The nozzles at the Main Uddin Filling Station on the Dhaka–Chattogram highway have been dry since 16 March. For more than a month, not a single drop of octane reached waiting vehicles, forcing commuters into punishing queues that stretched for hours.
Yet, inside the air-conditioned offices of the Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC) and the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, the message remained strikingly at odds with reality: “Supply is normal.”
That disconnect—between official assurance and lived experience—has now placed the country’s fuel governance under one of its most intense public examinations in decades.
As the impact of the 19 April 2026 price hike settles, a troubling possibility has emerged: the crisis may not have been caused by a shortage of fuel, but by a failure—whether deliberate or systemic—of management, transparency, and control.
A system without numbers
At the centre of the controversy lies a fundamental and deeply unsettling gap: the state does not appear able to say, with certainty, how much fuel the country currently has.
According to BPC data, 415,653 tonnes of octane were sold during the 2024–25 fiscal year. Total storage capacity across its subsidiaries—Padma Oil Company Limited, Meghna Petroleum Limited, Jamuna Oil Company Limited, and Eastern Refinery Limited—stands at 53,361 metric tonnes. Monthly sales figures in early 2026 show steady demand: 32,835 tonnes in January, 37,334 tonnes in February, and 37,439 tonnes in March.
Despite this, BPC Chairman Md Rezanur Rahman acknowledged that providing a precise estimate of current stock levels is “difficult” due to the continuous cycle of imports and distribution. He maintained that reserves remain above emergency thresholds.
The explanation has raised more questions than it answers. In a sector as critical as fuel supply, the inability of the primary state agency to quantify available reserves points to a serious breakdown in monitoring and accountability.
Attempts to obtain clarity only deepened the confusion. BPC’s public relations officer, Farzin Hasan Moumita, said such data is maintained by the ministry. But officials at the ministry offered a different account.
After repeated attempts to contact spokesperson Monir Hossain Chowdhury went unanswered, the ministry’s public relations officer, Mohammad Arif Sadeq, told TIMES of Bangladesh that the latest fuel reserve data is maintained by BPC—and that the ministry relies on BPC for such information.
The result is a circular information vacuum at the highest levels of governance.
Transparency advocates say such opacity is not neutral.
“The lack of transparency is a tool for deception,” said SM Nazer Hossain, vice-president of the Consumer Association of Bangladesh (CAB). “If supply was truly normal, as claimed, why did queues disappear immediately after the price hike? The public was held hostage by an artificial shortage.”
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) Executive Director Iftekharuzzaman also questioned the absence of reliable data.
He said that in a moment of crisis, accurate and up-to-date information on fuel stocks must be immediately accessible. Otherwise, serious questions about transparency are inevitable. He stressed that either BPC or the ministry must clearly and publicly explain the situation without delay.
He further warned that if supply conditions appear to improve following the price increase, concerns over deliberate stockpiling will naturally intensify.
However, Iftekharuzzaman noted that the government has initiated efforts to curb such practices, and the ongoing operations signal a move in that direction.
The price hike “turning point”
On 19 April, the government raised fuel prices.
Almost overnight, the crisis appeared to vanish.
Queues that had stretched for hours shrank to minutes. Fuel that had been inaccessible suddenly flowed again. For many motorists, the timing felt less like coincidence and more like confirmation.
“We were stranded for days,” said Akter Hossain, a motorcyclist who spent a week searching for fuel. “Then suddenly, after the price hike, everything is normal. If the stock existed, why couldn’t we get it before?”
The BPC’s explanation has been marked by contradiction.
General Manager (Operations) Mohammad Zahid Hossain said the situation is now normal due to “ensuring steady supply.” But he also admitted that the earlier shortage was linked to “import volume constraints”—a claim that contradicts earlier government assurances that supply was adequate.
This inconsistency has intensified scrutiny over whether the crisis was mismanaged—or manipulated.
Hoarding, enforcement and uneven supply
Evidence increasingly points to widespread irregularities within the supply chain.
According to BPC officials, some field-level retailers engaged in illegal stockpiling—holding back fuel purchased at lower prices and releasing it only after the price increase to maximise profit.
A nationwide crackdown appears to support this claim. Across all 64 districts, mobile courts have recovered approximately 600,000 litres of illegally stored fuel. More than 9,000 raids have been conducted, and 3,510 cases filed.
Even so, the official narrative of “normalised supply” remains contested on the ground.
Md Nur Nabi, a pump manager in Mirsarai, said his station has not received any octane since mid-March.
“For weeks, despite claims of increased supply, we haven’t received a drop. Diesel is erratic, meeting only half our demand,” he said.
Abu Tayyab, president of the Chittagong Divisional Petrol Pump Owners Association, echoed the concern, noting that while queues have shortened in urban areas, rural upazilas continue to face severe shortages.
Meanwhile, BPC has claimed that supply has been enhanced, including the introduction of a 20% octane blend in petrol. The mismatch between these claims and field-level realities suggests continuing gaps in distribution and oversight.
Scandal, corruption and a crisis of trust
The crisis reached a new level of concern with a major incident involving Padma Oil Company.
Four officials were suspended after 72,000 litres of jet fuel disappeared during transport from Narayanganj to Dhaka airport. Forged documentation falsely indicated that the delivery had been completed. Investigators believe the fuel was diverted for sale on the black market, possibly as adulterated octane.
The case highlights not just negligence, but the possibility of organised corruption within the supply chain.
Taken together, the events of the past two months reveal systemic weaknesses: poor coordination between institutions, lack of real-time data, weak enforcement, and opportunities for manipulation at multiple levels.
By failing to maintain transparency and control, the system created conditions in which hoarding, diversion, and profiteering could flourish.
The sudden disappearance of queues following the price hike has only deepened public suspicion. Rather than restoring confidence, it has reinforced the perception that the crisis was, at least in part, avoidable.
The “invisible hand” often invoked in economic theory appears here in more concrete form: the retailer withholding stock, the official falsifying records, and the institution failing to disclose information.
As prices rise, the burden ultimately falls on consumers—both at fuel stations and across the broader economy, where higher transport costs drive up the price of essential goods.
Fuel may once again be flowing.
But in the absence of accountability, the crisis has left behind a deeper deficit—one of trust.
