Aware that the path back to the political landscape is steep, Awami League is attempting an organisational turnaround.
Following its ouster in a mass uprising and a subsequent ban on all activities over allegations of involvement in mass killings, the party faces a harsh political reality. Leaders and activists have recently initiated meetings and processions, while also leveraging various online groups to accelerate organisational activities.
Currently scrambling for political survival, the top leadership is working to rebuild broken ties. While a large portion of the high command initially fled the country, went into hiding, and remained silent, many of these self-exiled leaders have now begun re-establishing communication with grassroots activists and organisers.
Following its collapse in August 2024 amid the student-led July Uprising, Awami League faced severe legal repercussions under the interim administration of Muhammad Yunus.
On 12 May 2025, the government issued a notification temporarily barring the party and its affiliate organisations from all political activities, holding them accountable for genocide, enforced disappearances, and state violence.
The restrictions solidified into a permanent legislative barrier following the passage of the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2026, during the latest parliamentary session, effectively bringing the party’s public political existence to a standstill.
Political analysts observe that the Awami League’s current crisis extends far beyond a typical political slump; it has become a battle for sheer survival. The party faces deep uncertainty, squeezed between rigid state crackdowns, a shifting stance from BNP, and fierce opposition from Jamaat-e-Islami and National Citizen Party (NCP).
Compounding this internal friction, many domestic leaders and grassroots activists harbour deep resentment toward senior figures implicated in past enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.
Speaking to TIMES of Bangladesh, writer and history researcher Mohiuddin Ahmed noted that the party must first fundamentally decide if and how it wants to re-enter the political landscape.
“The top leadership is currently abroad, facing serious charges related to disappearances and murders,” Ahmed said. “The aggressive, unyielding statements they continue to issue from exile are not being well received by their own rank and file inside the country.”
Ahmed emphasised that a genuine organisational revival is still far off. “It remains entirely unclear who will actually lead the Awami League on the ground.
Launching a few online offices or staging isolated programmes does not constitute a political comeback; in most cases, these are just disjointed efforts by confused, scattered activists acting on their own initiative,” he said.
“If the Awami League truly wishes to reintegrate into the mainstream political process, it must first undergo a massive internal reckoning regarding its leadership, accountability, and past governance.”
Strict control after parliament passes law
The legislative noose tightened further last April when parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act. By codifying bans on organisations tied to anti-state activities, violence, genocide, and civil unrest, the amendment has effectively suffocated the party’s remaining political prospects.
In practice, the law has granted the state absolute leverage over the AL’s residual operations, rendering public gatherings, processions, and basic office management virtually impossible under a blanket of aggressive field surveillance.
According to government insiders, the state’s stance is unyielding: any effort to resurrect the outlawed party will be dismantled immediately through a combination of enhanced intelligence operations and strict directives delivered to regional administrators.
Network operates in the shadows across key districts
According to intelligence and political sources, former AL operatives are attempting a quiet comeback in Khulna, Chattogram, Gazipur, Noakhali, Gopalganj, Cumilla, and select Dhaka neighbourhoods.
Former leaders of the party’s student, youth, and volunteer wings — the Chhatra League, Juba League, and Swechchhasebak League — are allegedly coordinating informal committees at the ward, police station, and upazila levels. This network avoids direct contact, relying instead on secure online groups to pass down directives.
Eschewing high-profile public rallies, the party’s current strategy focuses on a slow, grassroots reactivation centred around national days, historical milestones, and community gatherings.
Flash processions, lawsuits, and arrests
The AL’s sudden flash procession at Zero Point in Khulna triggered heavy legal blowback, resulting in a lawsuit against 113 people — 73 named, 40 unidentified.
This follows a separate police case on 30 April against 40 individuals, including five former MPs, for holding a secret meeting in Jessore. Law enforcement has clamped down on similar revival efforts nationwide.
Arrests were made in Chattogram after an affiliate-led procession near Jamiatul Falah mosque, while an attempt to stage a programme via banners at the Noakhali party office was swiftly thwarted.
In Dhaka, police detained several activists in Gulistan and Zero Point for trying to organise lightning processions and play archived speeches of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Notably, Dhaka University Professor AKM Jamal Uddin was arrested under the Anti-Terrorism Act for attempting an unauthorised march from the capital to Tungipara.
BNP changes position on AL issue
While the BNP initially maintained a measured, wait-and-see strategy regarding the AL’s fate, that cautious approach evaporated after parliament codified the ban. The party’s senior command now aggressively opposes the political rehabilitation of AL, viewing a potential comeback as a direct threat to its long-term power objectives.
BNP Vice-Chairman Shamsuzzaman Dudu said the party would block any revival attempt because AL “committed genocide and dismantled the country’s democracy.”
Jamaat and NCP draw a hard line
In the unfolding post-uprising landscape, Jamaat-e-Islami and the newly formed NCP stand as the most rigid barriers to the AL’s resurgence. Operating on a platform of total exclusion for the former regime, both groups are ensuring the political exile of the old leadership remains permanent.
“The party is banned, and its leadership is answering for genocide in court,” noted Jamaat Assistant Secretary General Ahsanul Mahboob Zubair. “They will not be permitted to restart political operations. Any back-channel attempt to normalise the Awami League will be met with fierce public resistance.”
NCP Joint Chief Coordinator Arifur Rahman Tuhin added, “A political entity defined by genocide, enforced disappearances, state-backed repression, and rampant money laundering has forfeited its right to participate in our democracy. Anyone trying to pave a path back for them is inviting a devastating political backlash.”
Disappointment at the grassroots
The defining struggle within the contemporary AL is a crisis of legitimacy, exacerbated by a deep disconnect between its fractured base and displaced elite. Following the 2024 collapse, the party’s top-tier leadership scattered into exile or retreated into hiding, managing a reeling political entity via digital threads and social media channels.
For the grassroots rank-and-file, this remote-control leadership highlights a refusal to face an uncomfortable reality. Internal critics argue that any path toward political rehabilitation is completely blocked as long as the party’s public face remains tied to legacy figures accused of systemic repression, money laundering, and extrajudicial killings.
While this internal friction has given rise to a push for a “reformed” organisational structure led by untainted figures, the exiled high command remains fiercely resistant to change, continuing to centre the party’s identity around Sheikh Hasina.
AL Joint General Secretary AFM Bahauddin Nasim minimised internal calls for change, declaring Hasina’s leadership absolute: “The Awami League will continue under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina. There is no alternative to her.”
He added that the current strategy focuses on low-profile, calculated mobilisation to keep workers safe while gradually ramping up operations, expressing confidence that the state will ultimately concede political space to the party under the banner of democratic inclusivity.
