On February 28th, when the U.S. and Israel launched unprovoked attacks on Iranian sovereignty, India remained silent; it also did not explicitly condemn them for the killings of 175 Iranian schoolchildren, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the sinking of the Iranian ship carrying 87 cadets who had just completed their Milan exercise with the Indian Navy in ‘India’s maritime backyard.’ India’s muted response to these serious matters has sparked heated debates among its politicians and foreign-policy pundits. Observers worldwide have witnessed India’s silence with bewilderment as the events unfolded. Was India’s silence the best strategic move?
Just days before the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran started, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel. During his visit, he stated, “India stands with Israel, firmly, with full conviction,” and called Benjamin Netanyahu ‘brother.’ This newly heightened Modi-Netanyahu bonhomie deeply disappointed the global South, which has historically viewed India as supportive of the Palestinian cause. Additionally, Arab and Gulf states did not appreciate the closer ties India has forged with Israel.
There was a time when India and Iran enthusiastically developed the Chabahar port. India imported a large portion of its oil from Iran, and this continued even after the U.S. imposed strict oil sanctions on Iran. However, as India strengthened its security ties with the U.S., it began to adjust its policies to maintain a balance between the U.S. and Iran. This balancing act pleased the U.S. but made Iran uneasy.
India has also been a major importer of oil from Russia. After the Russian-Ukrainian war broke out, the U.S. levied sanctions on Russian oil imports. Nevertheless, India reached a deal to buy oil from Russia at a price below the market rate. This agreement was mutually beneficial. However, the U.S. disapproved of such an arrangement, believing it kept the Russian economy afloat to continue its war in Ukraine. As a result, the U.S. threatened and eventually imposed high tariffs, including secondary tariffs, on Indian goods and services until India ceased importing Russian oil. In the end, India complied with the U.S. demands.
Over many decades, India has striven to preserve its strategic autonomy in foreign policy. But its reluctance to condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Israeli genocide in Gaza, the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, the killing of Iranian schoolchildren, and the assassination of Khamenei has damaged its otherwise savvy diplomatic reputation. Consequently, Iran has shunned India, restricting the passage of its ships through the Strait of Hormuz; for instance, out of the dozens of Indian oil tankers stranded in the Gulf, Iran only allowed 2 to pass through the Strait, while Chinese, Japanese, and Pakistani tankers have been able to navigate freely. Furthermore, oil and energy supplies from the Gulf region have become limited, causing prices to rise sharply. India has been struggling to source its oil from the region. Recently, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, waived sanctions on Russian oil supplies for 30 days and ‘gave permission’ to India to buy oil from Russia. The world did not realise that India had to seek U.S. ‘permission’ to act independently! Putting that U.S. condescension aside, India is once again turning to Russia. However, the Russians are now demanding the market price for their oil because of India’s obsequious deference to the U.S. and Israel.
India’s silence has unexpectedly allowed Pakistan to step in as a mediator to end the war. According to Indian politicians, this Pakistani role damages India’s diplomatic influence. Additionally, President Trump favours mavericks, strong leaders who display power and take bold action, whether dealing with the U.S. or elsewhere. Therefore, he respects Chinese President Xi, Russian President Putin, and Pakistani Field Marshal Munir. India could have been chosen as the mediator if Modi had been more assertive. Instead, Munir is now mediating the conflict.
One might argue that a state’s foreign polices are driven by its national interests. Therefore, India responded accordingly. For example, nearly 9 million Indians live, work, and send money home from Gulf countries, which is a vital lifeline for many families. India, thus, avoided upsetting the Gulf states. As a result, it took four days for India to send its Foreign Secretary to sign the condolence book at the Iranian embassy, acknowledging Khamenei’s assassination. Moreover, instead of condemning the U.S. and Israel for attacking Iran, India condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes in the Gulf states. Finally, during Modi’s visit to Israel, India agreed to a $10 billion deal with Israel for defense, technology, and AI, thus limiting its ability to criticise or condemn Israel as well.
Conversely, if the Iranian proxy, the Houthis, target vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the Red Sea, through which about 12 percent of the world’s oil and energy supplies are transported, then India could face a more serious situation with its energy supplies than it does now. West Asian countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are exporting less oil because their energy facilities have been targeted in retaliation by Iran. Therefore, India will need to reach out to Iran for oil and, more importantly, to secure the safe passage of its oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait; the Iranians, though, might not be as accommodating after India’s quiet reaction to U.S.-Israeli attacks on them.
However, geopolitics is a strategic gamble. India has decided to align with the U.S. and Israel, sidelining its long-standing relations with Iran; whether that choice was prudent will only become clear in the future. Meanwhile, India’s reputation has been questioned, a point Sonia Gandhi made in her recent column: “Credibility rests on the perception that India speaks from principle rather than expediency.” This is bluntly telling. Like Gandhi, the world expected a much more refined response than mere silence from India. Therefore, it has a lot of work to do, and it will take considerable diplomatic efforts to restore India’s credibility.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors’ own
The writer is a Doctoral Researcher, International Relations, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM)
