In the first part of the interview with TIMES of Bangladesh, Dr Syed Mahmud Ali, a distinguished research fellow at the Global Governance Institution, Beijing, candidly expressed his thoughts and examines Israel’s growing strategic cooperation with India and the wider security architecture taking shape around it. He examines the evolving geopolitical alliances involving India, Israel, and the United States, and how these shifts impact Bangladesh.
The discussion highlights India’s transition from a pro-Palestinian stance to a robust strategic partnership with Israel, characterised by shared intelligence and aggressive counter-insurgency tactics. For Bangladesh, this regional realignment creates internal friction, as the nation oscillates between the previous government’s integration with India and the current administration’s attempt to navigate sovereignty concerns.
He further analysed the broader global security system, arguing that the world is moving away from unipolarity toward a volatile transitional phase. Ultimately, he argued how smaller nations are forced to choose between balancing and bandwagoning as major powers like China, Russia, and the US redefine international order.
The interview was taken by Shiamak Ali, a writer on geopolitics and international affairs.
There’s a widening disconnect in the US—declining public support for Israel, yet continued, almost immovable institutional backing. At the same time, Israel is deepening ties with India, especially in defence, technology, and trade. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel in February 2026, the tone suggested more than strategy—it hinted at civilizational alignment. Is this diversification, or something more calculated? Is Israel using India as a geopolitical proxy to expand influence across Asia?
To understand this, we must look at India’s historical approach to Israel and the Middle East. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi leads the Bharatiya Janata Party, which evolved from the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—itself linked to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a right-wing Hindu nationalist movement.
Earlier government in the late 1990s under leaders like Lal Krishna Advani and Atal Bihari Vajpayee maintained strong right-wing Hindu nationalist positions but did not alter India’s pro-Palestinian stance. Even after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, India justified its actions on security grounds related to China and Pakistan, not ideological alignment. Vajpayee, the then PM, in his letter to then US President Clinton explaining why India conducted those tests.
A decisive shift came only after Modi assumed power in 2014. India moved away from its traditional pro-Palestinian policy to a strongly pro-Israel position. On other words there was a shift from India’s traditional and very well-established pro-Palestinian stance towards the Middle East and shifted completely in the opposite direction, very supportive of Israel and its rights, and practically no support at all for the Palestinians while simultaneously strengthening ties with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar.
And I think it was the Indian initiative rather than the Israeli initiative. But I also have to say that this was partly triggered by the 2008 assault by a group of terrorists linked to Pakistan who attacked Mumbai, and before that, at the Indian parliament in 2001. And these attacks, at least in Mumbai, targeted Jewish synagogues and Jewish cultural establishments. A number of Jewish Indians were killed. These incidents reinforced India’s perception of shared threats with Israel.
In response, India sought Israeli expertise in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. Israeli techniques were incorporated into Indian forces, including units like the Rashtriya Rifles and the National Security Guard. These are sort of sub-army — not regular military — but they’re pretty close to light infantry. And these two organizations are deployed to places like Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland and bits of Assam that are troubled, disturbed.
This integration significantly transformed India’s security doctrine—from a population-protection model to protect civilians from insurgents and government installations to a more aggressive approach by attacking the entire population within which these insurgents or guerrillas hid themselves. Regions like Kashmir increasingly resembled conflict zones, reflecting Israeli influence on tactics and strategy. You could say about 12 to 15 years ago, Israel and India have seen eye to eye on, first of all, internal security and then security overall, and then geopolitical and strategic perspectives.
Over time, India and Israel developed deep alignment—not only in internal security but also in broader geopolitical and strategic outlooks. As China strengthened ties with Pakistan, India sought counterbalancing alliances. To that extent, Israel turned out to be a very good source of support and I think Israel took advantage of India’s needs and integrated its security expertise, scientific, technological, military intelligence with India’s. And therefore, they developed what I would say is a diluted version of a symbiotic relationship, which had pre-existed between Israel and the United States.
The US-Israel relationship is very, very closely knit allies, and they share pretty much everything. Intelligence, technology, weapons, ammunition, ordnance, economic resources. Institution like AIPAC, a powerful lobbying group influencing American political support for Israel, is very active as all American presidential candidates, starting from former US president Ronald Reagan, felt it necessary to cultivate AIPAC before the election, to gain their endorsement, support and funding.
Narendra Modi went to America in 2018, and he was advised — now we know, because the files have been divulged — that he was advised to go to Israel. There’s this phrase — he used a ‘song and dance routine’ in Jerusalem, to help build a triad — US, Israeli and Indian triad. It’s a security strategic and geopolitical triangular relationship whereby they support each other, help each other endorse and reinforce each other’s capability.
As you know, India has been a founding member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue since it was founded in 2007. And it’s also part of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. So, there is this nexus of security interests and linkages. Thereby, India-Israeli relationship is, if you like, a part of India-USA-Israeli relationship. So, there’s a wider context in which the Israel-India relationship has developed.
For a country like Bangladesh, does that create a strategic environment we’re not fully accounting for?
It’s difficult to assess how Bangladesh’s new government is responding to its environment, especially after the 18-month interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus. That period was marked by political fluidity and reflected the views of student-led movements that opposed the previous government’s close alignment with India—given India’s ties with Israel and the United States. Bangladesh remains what I would call a “soft state,” with deep internal complexities. There is a lack of cohesion in political and ideological identity, with society divided into factions that fundamentally disagree on what Bangladesh represents and should be.
Bangladeshis are polarised at least between two or three separate factions who have serious differences with each other in terms of what they see is fundamental to the Bangladeshi idea. At the core, there are contrasting visions—particularly between the Awami League and its opponents. The Awami League emphasised a broader Bengali cultural identity linked to the subcontinent, especially India. This orientation naturally placed Bangladesh within India’s sphere of influence due to geography and strategic realities.
During its tenure (2009–2024), the Awami League pursued close cooperation with India, signing numerous agreements—many not widely discussed domestically. These agreements, especially between 2019 and 2024, indicated deepening institutional and strategic integration between the two countries.
I had a study of the agreements signed between 2019 and 2024, and there were many, and these were signed between the two prime ministers. There were other ministerial- or secretarial-level accords, but those are secondary. The primary ones are agreed between the two prime ministers. And if you look at the agreements signed between the two prime ministers from 2019 to 2024, in those five years, you’ll see dramatic intimacy in terms of territorial jurisdiction, question of sovereignty and independence, and how the organs, the state organs of one country, would shape and influence and interact with state organs of another country.
Bangladesh gradually became embedded within India’s wider security framework. However, this integration was increasingly challenged by youth and student movements. While their protests were framed around economic and rights-based issues, they also reflected deeper concerns about sovereignty and over-integration with India. These groups began to view India as an adversary, shaping the interim government’s stance and contributing to strained relations between Dhaka and Delhi.
The interim government questioned many prior agreements—ranging from transit and transshipment to energy and water-sharing arrangements—arguing that Bangladesh had conceded too much without adequate benefit. There were other things as well — water rights, control of border territories, energy. Particularly notable is the energy deals it signed with India, where prices of coal, for instance, were marked up so much higher that Bangladesh’s own power development board had questioned the sense of logic to those arrangement, but the government went ahead anyway. [See How One Deal Rewired Bangladesh’s Energy Dependence. TOB Feb 3, 2026]. This reassessment further strained bilateral ties.
The interim government challenged the previous government’s policies and questioned it, over a number of issues and this led to the relationship between Delhi and Dhaka becoming very tense indeed. This was reflected in popular statements in Indian media and Bangladeshi media — there were these very strong anti-Bangladesh views in India and very strong anti-India views in Bangladesh. So it was mutual, reciprocal, and unsettling, I’d say.
The newly elected government, however, has shifted course. It has adopted a more moderate approach, re-engaging with India diplomatically and attempting to stabilize relations. It tried to moderate its rhetoric and tried to engage with Delhi, sending very senior government officials to engage with the Indian counterparts. And relations have become, I would say, less tense and more normal. But in the public domain in Bangladesh, there has been some view expressed that the current government has gone very softly, softly towards India, making compromises.
American bases in the Gulf were meant to provide security, but now seem to create risks. In such moments, how should we understand the international security system? What framework explains how power operates today?
This raises a fundamental question about the international security system—the framework within which states calculate and pursue their national interests. It reflects the totality of interactions among states and offers a way to understand global power dynamics. It gives us an idea of how to look at the world and how you look at your place in the world. The security system comprises interactions and interfaces of national interests among all state actors in the world. So, consider there are two ways of looking at this.
One way to see this is through institutions like the United Nations General Assembly, where all states engage diplomatically, and the United Nations Security Council, where real decision-making power lies—especially with the permanent five (P5) nuclear states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This reflects a clear hierarchy of power. Yet, the UN has largely failed in its core mission of preventing war.
Another way to understand the system is as concentric circles. The outer layer includes all states, followed by middle powers, then great powers, and finally the core—superpowers with unmatched influence. The superpowers have capacity to inflict pain, or provide gain, so far exceeds the power of any other state.
After World War II, the world operated under a bipolar system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. They avoided direct conflict, instead fighting through proxies in Asia and Africa. After the Soviet collapse, a unipolar system emerged, dominated by the United States. It was insuperable. Nobody could touch it — and that was the United States.
By around 2014–2015, this unipolarity began to erode. Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and China’s expansion in the South China Sea in 2013, challenged US dominance. The unhappy and angry US could not do very much about it but responded with alliances like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and AUKUS, along with sanctions and technological restrictions. In short, a broad set of pressures being directed primarily at China, though Russia as well.
Meanwhile, China leveraged its dominance in rare earth minerals—critical for modern technology—as a strategic tool. Without these minerals, electronics, missiles, communications, radars, stealth systems — the entire spectrum of modern technology — is effectively rendered useless. The United States was eventually pushed towards negotiations. Part of that wider rebalancing and negotiation was the scheduled visit by President Trump to China. It was supposed to begin on the 31st of March and then the Middle East war intervened.
I think it is fair to say that the United States or President Trump wished to negotiate the new reset of the relationship, from what they described as a position of strength. The position of strength is established by demonstrating not only your ability, but also your willingness to use your strength, your power, your force to force your enemy to do their bidding. That’s why Venezuela President Nicolás Maduro was kidnapped. That’s why Cuba has been almost crushed and Iran is being targeted so heavily. This, I think, was the idea Trump intended to take to China in his negotiations with President Xi Jinping — to demonstrate a point.
However, unexpected resistance—particularly from Iran—has disrupted these dynamics, highlighting the unpredictability of the current system.
We are now in a transitional phase. The unipolar order is fading, but the next system—whether bipolar, multipolar, or something else—has not yet emerged. This uncertainty creates instability.
States respond in three main ways: bandwagoning (aligning with stronger powers), balancing (building or borrowing strength), or hedging (avoiding firm commitments). In peacetime, hedging may work—but not in conflict.
Today’s tensions involve major actors: the United States, Israel, and Iran, with backing from China and Russia. Given Israel’s nuclear capability, escalation risks are serious.
In this environment, countries are simultaneously hedging, balancing, and bandwagoning. Regardless of how current conflicts end, the global order is undergoing profound change—and it will not return to what it was before.
