Dr. Md. Shafiqul Islam
Nuclear technology is transforming lives in Bangladesh, powering advancements in life-saving cancer treatment, tissue banking, increased crop production, and sterilizing spices, dried fish, and fruit products. It also plays a vital role in research through the country’s nuclear research reactor and, soon, there will be electricity generation from the under-construction Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. These achievements, however, rely on sensitive radioactive sources and nuclear materials, whose use necessitates robust security measures.
This progress amplifies the need for a strong nuclear security framework to prevent theft, sabotage, or terrorism involving nuclear and radioactive materials. Such threats, often driven by political, religious, or economic motives, can come from external adversaries, insiders within facilities, or coordinated efforts between the two. Insider threats—unauthorized acts by personnel with legitimate access—are particularly difficult to detect and manage, especially when supported by external collaborators.
Ensuring the secure use of nuclear materials is essential to protecting people, the environment, and society at large. As the peaceful applications of nuclear energy grow, so too must our vigilance. Nuclear security is just as important as nuclear safety; in fact, compromising security can directly undermine safety. Nuclear security encompasses the prevention, detection, and response to malicious acts such as theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, or illicit trafficking involving nuclear or radioactive materials and their associated facilities.
Terrorist groups continue to pursue radioactive sources to build “dirty bombs” or radiological dispersal devices, using cesium-137, cobalt-60, or strontium-90. While these are not nuclear weapons, they can cause mass disruption, radiation exposure, and public panic. Even more alarming are efforts by international terrorist networks to acquire nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium to construct improvised nuclear devices, aiming to spread terror and influence geopolitical dynamics.
Radioactive and nuclear materials are vulnerable during storage, use, and transport—whether at hospitals, research facilities, or nuclear power plants. These materials may also be trafficked through black markets, often across poorly monitored borders. Numerous real-world incidents underscore these risks. For instance, in 2003, cesium and cobalt were looted from Iraq’s Tuwaitha research facility; in 1992, a technician stole a radioactive source from the Los Alamos National Lab in the USA; a Russian scientist from a scientific production association smuggled highly enriched uranium to the black market in 1992; and in the 1970s, Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan acquired centrifuge blueprints from the Netherlands, laying the groundwork for proliferation.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), which monitors such events, has recorded over 4,000 incidents since its inception in 1995. Most involve uncontrolled radioactive sources, unauthorized disposal, or inadvertent possession—often from medical or industrial uses. These cases underscore the vulnerabilities in the lifecycle of nuclear materials and highlight the urgent need for robust nuclear security systems at national, regional, and global levels.
One of the most essential pillars of a strong nuclear security regime is effective stakeholder communication. Sharing operational experiences, good practices, and challenges helps build trust and ensures all stakeholders understand their roles and responsibilities. According to the IAEA, stakeholder engagement should span the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from “cradle to grave.”
Stakeholders include government ministries, regulatory authorities, facility operators, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, technical support organizations, emergency responders, academic institutions, and think tanks. Each plays a unique and critical role.
Regulatory authorities establish and enforce security standards, issue licenses, and monitor compliance. Operators of nuclear power plants, research reactors, and medical facilities are responsible for implementing physical protection systems—such as access control, surveillance, and personnel vetting—and coordinating with national authorities. Law enforcement agencies and emergency responders prepare for and respond to incidents like theft or trafficking.
Academic institutions contribute by training future regulators, engineers, and policymakers, as well as conducting research to strengthen nuclear security knowledge. Think tanks offer independent policy assessments and propose innovative frameworks. While they may not handle nuclear materials directly, their intellectual contributions are indispensable to shaping a robust security culture.
For nuclear security to be effective and equitable, all stakeholders must be included. Inclusive engagement ensures the fair distribution of responsibilities and resources, enhances situational awareness, and strengthens national coordination—particularly important in newcomer nuclear states.
Bangladesh uses radioactive sources in medicine, industry, and agriculture and possesses nuclear materials for research and power generation. As a newcomer to nuclear technology, the country faces heightened risks due to regional instability, insider threats, and the rise of radicalism. The under construction Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant and the existing research reactor significantly increase these security concerns.
Border areas guarded by border guards, coast guards, customs, and airport security must be equipped with the tools and training needed to detect and intercept unauthorized nuclear and radioactive material transfers. But security is not just about physical measures—it also requires a foundation of strong communication and coordination.
The killing of nuclear scientists and military leaders in the recent Israel and Iran conflict—Mossad-led operations in Iran—illustrates how insider threats and foreign interference can dangerously intersect. Gaps in communication among stakeholders can delay detection and response, increasing vulnerability. Unfortunately, Bangladesh currently lacks institutionalized channels for collaboration among nuclear security stakeholders. Confidentiality is often cited as a reason for withholding information, training, and best practices. But in reality, this lack of cooperation can severely compromise national security.
To mitigate these risks, Bangladesh must equip key points of entry—border posts, seaports, airports, and customs—with advanced detection tools and real-time response capabilities. Just as importantly, the country must establish clear, reliable channels for communication and coordination among all stakeholders involved in nuclear security.
In the AI era, nuclear security is no longer limited to guards, gates, and guns. Cyberattacks, digital espionage, and data breaches pose new and growing threats. Nuclear intelligence must evolve with the times, integrating advanced digital tools supported by rigorous training and updated knowledge.
In sum, closing gaps in stakeholder coordination is not optional—it is essential. Inadequate collaboration increases the risk of security breaches that could destabilize national, regional, or global peace. An inclusive, well-informed, and well-connected nuclear security community—anchored in transparency and accountability—offers the best defense against the complex threats our nuclear facilities may face today or tomorrow.
The writer is a Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Dhaka and Former Visiting Professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering Dept., MIT, USA
