For more than a year and a half, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has unfolded against two layers of uncertainty: a rapidly fragmenting global order and a protracted Rohingya crisis that shows no sign of resolution.
Despite occasional optimistic statements from the interim government about renewed momentum on Rohingya repatriation, tangible progress has remained elusive. Diplomatic activity slowed, international attention drifted, and the early optimism gradually faded. Today, nearly one million Rohingyas remain in Bangladesh, posing long-term security, economic and environmental challenges that continue to weigh heavily on foreign policy calculations.
This unresolved crisis forms the backdrop to a world undergoing profound transformation.
A global order in flux
The international system that emerged after the Second World War is steadily eroding. The bipolar world of the Cold War and the brief unipolar moment that followed the Soviet Union’s collapse are now firmly in the past.
China, the world’s second-largest economy, is openly contesting US dominance. History suggests that rivalry between the top two global powers rarely remains contained, and its consequences are already rippling across regions. At the same time, middle and regional powers—India, Turkey, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and several European states—are asserting themselves more forcefully in pursuit of strategic autonomy and influence.
Bangladesh enters this uncertain phase with a national election scheduled for February next year. The government that emerges will confront a complex diplomatic environment, requiring a careful balancing act among competing powers while safeguarding development goals, securing access to technology, managing commodity price volatility and navigating global inflationary pressures.
The challenge is compounded by the global rise of far-right political forces and the shrinking space for moderate politics. As the world moves towards multipolarity, Bangladesh must recalibrate relations with the United States, China, India, Russia, Japan, the European Union and Turkey, while also exploring emerging opportunities in ASEAN, Africa and South America.
Economic aspirations of a young population, ongoing political uncertainty and regional tensions between India and Pakistan intersect with global flashpoints such as the Middle East crisis, particularly the ongoing Israeli oppression of the Palestinians, further complicating foreign policy choices.
Limited engagement with an interim government
Over the past 18 months, major foreign powers have engaged cautiously with Bangladesh’s interim government, mindful of its temporary mandate and limited scope for long-term commitments. This reality has shaped Dhaka’s bilateral relationships, which can be assessed through five interlinked dimensions: political trust, sectoral collaboration, security cooperation, technological engagement, and migration and mobility.
Political trust: uneven terrain
Political trust underpins any durable bilateral relationship, and perceptions of Bangladesh have shifted noticeably since the end of the Awami League government.
Relations with India have suffered from leadership-level misunderstandings, ideological divergence, negative public perceptions and the spread of misinformation. Together, these factors have eroded political trust and complicated bilateral engagement. Renewed engagement with India’s arch-rival Pakistan after a 17-year hiatus has further complicated Bangladesh’s ties with its closest neighbour.
China, by contrast, has maintained an engagement-first approach regardless of who governs in Dhaka. Beijing has actively reached out to all major political actors, and Bangladesh continues to see China as a vital strategic and economic partner. Political trust between the two sides has improved as a result.
Ties with Russia have weakened, shaped by pressure from the United States and its allies and by limited mutually beneficial economic engagement. Bangladesh’s political relationship with Moscow has become increasingly cautious.
Relations with the United States were strained during the Awami League era but improved after Professor Muhammad Yunus assumed responsibility, reflecting his close ties with the Biden administration. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has since shifted the relationship towards a more transactional footing.
Japan, known for its preference for long-term and transparent partnerships, remains a major investor in Bangladesh, including in flagship projects such as Matarbari. However, Tokyo is closely watching how the next government positions itself, particularly within the Dhaka–Delhi–Tokyo strategic framework.
Bangladesh currently enjoys strong political goodwill with Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan invited Professor Yunus to Ankara, although the visit did not materialise due to time constraints.
Political trust with the European Union has grown, especially as negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) move forward. Talks had been suspended in 2024 under the Awami League government. The PCA is expected to shape the long-term trajectory of Bangladesh–EU relations.
Sectoral collaboration: shifting patterns
Sectoral cooperation offers another window into bilateral ties.
Bangladesh has traditionally maintained extensive cooperation with India, supported by more than 70 institutional mechanisms covering water sharing, connectivity and other areas. Many of these mechanisms, however, slowed or stalled during the interim period.
Cooperation with China expanded, particularly in health and education. After India unilaterally reduced visa issuance following Sheikh Hasina’s fall, China responded to Bangladesh’s request by designating several hospitals to treat Bangladeshi patients.
Bangladesh has never developed broad-based sectoral cooperation with Russia, and existing engagement has declined further.
Cooperation with the United States increased, notably in aviation and trade. Dhaka plans to purchase 25 Boeing aircraft and billions of dollars’ worth of US products.
Turkey has offered assistance in defence, health and education. Bangladesh has sought Turkish support to establish a hospital, and Ankara has expressed readiness to help.
Japan’s sectoral engagement remains anchored in large infrastructure and connectivity projects. Progress on several Japanese-funded initiatives slowed due to policy indecision, leaving future cooperation dependent on decisions taken by the next government.
Security cooperation: constrained choices
Security engagement reflects both political trust and strategic calculations.
The trust deficit with India has constrained cooperation, limiting engagement largely to routine border force meetings.
Bangladesh has been cautious in deepening security ties with China, mindful of pressure from Washington and Delhi. Talks to procure Chinese defence equipment, including fighter jets, were initiated but later stalled.
Security cooperation with Russia remains closely tied to the broader and strained US–Russia relationship. Bangladeshi officials have often been reluctant to engage actively with Moscow.
The United States has sought a stronger presence in the Bay of Bengal, a prospect viewed unfavourably by both China and India. Dhaka has largely maintained the status quo in its security engagement with Washington.
Japan expressed interest in defence exports during the Awami League period, but momentum slowed under the interim government.
By contrast, defence cooperation with Turkey has expanded significantly, with both sides working towards a formal agreement. Security cooperation with the European Union has also increased, as Bangladesh explores the purchase of fighter jets from European suppliers.
Technology, mobility and people-to-people ties
Technology has become central to development and diplomacy. Technological cooperation with India, particularly in capacity building, has declined, while China has maintained steady engagement. Cooperation with Russia remains largely confined to the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant.
The United States continues to promote technology-driven exports bundled with expertise. Japan’s technological cooperation depends heavily on investment prospects. Turkey has shown interest in transferring defence-related technology, while engagement with the EU has remained largely static.
Migration and mobility trends reveal further shifts. Movement between Bangladesh and India has declined sharply, while travel to China has increased. Mobility with Russia, Turkey and Japan has remained stable, but declined with both the United States and the EU.
The road ahead
The next government will inherit a foreign policy landscape shaped by multipolar competition, weakening multilateralism and persistent regional instability.
The Rohingya crisis remains Bangladesh’s most pressing diplomatic challenge. Its prolonged nature poses risks to national security, economic resilience and environmental sustainability.
Overseas employment—particularly in the Middle East, where around 10 million Bangladeshis work—is another critical concern. Any external shock affecting labour markets there would have serious implications.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy, long anchored in aid and trade, must now integrate technology as a core pillar. As major powers increasingly favour bilateral over multilateral engagement, Dhaka must refine its diplomatic toolkit.
Neighbourhood diplomacy will remain crucial, requiring a clearer articulation of relations with India alongside deeper cooperation with China. At the same time, Dhaka has stepped up engagement with Pakistan since the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government—a development viewed uneasily in New Delhi and one that adds another layer of sensitivity to regional diplomacy. Managing ties with Islamabad will therefore require particular care, ensuring that renewed engagement does not further complicate relations with India. Revitalising SAARC and BIMSTEC, strengthening ties with ASEAN, and carefully balancing Indo-Pacific and China-led initiatives will define Bangladesh’s foreign policy choices in an increasingly volatile Indian Ocean region.
