Bangladesh is considering a One ID initiative at a time when citizens already carry many forms of identity. The Election Commission manages the National ID, birth registration authorities maintain birth records, the Passport Office issues passports, BRTA issues driving licences, and NBR issues tax identification numbers. Each system was created for a particular purpose and under a particular institution. One ID could reduce duplication, make public services easier, limit fraud and support a more connected digital economy. But before the country builds the platform, it must first answer a more basic question: what exactly is One ID meant to be?
Will One ID be another card, another number and another round of enrolment? Or will it be a secure way to connect the identity records people already have? These are very different models. One may replace existing identities; the other may simply allow different agencies to verify the same person without creating a new identity from scratch. Citizens deserve a clear answer in plain language. If the purpose is unclear at the beginning, confusion and mistrust will follow later. The next question is even more important: who has the legal mandate to own and govern the system? Existing identity systems belong to institutions that created them for their own official work. But the One ID would sit across many institutions. Would the Election Commission lead it because it already manages NID? Would a new authority be created? Would ownership remain shared among agencies? Or would one institution be given power over the identity records of all others?
This is not simply an administrative issue. It is a question about the distribution of state power. The institution that operates One ID may influence who can access citizen data, which records are treated as correct, and how identity decisions affect services. Who will approve access? Who will settle disputes when the NID, birth registration, passport, driving licence and tax records do not match? Which record will be treated as the final source of truth? Who will be answerable when a citizen is wrongly identified or denied a service?
The organisation running One ID should not be the only organisation reviewing its own decisions. If the same institution operates the platform, approves access, investigates complaints and decides whether it acted properly, accountability will be weak. Bangladesh, therefore, needs to ask whether there should be an independent oversight body, regular external audits and public reporting. The purpose is not to slow the system down. It is to ensure that no single institution can exercise powerful control over identity data without checks and accountability. The rights of citizens must also be clear. Before a bank, telecom operator, hospital, government office or private company accesses someone’s identity data, will the person know what information is being requested and why? Will consent be meaningful, or will people be forced to agree simply to receive a service? Can a citizen later withdraw permission? Can people see a simple history showing which institution accessed their data, when it was accessed and for what purpose?
There must also be a practical way to correct mistakes. Identity databases are not always perfect. Names may be misspelled, dates of birth may differ, family information may be incomplete, and records may be duplicated. If One ID links these errors together, a small mistake may affect many services at once. Where will a citizen go to correct the problem? How long will the correction take? Can a wrong decision be challenged? Will a person receive compensation or another remedy if an error causes financial loss, harassment or denial of a public service?
Law and security must support these rights. Which law will govern One ID? How will data protection, cybersecurity, digital governance and existing identity laws work together? If identity data is stolen or misused, who will be responsible: the citizen, the institution that collected the data, the service provider, or the government? The system should use strong encryption, multi-factor authentication and strict access controls, but technology alone is not enough. Clear responsibility is just as important as technical protection.
A national identity system cannot be successful if it works only for people with smartphones, fast internet and strong digital skills. Many citizens live in areas with weak connectivity. Older people, persons with disabilities, low-income families and people in remote communities may struggle with app-based services. Will One ID offer a reliable offline option? Can people verify their identity through local service centres? Will assistance be available in Bangla and in forms that ordinary citizens can understand?
The role of the private sector also needs careful rules. Banks, fintech companies, telecom operators, insurers, hospitals and educational institutions may all benefit from faster identity verification. But who will decide which private organisation gets access? Will small companies receive the same opportunity as large companies? Will access fees be fair? Could early access give a few powerful firms an unfair advantage? One ID should improve services without creating a new form of market control.
Bangladesh must also decide how the technology will be structured. A single database may appear simple, but it can also create a single point of failure and a very powerful centre of control. A connected or federated model may allow each institution to retain responsibility for its own records while sharing only what is necessary. The country must choose based on its own laws, institutions and risks, not simply copy a foreign model.
International experience can still offer lessons. Estonia shows how government systems can exchange information without placing everything in one database. Singapore’s Singpass shows how one trusted login can make services easier. India’s Aadhaar shows that identity services can reach a very large population, but also reminds us that privacy, exclusion and legal safeguards cannot be treated as secondary issues. Bangladesh should study these examples, but the final design must fit Bangladeshi realities.
The true measure of One ID will not be the number of databases connected or the speed of verification. It will be whether a farmer in a remote upazila, an elderly pensioner, a student, a business owner and a government official can all use it with confidence. One ID should therefore be treated not only as an IT project, but as a national trust infrastructure. Its success will depend on clear legal authority, balanced governance, citizen rights, strong security, inclusion and independent accountability. The most important question is not whether Bangladesh can build One ID. The real question is whether Bangladesh can build a system that citizens trust, institutions respect and the law can properly govern.
The writer is a Digital Transformation and e-Governance Expert, Chief Solutions Officer, Synesis IT PLC
