In the early hours of 21 February, the Central Shaheed Minar is usually a place of quiet solemnity. The first minutes of the day are marked by grief, reverence and remembrance, as political leaders, citizens and institutions line up to honour those who died in the 1952 Language Movement.
This year, however, one particular wreath-laying ceremony carried a deeper political resonance.
Senior leaders of Bangladesh Jamaat‑e‑Islami approached the altar slowly, their presence both symbolically significant and historically fraught. For decades, the party’s political position stood in sharp contrast to the linguistic nationalism embodied by the Shaheed Minar.
Now, after winning 68 seats in the 2026 parliamentary election and emerging as the country’s main opposition force, Jamaat’s leaders arrived at one of the country’s most sacred political sites.
Their presence raised a question that has long shadowed the party: was this an act of genuine homage, or a gesture shaped by political necessity?
When asked directly why he had come, party chief Shafiqur Rahman offered a simple explanation.
“This is a state ceremony, and as leader of the opposition, it is my responsibility,” he said.
The remark suggested that institutional obligation, rather than ideological transformation, may be driving the party’s participation in such commemorations.
Political analysts say this distinction matters. Professor Sabbir Ahmed of Dhaka University’s political science department argues that Jamaat’s historical position on the language movement and Bangladesh’s independence continues to shape public perceptions.
He says the party is attempting to reposition itself within mainstream politics, even as its historical record remains contested and politically charged.
The tensions surrounding Jamaat’s appearance at the Shaheed Minar became evident almost immediately.
As Shafiqur Rahman and his colleagues stood near the monument, a group of young protesters began chanting slogans accusing the party of historical complicity in anti-independence activities.
Jamaat supporters responded with their own chants, including a slogan hailing Ghulam Azam as a “language soldier”.
That counter-slogan, in particular, drew sharp criticism from historians and observers.
Professor Ahmed described the claim as historically unsustainable, noting that while Azam had some level of engagement in political activism during the language movement period, his later role in opposing Bangladesh’s independence fundamentally shaped his legacy.
“Participation in political debates of the time does not equate to being a language martyr or even a recognised language activist,” he said.
Historical records present a complex and often contradictory picture of Jamaat’s relationship with linguistic and national identity.
Founded in 1941 under Abul A’la Maududi, the party’s original ideological framework prioritised pan-Islamic unity over linguistic nationalism. Its early political philosophy rejected territorial nationalism, focusing instead on religious identity.
Research suggests that during the early 1950s, party figures criticised the language movement, portraying it as a threat to Muslim unity. Contemporary writings and later academic studies have documented statements by Jamaat leaders expressing scepticism toward Bengali linguistic nationalism.
Azam himself later publicly described his participation in the language movement as a “mistake”, according to historical reports, reflecting the ideological tensions of that period.
These ideological divisions deepened dramatically in 1971.
During the country’s war of independence, Jamaat leaders and affiliated groups supported Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Paramilitary units linked to Islamist political networks, including Al-Badr and Al-Shams, were accused of involvement in violence, including targeted killings of intellectuals.
Following independence, Jamaat was banned in Bangladesh in 1972, and its leadership faced political isolation for years.
Over the decades, Jamaat gradually re-entered Bangladesh’s political landscape, rebuilding its organisational structure and electoral base.
The party’s recent electoral success has given it unprecedented institutional legitimacy in post-transition Bangladesh.
In 2025, Shafiqur Rahman issued a broad apology for what he described as the party’s “past mistakes”, though critics noted that it did not explicitly acknowledge specific acts linked to the independence war. At the same time, party rhetoric continued to portray Azam as a victim of political persecution, highlighting the ongoing contest over historical interpretation.
Analysts say these dual narratives reflect a strategic balancing act.
On one hand, participation in national rituals such as wreath-laying at the Shaheed Minar signals a willingness to operate within Bangladesh’s established political and symbolic framework.
On the other, elements of the party’s base continue to promote interpretations of history that diverge sharply from mainstream national narratives.
For many observers, Jamaat’s appearance at the Shaheed Minar was less about reconciliation with the past and more about navigating the political realities of the present.
The Shaheed Minar represents not only remembrance, but the ideological foundation of the Bangladeshi state itself — linguistic identity, secular political mobilisation and resistance against cultural domination.
Jamaat’s effort to occupy that symbolic space illustrates its attempt to reposition itself within that national story.
But the chants and counter-chants that followed also underscored a deeper truth: historical memory in Bangladesh remains contested, and political legitimacy is still closely tied to interpretations of the past.
As Jamaat seeks to consolidate its role as a major parliamentary opposition force, its relationship with that past — and how it addresses it — may prove as politically consequential as its performance in the present.
