Maj Gen Dr Md Sarwar Hossain (Retd)
Bangladesh was not born in a day—it rose through a fierce struggle for identity, justice, and self-rule. From the Language Movement of 1952 to the Liberation War of 1971, each milestone—political, constitutional, and cultural—fueled a growing resistance. This article seeks to historically contextualize the emergence of Bangladesh by tracing these transformative moments and the unyielding will of its people. The military aspect has been consciously omitted to focus on the political journey, given space constraints.
To understand the roots of this political journey, it is essential to begin with Pakistan’s foundational challenges at independence in 1947. At that time, Pakistan did not have a genuine parliamentary system and was governed under the colonial-era Government of India Act of 1935. Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah wielded enormous powers akin to those of his British predecessor. The interim cabinet, largely composed of Muhajirs who had migrated from India, had little connection to the people or regions of either wing, while a weak Constituent Assembly served as the legislature.
Even as the fledgling state struggled with post-Partition reconstruction, Pakistan’s attention was quickly diverted to the Kashmir conflict, which erupted in 1947 when Pakistan-backed tribal forces invaded the princely state. This prompted the Maharaja to accede to India, triggering the first Indo-Pak war. Despite having no external threat apart from Kashmir, Pakistan’s military establishment was disproportionately large, consuming a staggering 80% of the national budget in its early years.
This oversized military, inherited from the British Indian armed forces, seized the opportunity to expand beyond defense and become a central political actor. This early dominance created a lasting imbalance in civil-military relations—giving rise to the well-known quip: while most countries have an army, Pakistan’s army has a country.
This imbalance in power between the military and civilian institutions underscored the broader challenges that threatened Pakistan’s unity—challenges that became especially acute in the eastern wing. While the partition was expected to herald a new dawn for the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan—long subjected to Hindu zamindari dominance under the British colonial system—the promise of Pakistan soon began to fade.
In its formative years, the new state grappled with a series of profound challenges: a massive refugee and housing crisis, a constitutional dilemma, unequal power sharing between the two wings, inflated military expenditure, and rising tensions over the national language. These early crises quickly exposed the fragility of a unity forged solely on religious identity.
Far from being empowered, the people of East Pakistan found themselves trapped in a web of contradictions. Political marginalization was further deepened by attempts to impose Urdu as the sole national language, fueling deep resentment and setting the stage for the Language Movement. The absence of any representative from the eastern wing in Pakistan’s first cabinet—despite East Bengal’s crucial role in the Pakistan Movement—intensified the growing sense of alienation.
Pakistan had a mosaic of diverse identities—Pathans, Sindhis, Baloch, Punjabis, and, in the east, with a Bengali-speaking majority. Unlike India, which embraced linguistically defined regions, Pakistan failed to do so—hindering its ability to evolve into a stable federal structure. In an attempt to impose national cohesion, the state sought to enforce Urdu as the sole language, igniting a deep cultural fault line. This decision, coupled with Jinnah’s untimely death, left a leadership void.
The ideological vacuum and mounting political tensions created space for championing the cause of East Pakistan’s cultural and political rights. Jinnah hardly had time to shape Pakistan’s destiny as he had envisioned due to his declining health and early death in 1948. The Objective Resolution passed in 1949, following Jinnah’s death, emphasized Pakistan as an Islamic state governed by Sharia alongside democracy. This marked a shift away from Jinnah’s secular and inclusive vision, especially as articulated in his famous 11 August 1947 speech, where he stressed equal rights and religious freedom for all citizens.
This growing ideological drift caused much of the political tension between secular voices and religious factions, impacting democracy and politics then and even today. Into this fraught landscape stepped Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, who, upon his return in early 1948 and disillusioned with the prevailing political system, founded the Awami Muslim League in June 1949—which alarmed the ruling elite in West Pakistan.
The new party added momentum to the ongoing language movement. However, before the language issue could be addressed meaningfully, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated during a political rally in Rawalpindi in 1951. Liaquat’s assassination plunged Pakistan into political instability, enabling the rise of a civil-military alliance that would increasingly dominate governance.
In this power vacuum, ambitious but mediocre politicians—like Malik Ghulam Muhammad—aligned with the civil-military bureaucracy to seize control. Defence Secretary Major General Iskandar Ali Mirza, acting out of sheer ambition, bypassed at least four senior generals and controversially appointed Major General Ayub Khan as the first indigenous Commander-in-Chief. This move marked the beginning of undue military influence in politics.
Amidst these elite power struggles in the West, the people of East Pakistan continued their own fight for recognition, culminating in the historic sacrifices of February 1952. That year, Bengali youths sacrificed their lives on the streets of Dhaka to defend their mother tongue. Like a diamond formed under immense pressure, a resilient Bengali identity emerged—shaped by years of neglect, marginalization, and determined defiance.
With language rights secured, East Pakistan moved toward its next milestone: the provincial elections of March 1954. The Bengalis, united by a newfound nationalism, achieved a resounding victory for the United Front—a coalition of like-minded political parties. The Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party, and others led by A.K. Fazlul Huq, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, and Maulana Bhashani won 223 out of 237 Muslim seats. The ruling Muslim League faced a humiliating defeat, winning only 9 seats, including the loss of Chief Minister Nurul Amin’s own constituency.
Despite this overwhelming mandate, the central government’s refusal to tolerate East Pakistani political assertiveness led to the swift dismissal of the United Front government. Just thirty-three days after taking office, the Pakistani regime imposed Governor’s rule. Iskandar Mirza was appointed Governor of East Pakistan, ruling through coercion and intimidation. Political leaders were arrested indiscriminately, and repressive police actions became routine.
This authoritarian approach paved the way for Mirza’s consolidation of power, culminating in his appointment as Acting Governor-General in October 1955 after Ghulam Muhammad left for treatment abroad. He remained in office until Pakistan became a republic in 1956. While India adopted its Constitution within two and a half years, Pakistan delayed it by nearly nine years, driven by fear that East Pakistan’s majority would dominate future elections.
Under the new 1956 Constitution, Mirza became Pakistan’s first President. The prolonged constitutional delay deepened political unrest and distrust, setting the stage for Mirza’s dramatic imposition of Martial Law in 1958. Although the Constitution appeared to accommodate some demands of the Bengali majority, its failure to decentralize authority laid the foundation for future unrest.
Unaware that power would shift to the army, Mirza miscalculated by declaring martial law. Ayyub Khan swiftly exiled him, marking the start of his long rule—backed by U.S. dollars and arms to counter communism and suppress dissent.
With Ayyub in control, his reforms began reshaping the state. He suspended political parties, disqualified leaders under EBDO, and introduced a new Constitution concentrating power in his hands. His Basic Democracies system replaced direct voting with an indirect process through 80,000 Basic Democrats—split equally between the two wings—further alienating East Pakistan.
The government also failed to decentralize education or promote Bengali. The 1962 Sharif Commission Report worsened the crisis by proposing a uniform system centered on Urdu and Islamized content. Students and teachers in East Pakistan viewed this as a direct attack on their identity, sparking protests and making education a new front in the autonomy struggle.
The political marginalization of East Pakistan was mirrored by its military vulnerability during the 1965 war, exposing deep strategic neglect by the West Pakistani leadership. The election held that year under Ayyub Khan’s “Basic Democracy” system was widely regarded as a farce. East Pakistani politicians, aware of its futility, refrained from fielding candidates. Fatima Jinnah represented the united opposition but was defeated.
To fulfill promises made to West Pakistanis, Ayyub’s regime launched a war against India. Although the war ended inconclusively, it emboldened Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who sensed Ayyub’s waning popularity. Bhutto resigned as Foreign Minister and founded the Pakistan People’s Party.
In an ironic twist, during a chance meeting in London after the 1965 war, Iskandar Mirza asked Bhutto how Pakistan had dared to challenge a country as vast as India. Bhutto replied, “Then how else could Ayyub be removed?” —a revealing admission, especially given that he had led Ayyub’s election campaign.
As tensions mounted and demands for autonomy grew louder, the passing of key Bengali leaders created a political vacuum that enabled new figures to spearhead the demand for autonomy. By the time the war ended, East Pakistan had lost Khawaja Nazimuddin (1962), Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1963), and A.K. Fazlul Huq (1964). With Maulana Bhashani leading the National Awami Party, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman seized the opportunity to intensify his call for autonomy through the Six-Point Movement.
Building on this momentum, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman launched the Six-Point Movement in 1966, demanding greater autonomy for East Pakistan, focusing on control over its economy, trade, taxation, currency, and militia. East Pakistanis viewed this as a step toward justice and self-rule, while West Pakistanis saw it as a threat to national unity.
As momentum grew, the Pakistani regime attempted to suppress the movement by filing a fabricated case titled the Agartala Conspiracy Case against Mujib and 34 others. When Mujib was arrested, Maulana Bhashani could not remain idle and led fierce protests, joined by student groups. The situation spiraled after Sergeant Zahurul Haque, one of the detainees, was shot dead by a Pakistani sentry. The public outrage forced the regime to release all prisoners, signaling that its fall was now inevitable.
Despite electoral triumph, the failure of political dialogue and escalating repression precipitated the final rupture leading to independence. On 25 March 1969, Ayyub Khan bowed out, transferring authority to General Yahiya Khan under the cover of Martial Law. As promised by Yahiya, a general election was held where the Awami League won a landslide victory. After post-election talks collapsed, the Pakistani government launched a military crackdown on the people of East Pakistan—triggering the final phase of the long march to liberation.
