Only a few societies in history have succeeded in decommodifying political power, rendering public office financially unrewarding and governance materially unattractive. Two often-cited, though radically different, examples are the welfare-state trajectory of the United Kingdom in the late twentieth century and the welfare-based Rashidun Caliphate (632–661 CE), during which nearly thirty governors were reportedly dismissed over roughly three decades of rule from Madina. These cases suggest that the nature of political power itself, rather than electoral mechanics alone, determines the integrity of governance.
In the contemporary world, elections are no longer merely democratic instruments for selecting representatives. They are deeply embedded in economic structures, power relations, and material incentives. Across democratic, hybrid, and authoritarian systems, electoral outcomes are shaped as much by money, markets, and media as by ideology or voter preference.
By examining election finance practices in South Asia and Western democracies, and contrasting them with the governance principles of the Rashidun Caliphate, the article explores whether political power can be meaningfully decommodified and what such decommodification would entail.
In most modern political systems, access to elected office confers control over state resources, regulatory authority, patronage networks, and, in many contexts, informal protection from legal or financial scrutiny. Political office thus becomes an asset with both direct and indirect economic returns. Elections increasingly resemble investment projects in which candidates and parties incur substantial upfront costs with the expectation of recouping those costs, often with profit, once in power.
This investment logic operates across both developed and developing democracies, albeit through different institutional channels. In weaker institutional environments, it manifests through black money, cash transactions, vote buying, and clientelist exchanges. In stronger institutional settings, it appears through legalised financial influence, lobbying, revolving-door employment, and campaign financing mechanisms that formally comply with the law. In both cases, the economic value of political power inflates the cost of electoral competition and skews outcomes in favour of wealth.
Several global trends have sharply increased the cost of elections. Media-centric campaigns, professional political consultants, data analytics, permanent campaigning, and social media advertising have transformed elections into capital-intensive enterprises. Even where legal spending limits exist, party-level expenditures, third-party campaigns, and informal financing routinely circumvent regulations.
This persistent gap between law and practice exposes a fundamental flaw in modern electoral governance: regulations are designed to monitor declared expenditures, while actual campaign financing flows through opaque, decentralised, and often informal networks. As a result, election oversight mechanisms audit compliance forms rather than the political economy of money itself.
In many developing and transitional democracies, election finance is dominated by illicit funding, cash-based mobilisation, and patron–client relationships. Weak enforcement capacity, economic vulnerability among voters, and limited state reach sustain these practices.
Western democracies, by contrast, have largely transformed illicit influence into institutionalised and legal forms of financial power. Corporate donations, unlimited independent expenditures, lobbying industries, and post-office employment normalise the influence of wealth in politics. While these systems are more transparent, they remain structurally unequal. Elections are not covertly purchased; they are openly influenced.
The distinction between ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ elections is therefore misleading. What differs is not the presence of money power, but the manner in which it is incorporated into political systems.
Two instances of decommodification can be noted. The official salary for the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (including the MP salary) is £166,786 per year as of recent guidance when the BBC Director‑General’s total pay (including salary and taxable benefits) was reported at about £547,000 per year for Tim Davie, according to the news outlet’s 2024–25 annual report. Sometimes former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson regret having poor salary. 2nd Caliph Umar used to audit the governors himself and restricted them from having lavish life.
Economic inequality translates directly into political inequality. Wealthy individuals, corporations, and organised interests shape political agendas long before elections occur, by influencing candidate selection, controlling media narratives, financing litigation, and capturing regulatory institutions after elections.
In much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, electoral politics operates through clientelist systems. Jobs, cash, welfare access, or protection are exchanged for political support, often mediated by local brokers rather than party platforms. Such systems flourish where the state is the primary source of livelihoods, social safety nets are weak, and informal economies dominate.
In these contexts, voter behaviour is not irrational. Accepting inducements often reflects economic necessity rather than moral failure. Electoral integrity cannot be separated from employment security, social protection, and access to basic services.
South Asia illustrates the limits of regulatory approaches in the absence of structural reform. India possesses one of the most elaborate election finance frameworks in the developing world, including spending ceilings, disclosure requirements, and surveillance mechanisms. Yet black money remains endemic due to large constituencies, party-level spending, third-party campaigns, and cash-driven mobilisation.
Pakistan’s electoral finance regime is even weaker. Patronage networks, elite capture, and informal funding dominate political competition, while enforcement bodies lack autonomy and capacity. Sri Lanka and the Maldives demonstrate variations of the same pattern: improved formal rules but weak control over party expenditure, business influence, and digital campaigning. Across the region, no state has decisively curtailed money power in elections. The problem is systemic, not administrative.
Western democracies reduce overt transactional corruption through public funding, spending caps, and independent regulators. Yet they remain vulnerable to plutocratic influence. In the United States, Super PACs, unlimited independent expenditures, and lobbying enable wealth to shape political outcomes legally. In Western Europe, corporate influence, media concentration, and post-electoral lobbying persist despite stronger safeguards. These systems manage the visibility of money power rather than eliminating it.
Modern electoral systems struggle to eliminate money power because politics is professionalised and expensive, enforcement agencies are embedded within political structures, and voters’ economic insecurity creates inducement opportunities. Most importantly, political office continues to promise private gain.
This brings us to a historical counterpoint that challenges the commodification of political authority itself.
The Rashidun Caliphate operated in a distinct historical context and cannot be mechanically replicated. However, it offers normative principles that illuminate how political power can be decommodified.
Leadership selection occurred through shura (consultation), elite consensus, and public acceptance, without mass campaigning, financial mobilisation, or vote buying. Public office did not require personal expenditure. Strict separation between wealth and authority was enforced: governors’ assets were audited, unexplained enrichment led to removal, and gifts to officials were prohibited. Office was regarded as amanah (trust), not entitlement.
Accountability extended to the highest authority. Caliphs were publicly questioned, and legitimacy rested on moral authority rather than wealth or coercion.
A flawless electoral system may be unattainable. However, a high-integrity and anti-oligarchic system requires addressing both incentives and norms. Essential elements include reducing the cost of politics through public funding and equal media access; regulating party-level as well as candidate spending; ensuring real-time financial transparency; enforcing asset audits; imposing swift and certain penalties; and strengthening social protection to reduce voter vulnerability.
Above all, political office must cease to function as a gateway to private accumulation. Neither South Asian states nor Western democracies have succeeded in insulating elections from money power; they have merely institutionalised it in different forms.
Ultimately, elections are corrupted not merely by money, but by what political power promises. Until power itself is decommodified, money, legal or illegal, will continue to shape electoral outcomes.
The writer is a journalist and political analyst
