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Rohingya crisis needs a whole-of-the-system diplomatic strategy

Rohingya crisis needs a whole-of-the-system diplomatic strategy
Mohammad Sufiur Rahman. Illustration: TIMES
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The Rohingya crisis entered its tenth year. A lot has changed since the largest influx took place in August 2017 – the situation within Rakhine and Myanmar, geopolitics and also the politics in Bangladesh. What awaits the future of the Rohingya?

Mohammad Sufiur Rahman, senior research fellow at the South Asian Institute of Policy and Governance in North South University and a former diplomat who was also Bangladesh Ambassador to Myanmar, speaks with TIMES in details.

Nine years after the Rohingya crisis began, what has fundamentally changed?

Almost everything has changed. The international environment is very different from what it was in 2017. At that time, there was considerable international attention and convergence around the Rohingya issue. Today, we have an attention deficit. There are competing crises everywhere — Ukraine, Gaza, Syria and tensions around the Strait of Hormuz. These have pushed the Rohingya issue down the international agenda.

There has also been a major change inside Myanmar. The military has lost significant territorial control, particularly in Rakhine. The Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing ousted the NLD government in 2021 and now seeking to rechristen as an ‘elected’ administration.

The Arakan Army now controls around 80 to 90 percent of Rakhine State, with the Myanmar military retaining control mainly in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, where major Chinese investments are located. So, the equation is no longer simply between Bangladesh and the Myanmar government. Arakan Army has emerged as the de facto power across our border in Rakhine.

How does the rise of the Arakan Army change the repatriation equation?

It changes it fundamentally. Any discussion about repatriation has to take into account who actually controls the territory to which the Rohingya are supposed to return. The Myanmar military may be conducting the verification process, but it does not control most of Rakhine and wherefrom the Rohingya were evicted.

The Arakan Army does. Therefore, if Bangladesh reaches an understanding with Naypyidaw but the Arakan Army is not part of the equation, how can that agreement be implemented on the ground? This is one of the biggest challenges Bangladesh now faces.

At the same time, we should be careful about assuming that the Arakan Army necessarily wants to establish an independent state. Despite controlling large territory, there has been no clear indication that it wants to create a separate sovereign country at this stage.

Myanmar recently said it has verified around 309,000 Rohingya from Bangladesh’s list. Does this represent progress?

I would be very cautious about calling it progress. Myanmar has said that, from a list of about 828,000 names provided by Bangladesh, it has verified around 309,000 people. But verification is meaningless unless there is a safe and conducive environment for their return. More importantly, the verification is being done by the Myanmar military authorities, while actual control over the territory in question mostly lies with the Arakan Army.

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So, under the present circumstances, the verification exercise is largely a diplomatic stunt. It creates an impression that something is happening, while the fundamental conditions for repatriation remain absent. Even if we accept Myanmar’s figures, only around 40 percent of the names submitted by Bangladesh have been verified. What happens to the remaining 60 percent? Returning only a fraction of the refugees cannot resolve the crisis.

But Myanmar says security conditions have to improve before repatriation can begin.

That argument itself demonstrates the problem. Myanmar is saying that security conditions are not yet suitable, but it is also the country that has the primary responsibility for creating those conditions. Bangladesh cannot simply wait indefinitely for Myanmar to become ready. The actual solution has to come from Rakhine itself. That means creating conditions where the Rohingya can return safely, have their rights restored and rebuild their lives.

What do you think Bangladesh has done well diplomatically over the past nine years?

There have been important successes of diplomacy at the functional level. One major achievement was Bangladesh’s engagement with the Kofi Annan Commission. Its report was balanced and objective and effectively put to rest Myanmar’s long-standing narrative that the Rohingya were simply illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

The report generally reflects the interests of the Rohingya and the narrative of Bangladesh. The commission also recommended reform of Myanmar’s discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law.

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Bangladesh also succeeded to conclude bilateral agreements with Myanmar that goes much beyond the agreements of 1978 and 1992, in scope which goes beyond return into reintegration. In the present geopolitical environment, such a broad agreement is unthinkable.

There has also been significant progress in international accountability where Bangladesh has played the role of the prime mover. Cases have moved forward at the International Criminal Court, while the merits phase of the International Court of Justice case began in January 2026. These legal processes are lengthy and cannot, by themselves, solve the Rohingya crisis. But they create pressure on Myanmar and other actors.

Where did Bangladesh’s diplomacy fail?

Despite initial successes at the functional diplomatic level, we failed at the higher political level which required national consensus and unity, and coherent actions among all domestic players. On specific aspects, first, Bangladesh failed to effectively counter Myanmar’s subsequent propaganda.

We also failed to sufficiently influence the three actors that have perhaps the greatest leverage over Myanmar — India, China and ASEAN. Second, we did not effectively contest Myanmar when it sought to frame the issue as a bilateral dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar.

It is not. This is an internal crisis of Myanmar whose consequences have been forced upon Bangladesh. We should have presented it much more clearly as a regional peace and security issue requiring international involvement.

Unfortunately, we saw no creativity and initiative since 2020, when Bangladesh injudiciously attempted a few times pilot repatriation exercise, without creating necessary conditions and thus lost hard-earned goodwill and attracted immense criticism.

Why have Bangladesh’s efforts with China and India not produced the expected results?

China looks at the issue through the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference. Bangladesh failed to convince China sufficiently that resolving the Rohingya crisis does not threaten Myanmar’s territorial integrity. We also failed to clearly tell China what role we expect it to play in the political and security stabilisation of Rakhine.

With India, there is a different concern beyond territorial integrity. India looks at the region heavily through a national security lens, including concerns about militancy and (Islamic) terrorism.

Bangladesh did not explain that the Rohingya were firmly indigenized in Rakhine during the British India period and resolution of the Rohingya crisis is also in the interests of India and the adjoining region. We also failed to engage ASEAN effectively. Some ASEAN countries continue to provide political space to Myanmar’s regime, despite its persistent wrongdoings.

What should Bangladesh do about the Arakan Army?

Bangladesh has to think pragmatically. Engaging the Arakan Army does not necessarily mean recognising or legitimising it. It is about protecting Bangladesh’s national interests and creating channels through which we can negotiate on issues affecting our security and the Rohingya.

If India and China can remain engaged the Arakan Army, why should Bangladesh— which carries the greatest direct security and socio-economic risk — remain isolated and face the consequences of nonengagement? But this engagement has to be at Bangladesh’s terms.

But we must also be extremely careful on the nature and extent of engagement. Bangladesh should not become involved in Myanmar’s internal conflict or be perceived as supporting the fragmentation of Myanmar. India, China and ASEAN all are particular about the territorial integrity of Myanmar. At the same time, Bangladesh has a right to protect its security and other interests and devise appropriate and credible deterrence.

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Does that mean Bangladesh need a new diplomatic strategy?

Absolutely. We need what I call “whole-of-the-system” creative diplomacy. Given the diverge aspects of the Rohingya crisis, Bangladesh must employ all capacities and should involve all relevant ministries and agencies, political parties, national stakeholders and, importantly, the Rohingya themselves. We also need to maintain communication with both the National Unity Government and the Myanmar military to explain our approaches to create confidence.

At the same time, Bangladesh must clearly and formally communicate to China, India and ASEAN countries as well as other interested and important stakeholders on what we expect from them in concrete terms.

What exactly should Bangladesh ask China and India and others can do?

We need to be very specific. We should not simply ask them to “help solve the Rohingya crisis”. We should clearly define what role each country can play in restoring stability in Rakhine and creating conditions for repatriation. We also need to make clear to the United States and the West that their broader geopolitical ambitions, if any, should not affect resolution of the Rohingya crisis. If Bangladesh becomes trapped in great-power competition, the crisis could continue for decades.

As for the UN system, they must firmly engage Rakhine/ Myanmar authorities and demand remedial measures, before raising further flexibilities from Bangladesh. UNHCR must reflect on how a dogmatic and absolute interpretation of the term ‘voluntariness’ risks the whole idea of return, and thus helping the project of genocide on the Rohingya.

What about the Rohingya themselves? Some insist on citizenship before returning.

This is another area where we need a more realistic approach. The Rohingya community often raise unrealistic demands. Their insistence on obtaining full citizenship before returning has contributed to a deadlock. Citizenship is a complex and long-term process. Bangladesh should have explored whether refugees could return under a transitional legal status with guaranteed rights and a clear pathway towards citizenship. The Rohingya community must remain united and shun the tendency of criminality among some sections within it.

Does justice for the Rohingya end with prosecuting Myanmar’s military leaders?

Accountability is important, but retributive justice alone will not resolve the crisis. The Rohingya need restoration of their rights that were taken away from them. That means transitional justice — acknowledgment of wrongdoing, truth-seeking, restoration of land and property, compensation for losses, restoration of cultural and religious institutions, and ultimately social, economic and political reintegration. Citizenship must eventually be part of that process.

What would a sustainable return ultimately require?

We have to restore stability in Rakhine and create an environment in which Rohingya can return safely and sustainably. That cannot be achieved through diplomacy alone. Nor can it be achieved through security measures alone. We need a combination of diplomacy and security.

Bangladesh also needs a national consensus on the Rohingya issue. During the height of the crisis in 2017-18, the government did not sufficiently involve other national stakeholders. A unified national position is essential for productive negotiation and implementing a long-term strategy.

After nine years, what should be Bangladesh’s single biggest priority?

We have to stop treating the Rohingya crisis as something that can be solved by waiting for Rakhine or Myanmar to change. We need to be proactive, creative and comprehensive. The objective should be very clear: restore stability in Rakhine and create a safe and sustainable environment for the Rohingya to return. The crisis is no longer simply a humanitarian problem or a bilateral problem. It has become a regional and geopolitical issue.

But Bangladesh is carrying the greatest burden. Therefore, we have to find a way to secure our interests and those of the persecuted Rohingya while taking in confidence views of China, India, ASEAN countries, Japan, the United States and other international actors without becoming trapped in their rivalries.

If we allow the Rohingya crisis to become another arena for great-power competition, we could be dealing with it for decades. The answer is creative and bold diplomacy, unleashed from the foundation of national consensus and coherence, coordinating with all relevant actors- domestic and external. There is no single shortcut.

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