On August 5, 2024, the political landscape of Bangladesh changed overnight when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned amidst a sweeping anti-discrimination student-led uprising and left the country aboard a military helicopter. Fleeing to India with her sister Sheikh Rehana, her sudden departure not only ended over 15 years of rule but also triggered a constitutional dilemma about governance, legality, and state continuity in the face of extraordinary events.
While her son and advisor, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, publicly claimed that she remained the constitutional Prime Minister, constitutional experts immediately rejected the assertion as ‘completely baseless’. According to them, Hasina’s departure, coupled with the President’s confirmation of her resignation, marked the definitive end of her tenure. What followed was an unprecedented political moment for Bangladesh that fell into a gray zone of legality and demanded urgent administrative action to prevent state collapse.
Governance in the absence of a Prime Minister
Following the Prime Minister’s resignation and her unannounced departure, Bangladesh found itself facing what many feared to be a constitutional vacuum. However, experts argue that while the constitutional framework was stretched, a complete vacuum was avoided due to swift decisions made by the President and coordination among key stakeholders, including the chiefs of the armed forces, student leaders, and representatives of civil society.
From August 5 to August 8, the President of Bangladesh, as the last constitutionally elected authority, assumed de facto administrative control. This temporary stewardship maintained constitutional continuity in the absence of a functioning executive. Then, on August 8, a national consensus led to the formation of an interim government with Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus appointed as Chief Advisor.
This interim setup, though not grounded in explicit constitutional provisions, was formed to stabilize the country and guide it toward elections and systemic reform. Experts describe this as a ‘de facto government’ which was a necessity in post-revolutionary settings to avoid anarchy and re-establish governance.
What the constitution says, and what it doesn’t
The Constitution of Bangladesh, as it stands following several amendments, particularly the controversial 15th Amendment in 2011, does not provide a clear mechanism for forming interim or caretaker governments. This legal void became glaringly evident after the resignation of Sheikh Hasina.
Key constitutional articles provide only limited guidance:
- Article 123(3)(b) stipulates that if Parliament is dissolved prematurely, general elections must be held within 90 days.
- Articles 57(3) and 58(4) state that a Prime Minister who resigns continues to hold office until a successor is appointed.
However, these clauses assume a functioning Parliament and orderly transitional conditions that were absent following the August uprising. In this case, Parliament was dissolved not through resignation or term expiration but by presidential order following a revolutionary upheaval.
Significantly, nowhere in the current Constitution is the formation of an interim or caretaker government described. The once-functional Non-Party Caretaker Government system which was introduced through the 13th Amendment in 1996, was designed to ensure fair elections every five years under a neutral administration. Headed by a retired Chief Justice, this structure successfully oversaw the elections of 1996, 2001, and 2008. However, it was abolished in 2011 by the ruling Awami League through the 15th Amendment, which removed Chapter IIA from the Constitution after the Supreme Court declared the 13th Amendment void.
As a result, there was no legal framework in place for managing transitions of power during a national crisis, which left the country navigating a constitutional no-man’s-land after Hasina’s exit.
The Interim Government: Legal gray zone or constitutional necessity?
The formation of the current interim government, led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, was not supported by any explicit constitutional provision. Recognizing the extraordinary circumstances, the President sought legal clarification from the Supreme Court under Article 106, which allows the President to consult the apex court on matters of law.
On August 8, a full bench of the Appellate Division ruled in favour of forming an interim government “with a Chief Advisor and a few other advisors in the absence of Parliament.” This legal endorsement provided crucial legitimacy to the interim government, easing fears of a complete constitutional breakdown.
Still, the ruling is widely viewed as being made under the ‘doctrine of necessity’, a legal principle that allows extraordinary measures to be taken to preserve the state when regular constitutional paths are unavailable. This doctrine was similarly invoked in 1990, following the resignation of President H M Ershad and the installation of a neutral caretaker government.
However, while the doctrine may justify immediate stabilization efforts, it raises serious concerns about the scope of authority such an unelected interim government should possess. Many experts warn against using the interim setup to carry out sweeping political or constitutional reforms without democratic legitimacy.
Legal reforms and electoral uncertainty
The formation of the interim government was seen by many as a necessary compromise to prevent further chaos, but it does not eliminate the pressing question: how long can such a government last without elections?
Given the ongoing political instability, logistical challenges, and the absence of a functioning Parliament, it is uncertain whether general elections can be held within the 90-day window mandated by Article 123. This has led to increased speculation that the interim government’s tenure may be extended, either through another Supreme Court opinion or an eventual constitutional amendment.
The possibility of the interim government initiating reforms to the electoral system, reintroducing a revised caretaker structure, or even re-drafting parts of the Constitution is being debated both in legal circles and the public sphere. But any major reform effort undertaken by an unelected body risks undermining the very principles of democratic governance and may face future legal challenges unless ratified by a duly elected Parliament.
Conclusion
Bangladesh stands at a critical interval between constitutional limitations and the political realities of revolution. The resignation and departure of Sheikh Hasina, while ending an era, left behind a system unprepared for such a dramatic shift.
The President’s actions, supported by the judiciary, averted immediate collapse. The formation of an interim government under Dr. Muhammad Yunus has brought temporary stability, but fundamental questions remain: Can the country restore constitutional normalcy through elections within the stipulated timeframe? Or will the path forward require a broader reimagining of the state’s legal foundations?
What is clear is that the events of August 5, 2024, have exposed the fragility of Bangladesh’s constitutional framework in moments of national crisis. Whether this moment becomes a turning point for deeper democratic reform or leads to further legal ambiguity depends on what comes next, and whether those now in power can maintain both public trust and legal credibility.