to understand Bangladesh’s development challenges from a broader perspective. Without popular sovereignty, the rule of law, effective democracy, and meaningful accountability, there are legitimate reasons to question how sustainable development can be over the long term.
‘The people are the owners of the state’ is not merely a political slogan. It is closely connected to the political science concept of Popular Sovereignty – the principle that the ultimate source of state authority is the people and that state institutions exercise power entrusted to them by citizens. No country can claim to have implemented this ideal perfectly. Yet societies where political rights, freedom of expression, voting rights, the rule of law, and institutional accountability are comparatively stronger generally possess more stable foundations for governance and development.
In a modern state, millions of citizens cannot govern directly. People therefore elect representatives and entrust them with the responsibility of governing for a defined period. But elected representatives, too, may have personal, political, and partisan interests. Therefore, checks and balances, independent institutions, and effective accountability are necessary to prevent entrusted public power from becoming excessively concentrated in individual or partisan interests. For this reason, modern democratic states have developed different systems of separation and mutual restraint among the legislature, executive, and judiciary. The institutional structure, however, varies from one democracy to another. In the United States, the separation of powers is comparatively strict. The President and members of the executive administration are not members of Congress; Congress can override a presidential veto under specified constitutional conditions; and the judiciary can review executive actions and legislation against constitutional limits.
The Constitution of Bangladesh recognises the people as the source of state power. Yet constitutional recognition alone cannot guarantee rights in practice. Institutions must possess the independence, capacity, and effective procedures necessary to protect those rights. This issue deserves particular attention in any discussion of Bangladesh’s system of governance.
When public confidence in elections declines, or the credibility of the electoral process comes into question, one of the principal institutional channels through which popular sovereignty is exercised becomes weakened. As a result, the pressure for public accountability on those exercising state power may diminish, while concerns about the neutrality of state institutions may increase. Maintaining a credible electoral system requires more than an effective Election Commission. The administration, law-enforcement agencies, judiciary, universities, professional organisations, public institutions, and media all have important roles in maintaining the balance between political authority and institutional independence. When that balance weakens, the boundaries between the state and political parties can become blurred. Questions may then arise as to whether professional standards, rather than political loyalty, determine appointments, institutional decisions, and public policy.
The internal structure of political parties is equally important. If decision-making within political parties becomes excessively centralised and opportunities for dissent are restricted, elected representatives may find it more difficult to exercise independent judgment and deliberate in the public interest. This can directly affect parliamentary accountability. Article 70 of the Constitution is an important part of this discussion. The constitutional requirement concerning party allegiance is intended, among other things, to maintain parliamentary stability. However, there is debate over the breadth of its application. Critics argue that it can restrict the independent expression and deliberation of Members of Parliament. This raises the question of whether Parliament is sufficiently equipped to scrutinise executive decisions rather than merely endorse government policy.
If Parliament cannot effectively question the executive, if the judiciary does not enjoy adequate institutional independence, if elections fail to command public confidence, and if the media cannot independently scrutinise those in power, then constitutional institutions may exist formally while popular sovereignty remains weak in practice. Understanding how these factors influence governance and development requires us to examine Bangladesh’s political and administrative realities.
Bangladesh’s political experience has repeatedly raised questions about the relationship between political competition and state institutions. It would be neither balanced nor constructive to assume that any single political party is entirely above these structural problems. Rather than attributing the entire problem to one party or government, it is more useful to examine it within the broader context of Bangladesh’s political culture, institutional structures, and long-term patterns of governance.
A Prime Minister or minister cannot personally manage every function of government. They must therefore depend on the administration. When the civil service operates with professionalism, neutrality, and competence, this strengthens the state. But when political loyalty or personal influence becomes excessively important in administrative decisions, the balance between policymaking, implementation, and accountability can be weakened. Similarly, when the boundaries between the responsibilities and powers of elected political leaders and the permanent bureaucracy become unclear, administrative accountability may suffer.
Bangladesh needs a system in which the Prime Minister can provide effective leadership but remains subject to constitutional and institutional limits; ministers can make decisions but remain accountable to Parliament and the public; civil servants remain competent and professional without becoming alternative centres of political power; Parliament retains the capacity to scrutinise and question the decisions of the majority government; the judiciary remains protected from political influence as far as institutionally possible; the Election Commission operates according to law and impartiality; and the media remains free to verify information and raise matters of public interest. The stability and effectiveness of the state should not depend on the strength of an individual leader. They should depend on strong, independent, and accountable institutions.
Bangladesh’s development challenge, therefore, cannot be reduced to building bridges, roads, ports, power plants, or increasing GDP. The political and institutional foundations of development must also be strengthened. Weak institutions, unreliable elections, and inadequate accountability can undermine the ability of development gains to reach citizens in a sustainable, equitable, and just manner.
The central question before Bangladesh is not merely who will hold power, but how power will be exercised and restrained. Replacing one political party with another does not, by itself, constitute institutional transformation. If the structure of the state, political behaviour, and mechanisms of accountability remain unchanged, problems of partisan influence, concentration of power, and limited public participation may simply continue under a different political leadership.
Bangladesh therefore needs a political and institutional culture in which power is exercised through law and accountable institutions; state institutions are not subject to the exclusive control of any individual or party; and governments understand that governing the state is a responsibility entrusted by the people,not ownership of the state itself.
The day Bangladesh establishes credible elections as a genuine source of governmental legitimacy, ensures that institutions are accountable to the Constitution and the law rather than to partisan loyalty, and creates effective accountability at every level of power, development will no longer be measured merely by economic statistics. It will become more deeply connected with good governance, justice, human dignity, institutional integrity, and sustainable state capacity.
Bangladesh’s long-term development will become truly sustainable when state power is exercised as a public trust, within a framework of transparency, law, institutional independence, and genuine accountability.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author
The writer is a columnist and political analyst
