Ahsan H. Tutul
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan is following a trajectory similar to that of many other military and revolutionary governments worldwide. It desperately wants to have its pariah status lifted so it can move forward with rebuilding the country. The regime believes now is an auspicious time to seek international recognition. They cannot be faulted for this, as they have a solid rationale: since 2021, several countries- China, UAE, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan- have continued engaging with the Taliban.
In July 2025, four years after taking power, Russia became the first country to officially recognise the Taliban regime. The Taliban has been courting India for support, and India is responding with eagerness, possibly influenced by Russia’s move; this will likely have a ripple effect on key players in South Asia’s geopolitics. Hence, India’s potential decision to recognise the Taliban regime and the reasons behind this bold diplomatic move deserve careful analysis.
India held talks with the Taliban in January in Dubai, where the foreign secretary, Bikram Misri, met with the Taliban foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to forge a working relationship. Much to India’s surprise, in July, a trilateral meeting of top diplomats from China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan took place in Kabul to boost political, regional, and economic cooperation. The event likely unsettled India, prompting faster action. As a result, the Taliban’s foreign minister’s visit to New Delhi was expedited to October.
There was a ruckus- a public, political, and media backlash against his visit, and several reasons can explain it. Emotional perceptions connect the Taliban to the 1999 plane hijacking and the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, which killed several Indian citizens. The deep-rooted friendship between the Taliban and Pakistan remains a sensitive issue. Most importantly, India’s democratic, pluralistic values clash with the oppressive aspects of Taliban ideologies, especially regarding women’s and human rights. These concerns are valid. Nonetheless, India’s decision to welcome the Taliban’s foreign minister was driven by essential national interests. Geopolitics is a ruthless game where emotion or morality plays little role; it must be pragmatic and focused on a country’s advantage. Because of this, it is vital to accentuate the key aspects of this rapprochement with the Taliban regime that the Indian public overlooked as they expressed anger.
First, regarding infrastructure, India has invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan during the Karzai and Ghani administrations; it has built the Parliament building, established the Indira Gandhi Children’s Hospital (IGICH) in Kabul, constructed the Salma Dam, officially named the Afghan-India Friendship Dam in Herat province, and completed other projects. Second, in terms of connectivity, India is expanding its use of Afghanistan as a trade route to Central Asian countries, via roads and the Chabahar port in Iran. Third, India imports a large volume of dry food and fruits from Afghanistan to meet domestic demand. Fourth, people-to-people contacts between these countries date back to historic times and have continued since then. Many Afghan students have studied and still study in India, and numerous Afghans travel there for medical treatment.
In the realm of security, India will maximise the benefits of its evolving relationship with the Taliban regime. As the saying goes, the enemy of the enemy is a friend. Pakistan is India’s arch-rival; the Taliban government is redefining its relations with Pakistan, moving away from the role of the “big brother” that the Pakistani government previously played, and that rift is now visible in their recent skirmishes. If Afghanistan prevents Pakistan from functioning within or along its borders, the disputed 2,600 km Durand Line, India can pursue its strategic goals: conducting reconnaissance into Pakistan, gathering intelligence on Pakistani militants, and partnering with other groups hostile to Pakistan, such as the Baloch separatists. This could drastically enhance India’s security and intelligence capabilities in the region.
India’s economic engagement with Afghanistan would provide greater latitude. Access to Afghanistan’s vast deposits of rare-earth minerals, worth billions of dollars, could give India a competitive edge. Although China is already developing many of these mineral sites, India could still yield substantial financial returns. Furthermore, India’s emphasis on reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, leveraging its materials, technology, and expertise, could further increase commercial gains. Accordingly, India’s support for the Taliban minister’s trip is not only a diplomatic gesture but also a strategic move aimed at strengthening security and advancing economic agendas, albeit at the expense of sacrificing the democratic principles it professes to uphold.
The Taliban foreign minister’s activities in India, including receiving diplomatic protocol, holding a press conference, which women journalists were not allowed to attend, and visiting the Deoband seminary, where many Taliban leaders studied, reflect the deep tolerance intertwined in this relationship. Then, criticising the foreign minister’s visit to India publicly overlooks the complex realities behind India’s geopolitical objectives.
Still, the key question is: what will the future of Indo-Taliban relations be? It will depend on the involvement and actions of other countries already operating in Afghanistan. For example, Pakistan will attempt to prevent this relationship from fully crystallising. China will do everything possible to protect its large investments there. Russia will reserve a strong presence in Afghanistan to keep its influence in Central Asia. The U.S. might flex its muscle to retake the Bagram airbase or operate covertly from Afghanistan to monitor Iran closely and secure its strategic activities in Central Asia as well. Non-state or regional terror groups could reemerge and destabilise the Taliban government. The role of these external players in shaping the future of Indo-Taliban relations is crucial, making it uncertain.
Uncertainties, though, should not deter India from investing its planned resources in Afghanistan; instead, it should continue engaging, strategising, and concentrating on attainable outcomes. In global politics, perception matters significantly. The deteriorating relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan should push India to seize the opportunity; any realist would do the same. The Taliban foreign minister’s visit has paved the way for this. In this anarchic world system, where there is no higher authority to call for help, a power vacuum is quickly filled by those seeking influence. Therefore, if India decides to recognise the Taliban government and officially normalise relations, acting sooner will allow India to benefit more quickly. India is undoubtedly aware of how South Asian geopolitics has evolved over the years. Thus, relying too heavily on the Taliban regime while ignoring the sentiments of ordinary Afghans could threaten the investments. That is the caveat India should remember when engaging with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
The writer is a doctoral researcher in International Relations at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM)
